Combat strength of the Red Army 1941 1945 monthly. Penal battalions and barrier detachments of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War. Hierarchy of military formations

ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR, a state military organization that formed the basis of the military power of the USSR.

To the beginning of the Great Patriotic War consisted of the Ground Forces, the Air Force, Navy, Air defense forces of the country's territory, Logistics of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces also included border troops and internal troops. At the beginning of the war, on the territory of the country there were 16 military districts, 1 front (Far Eastern), and there were also 4 fleets (Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, Pacific) and 3 separate military flotillas (Pinsk, Caspian and Amur).

The highest leadership of the country's defense and armed forces was carried out by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He coordinated all activities aimed at strengthening the military potential and increasing the defense capability of the USSR by a special body of the Council of People's Commissars - the USSR Defense Committee.

The direct control of the Armed Forces was carried out by the People's Commissariat of Defense (from May 1940, People's Commissar Marshal of the Soviet Union S.K. Timoshenko) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy (from April 1939, People's Commissar of the Fleet Flagship 2nd Rank, from June 1940, Adm. N.G. Kuznetsov). Under the chairmanship of the People's Commissar of Defense and the People's Commissar of the Navy, the main military councils of the Kyrgyz Republic functioned as collegial bodies. army and navy. General Staff of Kr. The army was headed by Gen. army G.K. Zhukov.

The situation grew rapidly in the late 1930s. the threat of war placed high demands on the organization and training of the USSR Armed Forces, increasing their combat readiness and combat effectiveness. The most important tasks in the construction of the Armed Forces at that time were to increase the number of troops (forces), increase their technical equipment, and establish an optimal ratio of the number of types of Armed Forces.

Based on the conclusions of Sov. military science that the main role in a future war will be assigned to the Ground Forces, the ratio of types of armed forces in terms of the number of personnel as of June 1941 was (in%): Ground Forces - 79.3; Air Force - 11.5; Navy - 5.8; Air defense troops of the country's territory - 3.4. In the Ground Forces, the main emphasis was on development rifle troops, armored forces, artillery. The cavalry underwent significant restructuring, airborne troops, railway, road, engineering, chemical forces, Signal troops. The Air Force focused on the development of fighter and bomber aircraft, and created attack aircraft. The Navy was replenished with new surface ships and submarines.

Particularly noticeable was the increase in the technical equipment of the USSR Armed Forces in 1939 - 1st half. 1941. Compared to 1939, the volume of military production in 1941 increased by 30%. During this period, new types of heavy and medium tanks were put into mass production, new artillery guns and powerful rocket weapons for salvo firing at area targets were developed, new types of fighters, a dive bomber, an attack aircraft, and several types of warships for light naval forces were created.

Scientists and designers ensured high quality and reliability of the owls. military equipment in many respects is the best in the world: La-5 fighters (designer S.A. Lavochkin) and Yak-9 (A.S. Yakovleva), Il-2 attack aircraft (S.V. Ilyushin), Pe-2 bomber ( V.M. Petlyakov), medium tank T-34 (M.I. Koshkin) and heavy KV (Zh.Ya. Kotin), rocket artillery combat vehicle BM-13 “Katyusha” (I.T. Kleymenov and G.E. Langemak) and others. Geologists discovered new deposits of strategic materials (bauxite, manganese, molybdenum). Methods were developed for demagnetizing warships (I.V. Kurchatov, A.P. Aleksandrov), automatic welding of armor (E.O. Platon), and automatic machines for producing cartridges were designed. Great strides have been made in the field of military medicine, which made it possible to subsequently return St. 70% of wounded soldiers.

The organizational structure of the troops has improved significantly. The rifle division included tanks, more powerful divisional artillery, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, which significantly increased their firepower and striking power. The RVGK artillery was further developed. Instead of separate tank and mechanized brigades, the formation of tank and motorized divisions began. In 1941 it was planned to form approx. 20 mechanized corps. In the airborne troops, which consisted of brigades, airborne corps were formed. There has been a transition to a divisional organization in the Air Force.

Simultaneously with the technical re-equipment of the army and navy, their numbers increased. The Law on General Military Duty, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on September 1, 1939, legally completed the transfer of the Red Army and Navy to a personnel system and allowed them to increase their numbers, which by mid-1941 amounted to 4.6 million people. In total, the Ground Forces by this time had 303 divisions (of which about 1/4 were at the stage of formation). However, not all planned organizational and other measures for the armed forces were completed by the beginning of the war. Motorization of the infantry remained insufficient; the rearmament of formations and units with new types of weapons and military equipment. Most of the units transferred to new states were not fully equipped with weapons, military equipment And vehicles. Sov. military science in the pre-war years did not fully take into account the possibility of a sudden invasion by large enemy forces and did not sufficiently develop methods of conducting defense on an operational and strategic scale.

Despite the large scale of training military personnel, the system of military educational institutions could not keep up with the pace of deployment of the armed forces. The consequences have taken their toll political repression in 1937–39 and in subsequent years, to which many owls were unjustifiably subjected. military leaders, commanders and political workers. Most of the reserve command personnel were unable to undergo retraining before the start of the war. The share of command personnel with higher military education in 1940 decreased by more than 2 times compared to 1936. Due to a large reshuffle of personnel in the top and middle levels of management, which was carried out in the midst of rearmament and the transition to new forms of organization, commanders promoted to responsible positions and bosses did not have enough time to acquire the experience necessary to work in new, higher positions.

Major miscalculations were made in determining the timing, direction and strength of the blows. troops. Serious errors occurred in the selection of aviation basing areas and the placement of material and technical supplies, most of which were located near the state. borders. The deployment of armed forces groups did not have a clear plan. The Red Army did not have sufficient experience in conducting modern warfare, organizing the interaction of troops, or effectively using new weapons and military equipment.

After the attack of Germany on June 22, 1941, the USSR began a radical restructuring of the entire military organization of the state. On June 30, 1941, an emergency body was formed - the State Defense Committee (GKO) under the chairmanship of I.V. Stalin, who also became People's Commissar of Defense (July 19, 1941) and Supreme Commander-in-Chief (August 8, 1941). For the strategic leadership of the Armed Forces, the Headquarters of the Main Command was formed on July 10, 1941 (see. Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), the main body of which became the General Staff of the Red Army, intermediate leadership bodies were created - the main commands of the troops of the directions (abolished in May - June 1942). On the basis of the border military districts, 5 fronts were formed (during the war there were 10–15 of them at different periods), which became operational-strategic formations of the Armed Forces. On July 1, 1941, 5.3 million people were drafted into the Armed Forces for mobilization. Active Army from June 1941 to November. 1942 increased from 2.9 million to 6.6 million people. Mobilization made it possible to expand preparations reserves and strengthen the main troop groups.

However, in the initial period of the war, the advanced strategic echelon of the Red Army was defeated, the enemy captured significant territory of the USSR and approached Moscow and Leningrad. By the end of 1941, through extraordinary measures, the self-sacrifice of the people, and the heroism of the army and navy, it was possible to stop the enemy and thwart his “blitzkrieg” plan. The Battle of Moscow 1941–42 dispelled the myth of his invincibility. army. In the summer of 1942, the center of military operations moved to the southern wing Soviet-German front.

In ever-increasing sizes, the army received weapons and military equipment, and above all their main types - artillery, tanks, and airplanes. From Dec. 1941 to Nov. 1942 the number of the most important combat weapons increased: for guns and mortars - from 22 thousand to 77.8 (without anti-aircraft guns), for tanks - from 1954 to 7350, for combat aircraft - from 2238 to 4544 units. The organizational structure of all military branches and special forces continued to be improved. In June 1941, the formation of rocket artillery units began. In September, in the battles near Yelnya, the Soviet Guard was born. In 1941–42, mechanized corps, artillery divisions of the RVGK, engineer armies, regiments, battalions and radio communications divisions, companies of high-explosive flamethrowers, and departments were formed. flamethrower tank battalions and dept. flamethrower-tank brigades of the RVGK, automobile battalions, railway brigades.

By the end of the first period of the war, the striking power of the Ground Forces increased, which was determined by the quantitative and qualitative growth of armored and mechanized forces, artillery and military air defense. In Aug. 1941 The Air Force was reorganized - the number of regiments and divisions and aircraft in the regiments decreased. Regiments for night operations, reserve aviation groups, and, from March 1942, attack aviation groups at the disposal of the Supreme High Command Headquarters were formed. From May 1942, operational aviation associations—air armies—began to be formed at the air force bases of the fronts. From Nov. 1941 began a radical reorganization of air defense. In the Navy, units and formations of fleets were transferred to wartime levels in a short time, and new units were formed. By the end of 1941, 46 new ships of the main classes entered service.

With the beginning of the war, the system of training and education of command personnel and specialists underwent restructuring. Academies and military school cadets graduated early. In 1942, 53 new military schools were opened. The capabilities of the pre-war network of military educational institutions were also increased by increasing their capacity and reducing the duration of training. A large number of front-line and army courses were created for accelerated training of junior officers. In July 1941, the institution of military commissars was introduced (abolished on October 9, 1942). The power of the USSR Armed Forces continued to grow: by the summer of 1942, they included approx. 11 million people, including in the active army - St. 5.5 million people From mid-1942, the defense industry began to increase the output of military products and more fully meet the needs of the front. As a result of the measures taken by the USSR Armed Forces, despite the losses incurred, by mid-November. 1942 were significantly strengthened organizationally, their technical equipment improved, the troops acquired combat experience, and the combat skills of the personnel increased. In fierce battles and battles, the Red Army and Navy inflicted heavy defeats on the enemy near Leningrad, in Moscow and Battle of Stalingrad, in the North Caucasus and seized the strategic initiative in the war.

During the second period of the war (Nov. 1942 – Dec. 1943) organizational events in the army and navy were aimed at ensuring the massive use and effective use of military equipment, a significant increase in the fire and strike power of all types of armed forces and branches of the military. By mid-1943, in the USSR Armed Forces, compared to the end of 1942, the number of weapons increased by 1.3 times, armored vehicles - by 1.4, aircraft - by 2.3 times. The Red Army surpassed him. troops in tanks and artillery almost 2 times, in aircraft 3 times. Total in the active army in December. In 1943 there were 11 fronts, 66 directorates of combined arms armies and 3 tank armies. The massive production of weapons in 1943 made it possible to strengthen divisional artillery and create corps, army and powerful artillery of the RVGK. A significant number of tank and mechanized corps were formed, most of which were later consolidated into tank armies of homogeneous composition. Armored and mechanized troops became the main striking force of the Ground Forces (by the end of 1943 they included 24 tank and 13 mechanized divisions, about 50% were part of 5 tank armies).

The increasing role of aviation during the war, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the aircraft fleet determined the need for new, significant organizational changes in the Air Force. The composition of air divisions, corps and air armies has increased. The country's Air Defense Forces have strengthened organizationally and grown in numbers. The Navy continued to create naval defensive areas, the number of marines increased, and new naval formations were formed. The problem of creating strategic reserves was successfully resolved. Thus, during the winter campaign of 1942/43, the Headquarters transferred to the fronts from its reserve 4 tank armies, 29 tank and mechanized corps, 108 rifle, 23 artillery, 26 anti-aircraft artillery, 19 aviation divisions, 16 engineering brigades and other formations and units, and in the summer and autumn of 1943 there were 2 times more combined arms formations, and 3 times more tank and aviation formations than in winter.

In 1943, a qualitatively new stage in the construction of the USSR Armed Forces was completed: significant changes took place in their military-technical equipment and organizational structure, in the development art of war, the personnel have accumulated a wealth of experience in combat operations. This was reflected in the newly published statutory documents: the Combat Manual of the Infantry (1942), the draft Field Manual of the Red Army and a number of regulations of the military branches. At the beginning of 1943, new insignia were introduced - shoulder straps. In order to increase the authority of command personnel and their responsibility, in July 1943 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established new order assignment of military ranks. All command and management personnel in the rank of ml. Lieutenant up to and including colonel began to be called officers. The growth of combat power and the strengthening of the morale of the troops allowed the USSR Armed Forces to win victories in Battle of Kursk, Battle of the Dnieper 1943, successfully carry out a number of other operations. From Nov. 1942 to Dec. 1943 The Red Army fought from 500 to 1300 km and liberated it. invaders a significant part of the occupied Soviet Union. territories. And by the end of 1944, the territory of the USSR was completely cleared of the enemy.

In the third period of the war (Jan. 1944 - May 1945), the Red Army continued to be equipped with weapons and military equipment. Compared to the first period of the war, the number of fronts on the fronts increased: tanks and self-propelled guns - by 4-6 times, guns and mortars - by 4-5, aircraft - by 4-8 times. By the beginning of 1945, there were 9.4 million people and 144.2 thousand troops in the active army, in the Reserve Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, on the southern and Far Eastern borders. and mortars, 15.7 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 22.6 thousand combat aircraft. Compared to June 1944, the number of armed forces increased by more than 300 thousand people, the number of tanks and self-propelled guns - by 3.9 thousand, guns and mortars - by 11 thousand, combat aircraft - by 820. Most of the USSR Armed Forces were concentrated in Soviet-German front, where they outnumbered the enemy in guns and mortars by almost 4 times, in tanks and self-propelled guns by 3 times, and in combat aircraft by 8 times. The dominant position was still occupied by the Ground Forces. In terms of personnel, by the end of the war they accounted for 80%, the Air Force - St. 8%. The share of air defense troops increased from 3.3% in December. 1941 to 5% in May 1945, and the Navy fell from 5.8% in 1941 to 3.6% in June 1943, and then increased to 5.3% in May 1945.

In 1945, the USSR Armed Forces together with the allied armies of the countries anti-Hitler coalition liberated Europe from occupation and finally defeated Germany and its allies.

The final act of World War II for the Sov. Union became the Soviet-Japanese war of 1945 Far East, in which the USSR Armed Forces quickly defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army.

During the Great Patriotic War, the USSR Armed Forces covered themselves with unfading glory. For the military feats of St. 7 million owls soldiers were awarded orders and medals, approx. 11.6 thousand were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Union. Mass heroism was characteristic not only of individual soldiers, but also of entire units, formations and associations. For distinction in battles for the Fatherland with him. The invaders awarded regiments and divisions 10.9 thousand military orders. Many of them were awarded orders several times. Moscow saluted the valiant owls 354 times. troops and navy. Hundreds of military formations and units were awarded honorary titles.

The defeat of the most powerful and dangerous armed forces for the world community fascist Germany and militaristic Japan was a severe test for the Armed Forces and peoples of the USSR, and they passed this test with honor. The Soviet Armed Forces expelled the enemy from the USSR and defended the independence and territorial integrity of the country. The fascist bloc suffered a complete and crushing defeat, Germany unconditionally capitulated. The USSR Armed Forces played a decisive role in ridding the peoples of Europe and Asia from the threat of the Nazis. enslavement brought them freedom and peace. The entry of the USSR into the war in the Far East accelerated the defeat of militaristic Japan.

Research Institute (Military History) VAGS of the RF Armed Forces

A comprehensive analysis of the experience of the combat use of tank troops in the operations of 1942, taking into account changes in the nature and methods of conducting combat operations by our troops, in the organization and methods of conducting combat operations by the Nazi army, as well as the increasing role of tank troops in subsequent operations allowed the party and government continue to pay special attention to the organizational development of this type of troops. A further increase in the combat capabilities of tank forces and their share in our army was facilitated by a qualitative improvement in armored vehicles and an increase in their production by defense industry factories.

In January 1943, due to the need to strengthen the troops advancing in the central and southwestern directions, the 1st and 2nd tank armies were formed. They included tank and mechanized corps, three or two rifle divisions, and were in fact the same armies that were formed in 1942. The 3rd Tank Army, which led fighting in the Kharkov direction. Subsequently, as these armies were withdrawn to the reserve of the Supreme Command Headquarters, they were all transferred to a new organization.

Before the Great Patriotic War, our army did not have self-propelled artillery. However, combat reality showed that in maneuverable forms of combat and operations, mechanically driven artillery lagged behind, especially behind tank formations, and when solving combat missions in the operational depths of the enemy, they were often left without fire support. At the same time, there was a need to have guns to accompany infantry and tanks when breaking through the prepared enemy defenses. These problems were solved by the release of self-propelled artillery units, which had more powerful weapons than tanks, reliable armor protection and high maneuverability.

Due to the emergence new technology at the beginning of 1943, the first self-propelled artillery regiments were formed, which were subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. The regiments were not the same both in organization and in terms of equipment. The use of these units in combat and operations yielded positive results. At the same time, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to have them subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Army. This was due to the fact that they were created on the basis of tanks, and there were no training units in the artillery to train crews. Along with this, the problem of maintaining and repairing vehicles arose, since the artillery department did not have the necessary repair units and units capable of restoring new material. In addition, self-propelled guns, being a means of qualitatively enhancing the fire of tanks, carried out their tasks in close cooperation with them not only when breaking through the enemy’s defenses, but also when developing an offensive in its operational depth. Therefore, it was required that self-propelled artillery units be organizationally part of the tank forces. Therefore, at the end of April 1943, all self-propelled artillery regiments available at that time were transferred to tank forces.

In May 1943, self-propelled artillery regiments were transferred to new states in order to have the same type of vehicles in the regiments. In this regard, three types of regiments were created: light, self-propelled artillery regiments SU-76, self-propelled artillery regiments SU-122. In addition, the previously created heavy self-propelled artillery regiments SU-152 remained. All regiments had command and control platoons, ammunition supply platoons, a repair platoon, a transport platoon, a regimental medical center and a utility department. At the end of 1943, all regiments were transferred to a four-battery structure. The number of vehicles in the shelves remained the same. This event made it possible to strengthen the firepower of the battery as the main combat unit.

The last reorganization of self-propelled artillery regiments was carried out in February 1944. The need for it was determined by the experience of combat use of self-propelled gun regiments and the arrival of new brands of heavy vehicles ISU-152, ISU-122. After this restructuring, three types also remained - heavy, medium and light self-propelled artillery regiments. However, each regiment already had 21 vehicles, and companies of machine gunners and technical support were included in it.

In May 1944, the staff of a separate self-propelled artillery division was approved, consisting of three batteries (12 SU-76 units in total). In June, these divisions began manning several guards rifle divisions, which to a certain extent contributed to the increase in their combat capabilities.

The experience of offensive operations carried out in 1943 showed that it is necessary for commanders of combined arms and tank armies to have powerful maneuverable means to combat enemy tank groups during operations. This served as the basis for the formation of self-propelled artillery brigades in February 1944.

In December 1944, guards heavy self-propelled artillery brigades were created on the basis of several tank brigades. These compounds had a slightly different organization. The new formations consisted of three regiments, support and service units.

The brigade had 1,804 people, 65 heavy self-propelled guns ISU-152 and three SU-76. At the same time, self-propelled artillery brigades were being formed in the same states, which had 1,492 people, 65 SU-100 self-propelled guns and three SU-76. Both brigades were intended to strengthen the combined arms and tank armies that carried out operations in the directions of the main attacks, and were the means of the RGK.

These were the organizational forms of self-propelled artillery of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War.

In the years under review, the tank brigade did not undergo fundamental organizational changes. Taking into account the combat experience of using brigades, some organizational measures were taken. Thus, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the motorized rifle and machine gun battalion, in January 1943, a company of anti-tank rifles was included in the brigade staff, and in March 1943, an anti-aircraft machine gun company was introduced.

More significant changes occurred at the end of 1943. War practice showed that a tank brigade, either separate or part of a tank or mechanized corps, should have a significantly greater striking force, which it needs both when breaking through enemy defenses and when developing offensive However, the presence in the brigade of two tank battalions, equipped with medium and light tanks, to some extent made it difficult to determine the most optimal option for constructing a battle formation in accordance with combat conditions and complicated the management of units. In this regard, in November 1943, a new staff of the tank brigade No. 010/500-010/506 was accepted.

An analysis of the organization of a tank brigade shows that the presence of only T-34 medium tanks in its composition significantly increased its striking force, firepower and mobility. Overall, the brigade's combat capabilities have increased significantly.

In connection with the adoption of the T-34-85 tank, whose crew consisted of five people, a company of anti-tank rifles of a motorized battalion of machine gunners in April 1944 was turned to complement the crews of new tanks.

Tank brigades were gradually transferred to this state. First of all, brigades that were part of tank and mechanized corps were transferred to this organization. Subsequently, until the end of the war, the organization of the tank brigade remained virtually unchanged.

In the period 1943 - 1945, taking into account the experience of fighting in the mechanized brigade, some organizational changes took place. In January 1943, in order to strengthen the brigade's striking force, another company of medium tanks was added to the tank regiment. The total number of tanks in the regiment remained 39. However, there were 32 medium tanks, instead of the previously available 23, and light tanks decreased by 9 vehicles.

In February of the same year, due to its bulkiness and low mobility, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the brigade, and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company was introduced in its place. At the same time, an engineering mine company was activated, and all vehicles intended for transporting personnel of motorized rifle battalions were consolidated into a brigade auto company.

Further changes in the organization of the mechanized brigade occurred mainly in connection with the improvement of the organizations of its tank regiment. So in February 1944, the tank regiment was transferred to a new staff, in which there were three tank companies, equipped only with medium tanks. As a result of this restructuring, the regiment received 35 T-34 tanks, and light tanks were excluded from the regiment's staff. After this, no changes occurred in the brigade until the end of the war.

As a result of the increase in industrial production of tanks, self-propelled artillery units and other military equipment in the last two years of the war, a number of changes occurred in the organization of tank corps.

In order to strengthen the firepower of the corps in January 1943, the RGK mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars) and the RGK self-propelled artillery regiment (25 self-propelled guns) were added to its staff. Somewhat later, a reserve of tanks (40 vehicles) with crews and 100 drivers was introduced into some corps. At the same time, the capabilities of the fuel and lubricants delivery company were increased.

In the following months, significant changes took place in the staff of the tank corps, as a result of which its combat capabilities were increased. So, in February, instead of engineering and mine companies, a sapper battalion is activated, and in March - an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. In order to increase the corps' capabilities to combat enemy tanks and assault guns, in April a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) and a fighter-anti-tank division (12 85-mm anti-aircraft guns) were added to the corps' staff. Significant changes in the tank corps took place in the second half of 1943. The experience of offensive operations showed that the anti-tank artillery available in the corps, as a rule, lagged behind the first echelon brigades and when encountering enemy tank groups, tanks were forced to fight them. This negatively affected the pace of the offensive, and often the corps suffered significant losses, losing to a certain extent their combat effectiveness.

Therefore, the anti-tank artillery regiment and the anti-tank artillery division were replaced in August 1943 by two self-propelled artillery regiments (SU-76 and SU-152). In October 1943, in individual tank corps, and in November 1943 in all others, instead of an armored car battalion, a separate motorcycle battalion was introduced (staff number 010/432), which included two motorcycle companies, a tank company, a company of armored personnel carriers and an anti-tank artillery battalion. battery. In this regard, the corps' reconnaissance capabilities have increased significantly. At the same time, workshops for the repair of weapons, equipment and clothing were introduced into the rear of the corps, and a corps exchange office (COP) was included in the corps of the tank armies. Due to the inclusion of the third tank battalion in tank brigades and the replacement of light tanks with medium tanks, the combat capabilities of the corps as a whole increased.

In 1944, the organization of the tank corps was improved mainly in the direction of strengthening its firepower, maneuverability and increasing operational-tactical independence. In connection with the transfer of self-propelled artillery regiments to a single staff in February, the number of self-propelled guns in the corps increased by 14 vehicles. In May, a medical battalion was included in all corps.

In order to increase the fire capabilities of the corps' artillery, in August a light artillery regiment (lap), which had 24 76-mm cannons, was introduced into its composition.

At the end of the year, a significant reorganization of repair units and divisions was carried out. The need for this reorganization was due to a number of reasons. The two field repair brigades (FRT) in the corps carried out repairs of both armored and tractor-tank vehicles. Because of this, the principle of specialization of repairs was not observed, which negatively affected its quality, and the machines themselves were idle for a lot of time for repairs. Therefore, in November 1944, two repair bases were created in the corps: a mobile tank repair base (PTRB) and a mobile vehicle repair base (PARB). The first was intended only for the repair of tanks and self-propelled artillery units, and the second only for the repair of wheeled vehicles and tractors.

Thus, during the war years, significant changes occurred in the organization of the tank corps, which are shown in the table.

Changes in the organizational structure of the Red Army tank corps during the Great Patriotic War

Analysis of the table data shows that the organization of the tank corps was improved in the direction of increasing fire and striking power, increasing mobility, maneuverability and independence of the corps during combat operations.

During the war years, the number of personnel more than doubled, the number of tanks and self-propelled guns increased 2.7 times, the number of artillery and mortars almost doubled, and the number of vehicles almost tripled.

The organization of the mechanized corps was also improved taking into account the experience of its combat use and in connection with the entry into the troops of new, more advanced military equipment and weapons.

In January 1943, due to its bulkiness and low mobility, the anti-aircraft artillery division was excluded from the mechanized brigade, and the army air defense regiment was excluded from the corps. At the same time, to strengthen the firepower of the mechanized corps, a mortar regiment (36 120-mm mortars), a mixed self-propelled artillery regiment (8 SU-122, 17 SU-76 installations), as well as a tank reserve (40 tanks and 147 members) are introduced into its composition. crews) and 100 drivers. In February, instead of an engineering mine company, an engineer battalion was included in the corps, and in March the control company was reorganized into a communications battalion. At the same time, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment was added to the corps staff, which had 16 37-mm cannons and 16 DShK machine guns.

In the following months, significant changes occurred in the corps staff. By order of the NKO, a fighter-anti-tank artillery regiment (20 45-mm guns) was introduced in April. At the same time, the corps included an aviation communications unit - 3 aircraft. In addition, in order to increase the combat capabilities of the corps to combat enemy tanks and assault guns, in May a fighter-anti-tank artillery division (12 85-mm guns) was added to the corps. To ensure anti-chemical protection of parts and connections of the corps, a chemical protection company was introduced into its staff.

Significant changes in the organization of the mechanized corps took place in August 1943. Instead of the anti-tank artillery regiment, the SU-76 self-propelled artillery regiment (21 units) was introduced into the corps staff, and instead of the anti-tank fighter division, the SU-85 regiment (16 units and one T-34 tank).

At the same time, armored car battalions were excluded from the mechanized corps that were part of the tank armies, and separate motorcycle battalions were introduced instead.

During 1944 - 1945 There have been some changes in the organization of the corps. In connection with the transfer of self-propelled artillery regiments to unified states in February 1944, the number of self-propelled artillery units increased by 14 vehicles. In addition, the tank regiment of the mechanized brigade was transferred to a new staff. As a result, the regiment received 35 medium tanks (three tank companies), and light tanks were completely excluded.

In order to improve the organization and implementation of logistics, a corps exchange office was introduced into the corps rear staff in September. In November of the same year, a mobile tank repair base and a mobile automobile repair base were included in the corps.

Thus, the mechanized corps, unlike the tank corps, underwent slightly fewer organizational changes. This is explained by the fact that these formations were created taking into account the experience of forming tank corps and in their initial organization had divisions and units of military branches, as well as rear units and institutions.

The dynamics of changes in the organization and strength of the mechanized corps are shown in the table.

Changes in the organizational structure of the mechanized corps of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War

The organization of the mechanized corps was improved in the same main areas as the tank corps. At the same time, a successful organizational combination of motorized infantry, tanks and artillery ensured that the corps conducted successful combat operations in various conditions and terrain.

Conclusions drawn from the experience of using tank armies in the operations of 1942 formed the basis for the subsequent reorganization of these formations.

At the end of January 1943, a special meeting of the State Defense Committee was held, dedicated to the development of regulations on the formation of tank armies. Previously, the opinions of some prominent military leaders were heard on this issue. Everyone agreed that it was necessary, first of all, to remove non-motorized rifle divisions from the tank armies and to organizationally allocate the tank core of the new formations. It was believed that such an approach to determining the combat strength of tank armies would provide them with high mobility and greater striking force, and therefore the conditions for control and logistics would significantly improve.

The composition of each army was different and was established by a separate formation directive, but its typical structure was established by GKO Resolution No. 2791. It was indicated that tank armies should, as a rule, consist of two tank, one mechanized corps, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a guards mortar, howitzer artillery, anti-tank fighter and motorcycle regiments. As support units it was planned to have a communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (Po-2 aircraft), an engineering battalion, an automobile regiment and two repair and restoration battalions. The rear units and institutions included divisions and service units of the field administration of the army, food, baggage, medical and chemical institutions, artillery supply bodies, fuel and lubricants supplies, as well as units for the collection, reception and evacuation of captured property. However, it should be noted that the composition of tank armies was determined by directives (orders) for their formation. Therefore, their combat composition was not the same (Table 7).

As can be seen from the table, the tank armies of the new composition, unlike previous tank formations, were supposed to have, in addition to artillery and mortar formations and units, support and service units, tank and mechanized corps, which formed the core of the army and had approximately the same combat capabilities and mobility. This gave the new tank formations high mobility and greater striking power, as a result of which real opportunities were created to deliver deep strikes on the enemy and conduct combat operations at a faster pace than before. The new tank armies were a powerful means of the Supreme Command Headquarters, which reinforced with them the fronts that delivered the main attacks.

At the same time, depending on the role of tank armies in operations and the conditions for their conduct, the combat and numerical composition of tank formations was unequal.

Table 8 shows that out of 64 offensive operations carried out by tank armies of a homogeneous composition, in 32 cases they operated in a two-corps composition. Only one tank army (3rd Guards) had three corps throughout the war.

War experience showed that when tank armies had two corps, their ability to carry out wide maneuver in the enemy's depths was limited. In addition, the army's operational formation was shallow, as there was no strong second echelon. With the decrease in the width of the front of the strategic offensive of our troops, the reduction in the number of important operational directions, and also due to the need to defeat strong enemy groups in a short time, the tank armies had three corps by the end of the war. This is confirmed by the experience of the Berlin and Manchurian operations.

In general, the experience of the combat use of tank armies, especially in offensive operations of the last war, showed the advisability of having at least three corps in such formations, including one of them should be mechanized, as was the case in the 3rd Guards Tank Army.

With this composition, as the war has shown, a tank army is capable of successfully performing all combat missions, such as breaking through hastily occupied enemy lines, crossing water barriers, conducting combat operations in mountainous, forested, wooded and swampy areas, and capturing large populated areas. Assessing the tank army's reconnaissance capabilities, it should be noted that at first they were insufficient. Therefore, starting from mid-1944, separate motorcycle regiments (omtsp) were introduced into almost all tank formations. This made it possible, taking into account the capabilities of the corps and brigades, to ensure simultaneous reconnaissance by the army throughout its entire offensive zone and on the flanks.

Until mid-1944, the artillery capabilities of the tank army were also insufficient. This in a number of cases had a negative impact on its combat operations, and especially in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, when the army had to independently break through the lines of enemy defense or fight against strong counterattack groups. Therefore, at the beginning of 1944, it was decided to introduce self-propelled artillery and light artillery brigades into the tank armies. By the end of September 1944, all six tank armies already had these brigades. However, to successfully carry out operations, tank armies were reinforced with artillery and anti-tank artillery brigades and regiments.

Directly as part of the tank armies, as the experience of combat operations showed, there were not enough anti-aircraft artillery weapons. Therefore, in the vast majority of operations, each tank army was reinforced, as a rule, by one anti-aircraft artillery division.

During offensive operations, all tank armies experienced a lack of engineering forces and equipment. The presence in the army of 1 - 2 engineer battalions did not allow the necessary engineering activities to be carried out on an army scale. In this regard, in the spring and summer of 1944, a number of organizational measures were carried out. In the tank armies in July - August 1944, motorized engineering brigades (mibr) were formed, which included two motorized engineering battalions (mib), one pontoon-bridge battalion (pomb). As a result, the capabilities of the army's engineering troops have increased significantly. However, since the tank armies did not have the required number of pontoon-bridges and airborne transport means, this to a certain extent made it difficult for the tank armies to cross water barriers.

The signal troops were not equally represented in both quantitative and qualitative terms. All tank armies had a separate communications regiment, an aviation communications regiment (with the exception of the 2nd Guards TA) and other communications units. In general, the tank armies were fairly well equipped with radios, mobile and wired communications. However, when conducting combat operations in mountainous and forested areas (the Transylvanian Alps, areas southwest and west of Vienna, the Greater Khingan mountain range), there was a need to reinforce tank armies with more powerful radio stations.

Analyzing the capabilities of tank armies in terms of material and technical support troops, it should be noted that the presence of motor transport units and subunits generally ensured the delivery and evacuation of material resources and property. However, the insufficient staffing of units and subunits with motor vehicles in a number of operations had a negative impact on material support, especially on the supply of fuel and lubricants. During this period, the organizational structure was improved and the capabilities of repair and evacuation units and subunits that were part of the tank armies increased. At the end of 1944, specialized repair battalions were created in them for the repair of tracked armored vehicles (1 - 2 oatrb) and automotive vehicles (1 - 2 oarb). Taking into account military repair units in tank armies, 85% of all medium repairs were carried out during the war.

Thus, the organizational structure of tank armies in 1943 - 1945. continuously improved. The organizational measures taken were aimed at increasing the firepower, striking force, mobility and maneuverability of tank armies, which was determined by the requirements of warfare.

At the end of the war, the three-corps tank army, as a rule, had over 50 thousand people, 850 - 920 tanks and self-propelled guns, about 800 guns and mortars, and more than 5 thousand vehicles. However, in the vast majority of offensive operations, tank armies did not have a full complement of people, weapons and military equipment.

In the years under review, the tank forces included separate tank battalions, regiments, heavy tank regiments and brigades, as well as special tank units and formations of the RVGK.

In February 1944, the existing heavy breakthrough tank regiments were transferred to new states. At the same time, several such regiments were re-formed. The new regiments had 375 people, four IS-2 tank companies (21 tanks), a company of machine gunners, an engineer platoon, a utility platoon and a regimental medical center (RPM). When these regiments were created, they were given the honorary name “Guards”.

Individual tank regiments were also reorganized. The essence of this reorganization, carried out at the beginning of 1944, was to exclude light tanks from them and strengthen the support and service units. In total, the regiment was supposed to have 386 people and 35 T-34 tanks.

In December 1944, the formation of separate Guards heavy tank brigades began. The creation of these formations was necessitated by the need to concentrate heavy tanks in the directions of the main attacks of fronts and armies in order to break through, in cooperation with infantry and artillery, heavily fortified defensive lines and fortified areas in order to ensure the introduction of development echelons into the breakthrough, as well as to combat enemy tank groups during operations . Organizationally, the brigade consisted of three heavy breakthrough tank regiments, a motorized battalion of machine gunners, and support and service units. In total, the brigade consisted of 1,666 people, 65 IS-2 heavy tanks, three SU-76 self-propelled artillery mounts, 19 armored personnel carriers and three armored vehicles.

In addition to the units and formations considered, the tank forces had tank regiments and special-purpose brigades.

In connection with the development of enemy defense, in which mine-explosive barriers, including anti-tank ones, were widely used, the need arose to make passages in minefields during the attack. To accomplish this task, a mine-resistant tank trawl was developed and put into service. All this necessitated the creation of special tank units. Therefore, in mid-1943, an engineering tank regiment was formed. It had two T-34 tank companies and support units. The regiment had 22 medium tanks, 18 trawls and means of transporting them.

These are, in general, the main directions along which the organizational development of tank forces was carried out during the Great Patriotic War. Large quantity The changes that took place in the organization of units and formations were explained mainly by changes in the methods of conducting combat operations during the war years and were aimed at achieving constant correspondence between the forms of organization of tank forces and the methods of warfare and operations.

This chapter reveals the organization of parts and connections. However, this does not mean that the regiments, brigades and corps were all the same in strength. In reality, especially in the tank and mechanized corps, there were significant discrepancies with their main staff. This was explained by various reasons and, mainly, by the country’s economic capabilities for the production of weapons and military equipment.

* * *

An analysis of the organizational structure of the tank forces of our army during the years of the last war allows us to conclude that this type of troops was repeatedly and radically reorganized. Characteristic feature This process was that the tank forces organizationally consisted of separate tank units and formations intended for joint actions with infantry, but not organizationally included in the staff of rifle formations. In addition, large tank (mechanized) formations and tank associations were created as part of the tank forces, the main purpose of which was: in the offensive - developing tactical success into operational success, in defense - delivering powerful counterattacks against an intruded enemy.

At all stages of the organizational development of tank forces, a number of main trends were clearly visible: a constant increase in the firepower and striking force of units, formations and associations; giving, especially to corps and armies, the necessary autonomy when conducting combat operations in isolation from rifle formations; constant desire to ensure all organizational forms of high flexibility and mobility; providing units, formations and formations with the capabilities to successfully conduct combat and operations in various terrain conditions; creation of an easily manageable organization of regiments, brigades, corps and armies.

In general, it should be noted that during the war, the organizational structure of the tank forces was in full accordance with the methods of conducting combat operations and significantly contributed to the achievement of high combat effectiveness of this type of troops.

In this paragraph we will consider key points related to the participation of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War and its condition after the end of the war.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact concluded in 1939 was violated on June 22, 1941, when the USSR was attacked by German troops.

By the day of the surprise attack by German forces, the number of field troops of the Red Army was 303 divisions and 22 brigades, which amounted to 4.8 million people. 9 brigades and 166 divisions, with a total number of 2.9 million people, were located on the western borders of the USSR. The Axis powers concentrated 18 brigades and 181 divisions, numbering 3.5 million men, on the Eastern Front. The first months of the invasion cost the Red Army the loss of hundreds of thousands of people in encirclement pockets, the loss of various weapons, combat aircraft, tanks and artillery. The Soviet leadership urgently announced general mobilization. As a result, by August 1, 1941, the Red Army included 401 divisions, despite the loss of 46 divisions in battle. Large losses are explained by low readiness for a surprise attack, poor coordination of leadership, and a focus on launching an instant counterattack in a situation when a systematic retreat and regrouping of forces could bring tangible military benefits.

The first significant success of the Soviet army was the counteroffensive near Moscow, which took place on December 5, 1941. As a result of this counteroffensive, German troops were driven back from the capital. But the subsequent attempt of the Red Army to launch a general, massive offensive ended in disaster.

The Soviet government resorted to a number of emergency measures in order to stop the retreating Red Army. One of the most effective means was to shoot soldiers trying to escape from the battlefield. This measure was sanctioned by Stalin’s order, which received the unofficial name “Not a Step Back.”

In the conditions of a fast-paced, mobile war, political commissars, positioned as party envoys assigned to monitor the commanders, lost their power. They were renamed political deputies, and became subordinates of the units to which they were assigned. A landmark step designed to strengthen the army by turning to military tradition Russian state, was the restoration of pre-revolutionary insignia and military ranks, albeit with minor changes.

On November 19, 1942, during Operation Uranus, German-Romanian troops were encircled in Stalingrad, which was preceded by powerful artillery preparation. Enemy troops surrendered on February 2, 1943. Then, in the summer of 1943, during Operation Citadel, German troops attempted to destroy the Kursk ledge, but the advance of the Wehrmacht forces was stopped by the Red Army, which in the fall of 1943 launched a massive counteroffensive. The advancing Red Army reached the state border of the USSR in the summer of 1944. During the 1944 offensive, the Red Army moved to liberate the countries of Eastern Europe from the German occupiers. Soviet troops fought in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, occupied Bulgaria, and occupied East Germany.

The victorious march of the Red Army also had a long-term foreign policy perspective. The liberation of a number of Eastern European countries laid the foundation for the subsequent formation of the “socialist camp” in Europe. Although it should be noted, for example, that the communists in Yugoslavia came to power thanks to the partisan People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, which was de facto independent of Moscow. Soviet troops did not conduct military operations on the territory of Albania.

Germany's military and socio-economic situation deteriorated further after the Allies opened a second front in Europe in 1944. On April 16, 1945, Soviet troops launched the Berlin operation, which ended with the surrender of German troops on the night of May 8-9, 1945.

During the Great Patriotic War, 29,574,900 people were drafted into the Red Army. This does not count the 4,826,907 who were under arms at the very beginning of the war. According to data released during Stalin's reign, the losses amounted to 6,329,600 people killed, 555,400 dead from disease, 4,559,000 missing (most of them prisoners). Moreover, of these 11,444,100 people, 939,700 joined the army in the liberated territories, and 1,836,000 people returned from German captivity.

Initially, at the first stage of the war, the Red Army had at its disposal weapons and military equipment of varying quality. The advantage was that the Soviet army had excellent artillery, but the disadvantage was felt in the field of automotive technology. As a result, the Wehrmacht was able to capture most of it. Soviet T-34 tanks were the best until 1943, but very often experienced supply problems.

Air Force Soviet Union initially they were much inferior to the Luftwaffe, moreover, a significant part of them was destroyed in the first days and months of the war (many aircraft were lost on the first day, since airfields became the main target of the German attack - as a result, the majority of the aircraft were destroyed before they even had time to take off). The rearmament process was significantly complicated by the fact that a significant part of the military industry of the Soviet Union ended up in occupied territory.

A special feature of the Red Army during the war was the BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers, which gained wide popularity among the troops.

An important step by the Soviet leadership, which made it possible to further stabilize the process of reproduction of military equipment and constantly accelerate its pace, was the evacuation of industry to the east of the USSR. The military production that developed there made it possible to provide the Soviet army with the necessary weapons. Soviet superiority over Germany in the last stages of the war is estimated, for example, in 10,200 Soviet military aircraft against 3,100 Luftwaffe aircraft on the Eastern Front (1944), 6 million 354 thousand soldiers and officers of the Red Army against 4 million 906 thousand soldiers and officers Wehrmacht, SS troops, and troops allied with Germany, 95,604 artillery pieces of the Red Army against 54,570 German guns, 5,254 tanks and self-propelled guns of the Red Army against 5,400 tanks and assault guns of the enemy.

The question of the role of Lend-Lease (American military supplies) in the Red Army achieving superiority over Germany remains controversial in historiography to this day. Proponents of the first point of view focus on the fact that such deliveries amounted to only a minority of the country’s own military production volume, namely no more than a quarter of the total amount of weapons and supplies. Supporters of a different point of view point out that supplies were concentrated on the most important things, such as automotive equipment and high-quality fuel for combat aircraft.

At the end of World War II, the Soviet army was the most powerful army in the world. It had more tanks and artillery than all other countries combined, and a larger number of soldiers. In subsequent years, the Red Army began to play the role of guarantor of the socialist camp being established in Eastern Europe. The technical improvement of combat weapons in service with the USSR continued.

In this paragraph, we analyzed the main stages of the Red Army’s conduct of hostilities during the Great Patriotic War and identified ideological, mobilization, technical and production factors that contributed to success in the war.

In periodicals and published literature, there are a number of myths and legends about penal units of the Red Army: “penal units turned into a kind of military prison”; for them in Soviet Army reconnaissance in force was “invented”; With their bodies, the penalty soldiers cleared minefields; penal battalions were “thrown into attacks on the most inaccessible areas of the German defense”; Penalties were “cannon fodder,” their “lives were used to achieve victory during the most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War”; criminals were not sent to penal formations; the penal battalions did not have to be supplied with ammunition and provisions; Behind the penal battalions there were blocking detachments of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) with machine guns and others.

The published material reveals on a documentary basis the process of creation and combat use of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments. They were first created in the Red Army in the years Civil War. The experience of their creation was used during the Great Patriotic War. The formation of penal battalions and companies and barrage detachments began with Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense (NKO) of the USSR I.V. Stalin dated July 28, 1942. What caused the appearance of this document, dubbed the order “Not a step back!”?

Formation of penal battalions and companies

During the successful counter-offensive of the Red Army near Moscow and its general offensive that then unfolded, the enemy was thrown back 150-400 km to the west, the threat to Moscow and the North Caucasus was eliminated, the situation in Leningrad was eased, and the territories of 10 regions of the Soviet Union were liberated in whole or in part. The Wehrmacht, having suffered a major defeat, was forced to switch to strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front. However, many operations of the Red Army remained unfinished due to the Supreme High Command's overestimation of the capabilities of its troops and underestimation of the enemy's forces, dispersal of reserves, and inability to create decisive superiority in the most important sectors of the front. The enemy took advantage of this, and in the summer-autumn campaign of 1942 he again seized the initiative.

Miscalculations made by the Supreme Command Headquarters and the command of a number of fronts in assessing the situation led to new defeats of Soviet troops in the Crimea, near Kharkov, southeast of Leningrad and allowed the enemy to launch a major offensive on the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. The enemy advanced to a depth of 500-650 km, broke through to the Volga and the Main Caucasus Range, and cut communications connecting the central regions with the south of the country.

During the summer-autumn campaign of 1942, the losses of the Soviet Armed Forces amounted to: irrevocable - 2064.1 thousand people, sanitary - 2258.5 thousand; tanks - 10.3 thousand units, guns and mortars - about 40 thousand, aircraft - more than 7 thousand units. But, despite the heavy defeats, the Red Army withstood a powerful blow and, in the end, stopped the enemy.

I.V. Stalin, taking into account the current situation, on July 28, 1942, as People's Commissar of Defense, signed order No. 227. The order stated:

“The enemy is throwing ever new forces at the front and, regardless of the great losses for him, climbs forward, rushes into the depths of the Soviet Union, captures new areas, devastates and ruins our cities and villages, rapes, robs and kills the Soviet population. Fighting is taking place in the Voronezh region, on the Don, in the south and at the gates of the North Caucasus. The German occupiers are rushing towards Stalingrad, towards the Volga and want to capture Kuban and the North Caucasus with their oil and grain riches at any cost. The enemy has already captured Voroshilovgrad, Starobelsk, Rossosh, Kupyansk, Valuiki, Novocherkassk, Rostov-on-Don, and half of Voronezh. Units of the troops of the Southern Front, following the alarmists, left Rostov and Novocherkassk without serious resistance and without orders from Moscow, covering their banners with shame.

The population of our country, who treats the Red Army with love and respect, begins to become disillusioned with it and loses faith in the Red Army. And many curse the Red Army because it is putting our people under the yoke of the German oppressors, while it itself is fleeing to the east.

Some stupid people at the front console themselves by saying that we can continue to retreat to the east, since we have a lot of land, a lot of population and that we will always have plenty of grain. With this they want to justify their shameful behavior at the front.

But such conversations are completely false and deceitful, beneficial only to our enemies.

Every commander, Red Army soldier and political worker must understand that our funds are not unlimited. The territory of the Soviet state is not a desert, but people - workers, peasants, intelligentsia, our fathers, mothers, wives, brothers, children. The territory of the USSR, which the enemy has captured and is trying to capture, is bread and other products for the army and home front, metal and fuel for industry, factories, plants supplying the army with weapons and ammunition, and railways. After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic states, Donbass and other regions, we have much less territory, which means there are much fewer people, bread, metal, plants, factories. We have lost more than 70 million people, more than 800 million pounds of grain per year and more than 10 million tons of metal per year. We no longer have a superiority over the Germans either in human reserves or in grain reserves. To retreat further means to ruin ourselves and at the same time ruin our Motherland. Each new piece of territory we leave behind will strengthen the enemy in every possible way and weaken our defenses, our Motherland, in every possible way.

Therefore, we must completely stop the talk that we have the opportunity to retreat endlessly, that we have a lot of territory, our country is large and rich, there is a lot of population, there will always be plenty of grain. Such talk is false and harmful, they weaken us and strengthen the enemy, because if we do not stop retreating, we will be left without bread, without fuel, without metal, without raw materials, without factories and factories, without railways.

It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat.

Not a step back! This should now be our main call.

We must stubbornly, to the last drop of blood, defend every position, every meter of Soviet territory, cling to every piece of Soviet land and defend it to the last opportunity.

Our Motherland is going through difficult days. We must stop, and then push back and defeat the enemy, no matter the cost. The Germans are not as strong as the alarmists think. They are straining their last strength. To withstand their blow now, in the next few months, means ensuring our victory.

Can we withstand the blow and then push the enemy back to the west? Yes, we can, because our factories and factories in the rear are now working perfectly, and our front is receiving more and more planes, tanks, artillery, and mortars.

What do we lack?

There is a lack of order and discipline in companies, battalions, regiments, divisions, tank units, and air squadrons. This is now our main drawback. We must establish the strictest order and iron discipline in our army if we want to save the situation and defend our Motherland.

We cannot tolerate any more commanders, commissars, and political workers whose units and formations leave combat positions without permission. We cannot tolerate it any longer when commanders, commissars, and political workers allow a few alarmists to determine the situation on the battlefield, so that they drag other fighters into retreat and open the front to the enemy.

Alarmists and cowards must be exterminated on the spot.

From now on, the iron law for every commander, Red Army soldier, and political worker must be the requirement - not a step back without an order from the high command.

Commanders of a company, battalion, regiment, division, corresponding commissars and political workers who retreat from a combat position without orders from above are traitors to the Motherland. Such commanders and political workers must be treated as traitors to the Motherland.

This is the call of our Motherland.

To carry out this order means to defend our land, save the Motherland, destroy and defeat the hated enemy.

After their winter retreat under the pressure of the Red Army, when discipline weakened in the German troops, the Germans took some harsh measures to restore discipline, which led to good results. They formed more than 100 penal companies from soldiers who had violated discipline due to cowardice or instability, placed them in dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins with blood. They formed, further, about a dozen penal battalions from commanders who were guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, deprived them of their orders, placed them in even more dangerous sectors of the front and ordered them to atone for their sins. They finally formed special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot panickers on the spot if they attempted to leave their positions without permission or if they attempted to surrender. As you know, these measures had their effect, and now the German troops are fighting better than they fought in the winter. And so it turns out that the German troops have good discipline, although they do not have the lofty goal of defending their homeland, but have only one predatory goal - to conquer a foreign country, and our troops, who have the lofty goal of defending their desecrated homeland, do not have such discipline and tolerate due to this defeat.

Shouldn't we learn from our enemies in this matter, just as our ancestors learned from their enemies in the past and then defeated them?

I think it should.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army orders:

1. To the military councils of the fronts and, above all, to the commanders of the fronts:

A) unconditionally eliminate retreating sentiments in the troops and suppress with an iron hand the propaganda that we can and should allegedly retreat further to the east, that such a retreat will supposedly cause no harm;

B) unconditionally remove from post and send to Headquarters to bring to court martial the army commanders who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the front command;

C) form within the front from one to three (depending on the situation) penal battalions (800 people each), where to send middle and senior commanders and relevant political workers of all branches of the military who are guilty of violating discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them on more difficult sections of the front to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against the Motherland.

2. To the military councils of the armies and, above all, to the commanders of the armies:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of corps and divisions who allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of troops from their positions without an order from the army command, and send them to the military council of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (up to 200 people in each), place them in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them, in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of division units, to shoot panickers and cowards on the spot and thereby help honest fighters divisions to fulfill their duty to the Motherland;

C) form within the army from five to ten (depending on the situation) penal companies (from 150 to 200 people in each), where to send ordinary soldiers and junior commanders who have violated discipline due to cowardice or instability, and place them in difficult areas army to give them the opportunity to atone for their crimes against their homeland with blood.

3. To commanders and commissars of corps and divisions:

A) unconditionally remove from their posts the commanders and commissars of regiments and battalions that allowed the unauthorized withdrawal of units without an order from the corps or division commander, take away their orders and medals and send them to the military councils of the front to be brought before a military court;

B) provide all possible assistance and support to the army’s barrage detachments in strengthening order and discipline in the units.

The order should be read in all companies, squadrons, batteries, squadrons, teams, and headquarters.”

Order No. 227 makes no mention of the experience gained in the Civil War, but makes reference to the experience of the enemy, who practiced the use of penal battalions. The enemy's experience undoubtedly needed to be studied and creatively applied in practice. But Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin, who was a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic and the Revolutionary Military Council of a number of fronts during the Civil War, had an idea about the creation of similar formations in the Red Army.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky, assessing order No. 227, writes in the book “The Work of a Whole Life”: “This order immediately attracted the attention of all personnel of the Armed Forces. I was an eyewitness to how soldiers in units and subunits listened to him, officers and generals studied him. Order No. 227 is one of the most powerful documents of the war years in terms of the depth of patriotic content, the degree of emotional intensity... I, like many other generals, saw some harshness and categorical assessments of the order, but they were justified by a very harsh and alarming time. What attracted us to the order, first of all, was its social and moral content. He attracted attention with the severity of the truth, the impartiality of the conversation between the People's Commissar and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin with Soviet soldiers, from ordinary soldiers to army commanders. Reading it, each of us thought about whether we were devoting all our strength to the struggle. We were aware that the cruelty and categorical demands of the order came on behalf of the Motherland, the people, and what was important was not what penalties would be introduced, although this was important, but that it raised the consciousness of the soldiers’ responsibility for the fate of their socialist Fatherland. And those disciplinary measures that were introduced by order had already ceased to be an indispensable, urgent necessity even before the Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive at Stalingrad and the encirclement of the Nazi group on the banks of the Volga.”

Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov in his “Memoirs and Reflections” noted: “In some places, panic and violations of military discipline reappeared in the troops. In an effort to stop the decline in the morale of the troops, I.V. Stalin issued order No. 227 on July 28, 1942. This order introduced tough measures to combat alarmists and violators of discipline, and strongly condemned “retreat” sentiments. It said that the iron law for active troops should be the requirement “Not a step back!” The order was supported by intensified party-political work in the troops.”

During the Great Patriotic War, the attitude towards order No. 227 was ambiguous, as evidenced by documents of that time. Thus, in a special message from the head of the Special Department of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, senior state security major N.N. Selivanovsky, sent on August 8, 1942 to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Commissar state security 3rd rank V.S. Abakumov, it was emphasized: “Among the command staff, the order was correctly understood and appreciated. However, amid the general upsurge and correct assessment of the order, a number of negative, anti-Soviet defeatist sentiments are recorded, manifesting themselves among individual unstable commanders...” Similar facts were cited in the report of the head of the political department of the Volkhov Front, brigade commissar K. Kalashnikov, dated August 6, 1942, to the head of the Main Political Department of the Red Army.

After the publication of Order No. 227, measures were taken to bring it to the attention of personnel, to form and determine the procedure for the use of penal and barrage units and units. On July 29, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) A.S. Shcherbakov demanded that the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts and the heads of the political departments of the armies “personally ensure that the People’s Commissar’s order is immediately communicated to units and subunits, read out and explained to all personnel of the Red Army.” In turn, People's Commissar of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov, in Directive No. 360/sh dated July 30, ordered the commanders of fleets and flotillas to accept Order No. 227 “for execution and management.” July 31, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin signed Directive No. 1096, which ordered military prosecutors and tribunal chairmen to take “decisive measures to provide the command and political agencies with real assistance in fulfilling the tasks set in the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense.”

Even before the publication of order No. 227, the first penal company was created in the 42nd Army of the Leningrad Front on July 25, 1942. On July 28, the day order No. 227 was signed, 5 separate penal companies were created in the active army, on July 29 - 3 separate penal battalions and 24 separate penal companies, on July 30 - 2 separate penal battalions and 29 separate penal companies, and on July 31 - 19 separate penal companies. The Baltic and Black Sea fleets, the Volga and Dnieper military flotillas had their own penal companies and platoons.

Who formed penal battalions and companies

August 10 I.V. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky signed Directive No. 156595, which demanded that personnel convicted of sabotage or sabotage be transferred to penal tank companies, as well as to send “hopeless, malicious selfish tankmen” to penal infantry companies. Penal companies were created, in particular, in the 3rd, 4th and 5th tank armies.

On August 15, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army A.S. Shcherbakov signs Directive No. 09 “On political work to implement NGO Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” On August 26, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov issued an order “On the tasks of military tribunals to implement the order of the NKO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942.” The procedure for registering military personnel assigned to penal battalions and companies was determined in Directive No. 989242 of the Red Army General Staff of August 28.

September 9, 1942 People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin signed order No. 0685, which demanded that “fighter pilots who evade combat with an air enemy should be brought to trial and transferred to penal units in the infantry.” The pilots were sent not only to penal infantry units. In accordance with the regulations developed in the same month at the headquarters of the 8th air army, it was envisaged to create three types of penal squadrons: fighter squadrons on the Yak-1 and LaGG-3 aircraft, attack squadrons on the Il-2, and light bomber squadrons on the U-2.

September 10, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Major General of Artillery V.V. Aborenkov issued an order, according to which it was ordered to immediately send to penal rifle battalions “those guilty of negligent attitude towards the military equipment entrusted to them” from the 58th Guards Mortar Regiment.

On September 26, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense General of the Army G.K. Zhukov approved the provisions “On penal battalions of the active army” and “On penal companies of the active army.” Soon, on September 28, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko issued order No. 298, in which the following were announced to the leadership:

"1. Regulations on penal battalions of the active army.

2. Regulations on penal companies in the active army.

3. Staff No. 04/393 of a separate penal battalion of the active army.

4. Staff No. 04/392 of a separate penal company of the active army...”

Despite the fact that the staff of penal battalions and companies were clearly defined by the relevant provisions, their organizational and staffing structure was different.

Order No. 323 of October 16, 1942, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko, the provisions of Order No. 227 were extended to military districts. Sent to penal units in accordance with Order No. 0882 of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense E.A. Shchadenko of November 12, both those liable for military service and military personnel who feigned illness and so-called “mutilators” were subject to punishment. By order No. org/2/78950 of the Main Organizational and Staff Directorate of the Main Administration of the Red Army dated November 25, a single numbering of penal battalions was established.

December 4, 1942 Deputy People's Commissar of Defense A.S. Shcherbakov signs order No. 0931, according to which for “the soulless bureaucratic attitude towards the material and everyday needs of political workers who are in the reserve of GlavPURKKA at the Military-Political School. M.V. Frunze" were removed from their posts and sent to the active army in a penal battalion, the assistant head of the school for logistics, Major Kopotienko, and the head of the school's baggage supply, senior lieutenant of the quartermaster service, Govtvyanits.

According to order No. 47 of January 30, 1943, signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Colonel General E.A. Shchadenko, junior lieutenant of the 1082nd Infantry Regiment Karamalkin was sent to a penal battalion for a period of 3 months and demoted to the ranks “for criticism, an attempt to slander his superiors and the corruption of discipline in his unit.”

According to Directive No. 97 of the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shadenko of March 10, 1943, it was required that “after a quick check, immediately send to penal units” former military personnel who “at one time surrendered to the enemy without resistance or deserted from the Red Army and remained to live in territory temporarily occupied by the Germans, or, finding themselves surrounded at their place of residence, they stayed at home, not wanting to go out with the Red Army units.”

By order No. 0374 of the People's Commissar of Defense of May 31, 1943, the decision of the Military Council of the Kalinin Front was ordered to send to penal battalions and companies “persons of command who are guilty of interruptions in the nutrition of the soldiers or the lack of food supplies to the soldiers.” Employees of the Special Departments did not escape the fate of fines. On May 31, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, based on the results of an inspection of the work of the Special Department of the 7th Separate Army, issued order No. 0089, by which “for criminal errors in investigative work” investigators Sedogin, Izotov, Solovyov were dismissed from counterintelligence agencies and sent to a penal battalion.

By Order No. 413, People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin on August 21, 1943, the command staff of military districts and inactive fronts was given the right to send military personnel to penal formations without trial “for unauthorized absence, desertion, failure to comply with orders, squandering and theft of military property, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and other military crimes in cases where the usual disciplinary measures for these offenses are insufficient, as well as all detained deserters of sergeants and privates who fled from units of the active army and from other garrisons.

Not only male servicemen, but also women were sent to penal formations. However, experience has shown that it is inappropriate to send female military personnel who have committed minor crimes to penal cells. Therefore, on September 19, 1943, General Staff Directive No. 1484/2/org was sent to the chiefs of staff of fronts, military districts and individual armies, which demanded that female military personnel convicted of crimes not be sent to penal units.

According to the joint directive of the NKVD/NKGB of the USSR No. 494/94 of November 11, 1943, Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers were also sent to penal units.

In order to streamline the practice of transferring convicts to the active army, on January 26, 1944, order No. 004/0073/006/23 was issued, signed by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs L.P. Beria, People's Commissar of Justice N.M. Rychkov and USSR Prosecutor K.P. Gorshenin.

By order No. 0112 of the First Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal G.K. Zhukov on April 29, 1944, the commander of the 342nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 121st Guards Rifle Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.A., was sent to a penal battalion for a period of two months. Yachmenev “for failure to comply with the order of the Military Council of the Army, for leaving the enemy advantageous positions and not taking measures to restore the situation, for showing cowardice, false reports and refusal to carry out the assigned combat mission.”

Persons who were careless and uncontrolled were also sent to penal units, as a result of which military personnel died in the rear, for example, according to the order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin, signed in May 1944.

Practice has shown that when implementing this order, significant violations were committed, the elimination of which was directed by Order No. 0244, signed on August 6, 1944 by Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky. Approximately the same kind of order No. 0935, concerning officers of fleets and flotillas, was signed on December 28, 1944 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet N.G. Kuznetsov.

Military units were also transferred to the category of penalties. On November 23, 1944, People's Commissar of Defense Stalin signed order No. 0380 on the transfer of the 214th Cavalry Regiment of the 63rd Cavalry Korsun Red Banner Division (commander of the guard regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Danilevich) to the category of penalties for the loss of the Battle Banner.

The formation of penal battalions and companies was not always carried out successfully, as required by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. In this regard, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. On March 24, 1943, Zhukov sent directive No. GUF/1902 to front commanders, which demanded:

"1. Reduce the number of penal companies in armies. Collect penal prisoners into consolidated companies and, thus, keep them together, preventing them from being aimless in the rear and using them in the most difficult areas of combat operations.

2. In the event of a significant shortage in penal battalions, introduce them into battle in squadrons, without waiting for the arrival of new penal battalions from command personnel in order to cover the shortage of the entire battalion.”

The regulations on penal battalions and companies noted that permanent personnel (commanders, military commissars, political commissars, etc.) were appointed to positions by order of the front and army troops from among the strong-willed and most distinguished commanders and political workers in battle. This requirement, as a rule, was fulfilled in the active army. But there were exceptions to this rule. For example, in the 16th separate penal battalion, platoon commanders were often appointed from among those who had redeemed their guilt. According to the provisions on penal battalions and companies for all permanent personnel, the terms of service in ranks, in comparison with the command, political and command staff of combat units of the active army, were reduced by half, and each month of service in penal formations was counted towards the assignment of a six-month pension. But this, according to the recollections of penal unit commanders, was not always followed.

The variable composition of penal battalions and companies consisted of military personnel and civilians sent to these formations for various offenses and crimes. According to our calculations, made on the basis of orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, People's Commissar of the Navy, Deputy People's Commissars of Defense, People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of State Security, about 30 categories of such persons have been identified.

So, the orders and directives of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies clearly defined the types of offenses for which military personnel and other persons could be sent to penal units, as well as the circle of persons who had the right to send those guilty and convicted to penal units. The fronts and armies also issued orders regarding the procedure for the formation of penal units and subunits. Thus, by order No. 00182 of the commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant General of Artillery L.A. Govorov dated July 31, 1942, members of the command and political staff of the 85th Infantry Division, who were “the main culprits for the failure to complete the combat mission,” were sent to the front-line penal battalion, and “junior command and rank and file personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield” were sent to army penal company. On May 6, 1943, Directive No. 005 was issued by the front commander, Colonel General I.I. Maslennikov, who demanded that military personnel who showed cowardice on the battlefield be sent to a penal battalion or tried by a military tribunal.

Published literature and memoirs of front-line soldiers contain information that commanders and superiors did not always adhere to the rules established in orders and directives. This, as the study showed, concerned approximately 10 categories of fines:

1. Unjustly convicted, who were slandered and slandered in order to settle scores with them.

2. The so-called “surrounded people” who managed to escape from the “cauldrons” and reach their troops, as well as those who fought as part of partisan detachments.

3. Military personnel who have lost combat and secret documents.

4. Commanders and superiors guilty of “criminally careless organization of the combat security and reconnaissance service.”

5. Persons who, due to their beliefs, refused to take up arms.

6. Persons who supported “enemy propaganda.”

7. Military personnel convicted of rape.

8. Civil prisoners (thieves, bandits, repeat offenders, etc.).

9. Fraudsters.

10. Employees of defense enterprises who committed negligence.

The published literature provides various information about equipping penal battalions and companies with weapons and military equipment. Some authors write that the penalty officers were armed only with light small arms and grenades, being “light” rifle units.” Other publications provide information about the presence of captured automatic weapons and mortars in the penal units. To perform specific tasks Artillery, mortar and even tank units were temporarily subordinated to the commander of the penal unit.

Penal prisoners were provided with clothing and food supplies in accordance with the standards established in the army. But, in a number of cases, according to the recollections of front-line soldiers, there were violations in this matter. In some publications, for example I.P. Gorin and V.I. Golubev, it is said that in the penal units there was no normal relationship between permanent and variable personnel. However, the majority of front-line soldiers testify to the opposite: in penal battalions and companies, statutory relationships and strong discipline were maintained. This was facilitated by well-organized political and educational work, which was carried out on the same basis as in other parts of the active army.

The penal formations, which were staffed mainly from among military personnel of various military specialties, received additional training when there was time so that they were able to solve the tasks assigned to them.

According to the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” by the end of 1942 there were 24,993 penal prisoners in the Red Army. In 1943, their number increased to 177,694 people, in 1944 it decreased to 143,457, and in 1945 to 81,766 people. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, 427,910 people were sent to penal companies and battalions. Judging by the information included in List No. 33 of rifle units and units (individual battalions, companies, detachments) of the active army, compiled by the General Staff in the early 60s of the 20th century, then during the Great Patriotic War 65 separate penal battalions were formed and 1028 separate penal companies; a total of 1093 penalty parts. However, A. Moroz, who studied the funds of penalty parts stored in the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense Russian Federation, believes that during the war, 38 separate penal battalions and 516 separate penal companies were formed.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” states: “Penal units of the Red Army existed legally from September 1942 to May 1945.” In fact, they existed from July 25, 1942 to October 1945. For example, the 128th separate penal company of the 5th Army participated in the Harbin-Girin offensive operation, which was carried out from August 9 to September 2, 1945. The company was disbanded based on Directive No. 0238 of the 5th Army Headquarters dated October 28, 1945.

Penal battalions and companies were used in the most dangerous areas

As noted, much speculation exists regarding how penal battalions and companies were used. Moreover, the most common myth is that they served as a kind of “cannon fodder”. This is not true. During the Great Patriotic War, penal companies and battalions solved almost the same tasks as rifle units and subunits. At the same time, as ordered by Order No. 227, they were used in the most dangerous directions. They were most often used to break through enemy defenses, capture and hold important settlements and bridgeheads, and conduct reconnaissance in force. During the offensive, penal units had to overcome various types of natural and artificial obstacles, including mined areas. As a result, the myth that they “cleared minefields” with their bodies gained vitality. In this regard, we note that not only penal units, but also rifle and tank units repeatedly operated in directions where minefields were located.

The penalty units, in general, acted staunchly and courageously in defense. They participated in crossing water barriers, capturing and holding bridgeheads, and in combat operations behind enemy lines.

Due to the fact that penal formations were used in the most difficult sectors of fronts and armies, they, according to the authors of the work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study,” suffered heavy losses. Only in 1944 total losses personnel (killed, deceased, wounded and sick) of all penal units amounted to 170,298 permanent personnel and penal prisoners. The average monthly losses of permanent and variable personnel reached 14,191 people, or 52% of their average monthly number (27,326 people). This was 3–6 times more than the average monthly losses of personnel in conventional troops in the same offensive operations in 1944.

In most cases, penal prisoners were released within the time limits established by the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense and his deputies. But there were also exceptions, which were determined by the attitude of the command and military councils of the fronts and armies towards the penal units. For the courage and heroism shown in battles, penal prisoners were awarded orders and medals, and some of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Barrage detachments of the Red Army

In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, leaders of a number of party organizations, commanders of fronts and armies took measures to restore order in the troops retreating under enemy pressure. Among them is the creation of special units that performed the functions of barrage detachments. Thus, on the North-Western Front, already on June 23, 1941, in the formations of the 8th Army, detachments were organized from the withdrawn units of the border detachment to detain those leaving the front without permission. In accordance with the decree “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the frontline zone,” adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 24, by decision of the military councils of the fronts and armies, barrage detachments were created from the NKVD troops.

On June 27, the head of the Third Directorate (counterintelligence) of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense, State Security Major A.N. Mikheev signed Directive No. 35523 on the creation of mobile control and barrier detachments on roads and railway junctions in order to detain deserters and all suspicious elements who penetrated the front line.

Commander of the 8th Army, Major General P.P. Sobennikov, who was operating on the North-Western Front, in his order No. 04 of July 1, demanded that the commanders of the 10th, 11th Rifle and 12th Mechanized Corps and divisions “immediately organize barrage detachments to detain those fleeing from the front.”

Despite the measures taken, there were significant shortcomings in the organization of the barrage service at the fronts. In this regard, the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, Army General G.K. Zhukov, in his telegram No. 00533 dated July 26, on behalf of Headquarters, demanded that the commanders-in-chief of the troops of the directions and the commanders of the front troops “immediately personally figure out how the barrier service is organized and give comprehensive instructions to the rear security chiefs.” On July 28, Directive No. 39212 was issued by the Head of the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank B.S. Abakumov on strengthening the work of barrage detachments to identify and expose enemy agents deployed across the front line.

During the fighting, a gap formed between the Reserve and Central Fronts, to cover which the Bryansk Front was created on August 16, 1941 under the command of Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko. In early September, his troops, at the direction of Headquarters, launched a flank attack with the aim of defeating the German 2nd Panzer Group, which was advancing to the south. However, having pinned down very insignificant enemy forces, the Bryansk Front was unable to prevent the enemy group from reaching the rear of the troops of the Southwestern Front. In this regard, General A.I. Eremenko turned to Headquarters with a request to allow the creation of barrage detachments. Directive No. 001650 Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated September 5th gave such permission.

This directive marked the beginning of a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. If before that they were formed by the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense, and then by Special Departments, now the decision of Headquarters legitimized their creation directly by the command of the troops of the active army, so far only on the scale of one front. This practice was soon extended to the entire active army. September 12, 1941 Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin and Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union B.M. Shaposhnikov signed Directive No. 001919, which ordered that each rifle division have “a defensive detachment of reliable fighters of no more than a battalion (one company per rifle regiment), subordinate to the division commander and having at its disposal, in addition to conventional weapons, vehicles in the form of trucks and several tanks or armored vehicles.” The tasks of the barrage detachment were to provide direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline in the division, in stopping the flight of panic-stricken military personnel, without stopping before using weapons, in eliminating the initiators of panic and flight, etc.

On September 18, the military council of the Leningrad Front adopted resolution No. 00274 “On strengthening the fight against desertion and penetration of enemy elements into the territory of Leningrad,” according to which the head of the front’s military rear security was instructed to organize four barrage detachments “to concentrate and check all military personnel detained without documents."

On October 12, 1941, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union G.I. Kulik sent I.V. Stalin received a note in which he proposed to “organize a command group along each highway going north, west and south from Moscow” to organize the repulsion of enemy tanks, which would be given a “barrage detachment to stop the fleeing.” On the same day, the State Defense Committee adopted Resolution No. 765ss on the creation of a security headquarters for the Moscow zone under the NKVD of the USSR, to which the troops and regional organizations of the NKVD, police, fighter battalions and barrage detachments located in the zone were operationally subordinate.

In May-June 1942, during the fighting, the Volkhov group of troops of the Leningrad Front was surrounded and defeated. As part of the 2nd Shock Army, which was part of this group, barrier detachments were used to prevent escape from the battlefield. The same detachments operated at that time on the Voronezh Front.

On July 28, 1942, as already noted, Order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. was issued. Stalin, which became a new stage in the creation and use of barrage detachments. On September 28, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Army Commissar 1st Rank E.A. Shchadenko signed order No. 298, which announced staff No. 04/391 of a separate barrage detachment of the active army.

Barrier detachments were primarily created on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. At the end of July 1942, I.V. Stalin received a report that the 184th and 192nd rifle divisions of the 62nd Army had abandoned the village of Mayorovsky, and the troops of the 21st Army had abandoned Kletskaya. On July 31, the commander of the Stalingrad Front V.N. Directive No. 170542 of the Supreme Command Headquarters, signed by I.V., was sent to Gordov. Stalin and General A.M. Vasilevsky, who demanded: “Within two days, form barrage detachments of up to 200 people each, using the best composition of the Far Eastern divisions that arrived at the front, which should be placed in the immediate rear and, above all, behind the divisions of the 62nd and 64th armies. The barrage detachments shall be subordinated to the military councils of the armies through their special departments. Place the most combat-experienced special officers at the head of the barrage detachments.” The next day, General V.N. Gordov signed order No. 00162/op on the creation within two days of five barrage detachments in the 21st, 55th, 57th, 62nd, 63rd, 65th armies, and in the 1st and 4th th tank armies - three defensive ones. At the same time, it was ordered to restore barrage battalions in each rifle division within two days, formed according to the Directive of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 01919. By mid-October 1942, 16 barrage detachments were formed on the Stalingrad Front, and 25 on the Don, subordinate to special departments of the NKVD armies.

On October 1, 1942, Chief of the General Staff Colonel General A.M. Vasilevsky sent directive No. 157338 to the commander of the troops of the Transcaucasian Front, which spoke about the poor organization of the service of the barrier detachments and their use not for their intended purpose, but for conducting combat operations.

During the Stalingrad strategic defensive operation (July 17 - November 18, 1942), barrage detachments and battalions on the Stalingrad, Don and South-Eastern fronts detained military personnel fleeing the battlefield. From August 1 to October 15, 140,755 people were detained, of whom 3,980 were arrested, 1,189 were shot, 2,776 were sent to penal companies and 185 penal battalions, and 131,094 people were returned to their units and transit points.

Commander of the Don Front, Lieutenant General K.K. Rokossovsky, according to a report from a special department of the front to the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR dated October 30, 1942, proposed using barrier detachments to influence the infantry of the unsuccessfully advancing 66th Army. Rokossovsky believed that the barrage detachments should have followed the infantry units and forced the fighters to attack by force of arms.

Army barrage detachments and division barrage battalions were also used during the counteroffensive at Stalingrad. In a number of cases, they not only stopped those fleeing the battlefield, but also shot some of them on the spot.

In the summer-autumn campaign of 1943, Soviet soldiers and commanders showed massive heroism and self-sacrifice. This, however, does not mean that there were no cases of desertion, abandonment of the battlefield and panic. To combat these shameful phenomena, barrage formations were widely used.

In the fall of 1943, measures were taken to improve the structure of the barrage detachments. In directive 1486/2/org of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, sent on September 18 by the commander of the front forces and the 7th separate army, said:

"1. In order to strengthen the numerical strength of rifle companies, non-standard barrage detachments of rifle divisions, formed according to the directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command No. 001919 of 1941, are to be disbanded.

2. In each army, in accordance with the order of the NKO No. 227 of July 28, 1942, there must be 3-5 full-time barrage detachments according to the state No. 04/391, numbering 200 people each.

Tank armies should not have barrage detachments.”

In 1944, when the Red Army troops were successfully advancing in all directions, barrage detachments were used less and less. At the same time, in the front line they were used to the fullest. This was due to an increase in the scale of outrages, armed robberies, thefts and murders of the civilian population. To combat these phenomena, Order No. 0150 was sent to the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky dated May 30, 1944

Barrage detachments were often used to solve combat missions. The incorrect use of barrage detachments was discussed in the order of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters G.K. Zhukov on March 29, 1943 as commander of the 66th and 21st armies. In the memorandum “On the shortcomings of the activities of the front troops’ detachments,” sent on August 25, 1944 by the head of the political department of the 3rd Baltic Front, Major General A.A. Lobachev to the Chief of the Main Political Department Red Army Colonel General A.S. Shcherbakov, noted:

"1. The barrier detachments do not perform their direct functions established by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense. Most of the personnel of the barrier detachments are used to protect army headquarters, protect communication lines, roads, comb forests, etc.

2. In a number of barrier detachments, the staffing levels of the headquarters have become extremely swollen...

3. Army headquarters do not exercise control over the activities of the barrier detachments, left them to their own devices, and reduced the role of the barrier detachments to that of ordinary commandant companies...

4. Lack of control on the part of the headquarters has led to the fact that in most of the detachments, military discipline is at a low level, people have disbanded...

Conclusion: The barrier detachments for the most part do not carry out the tasks specified by the People's Commissar of Defense Order No. 227. The protection of headquarters, roads, communication lines, the performance of various economic works and assignments, servicing commanders and superiors, supervision of internal order in the rear of the army is in no way included in the function of barrier detachments of front troops.

“I consider it necessary to raise the question with the People’s Commissar of Defense about the reorganization or disbandment of the barrier detachments, as they have lost their purpose in the current situation.”

However, not only the use of barrage detachments to perform tasks unusual for them was the reason for their disbandment. By the fall of 1944, the situation with military discipline in the active army had also changed. Therefore I.V. On October 29, 1944, Stalin signed order No. 0349 with the following content:

“Due to the change in the general situation at the fronts, the need for further maintenance of barrage detachments has disappeared.

I order:

1. Disband individual barrage detachments by November 15, 1944. The personnel of the disbanded detachments will be used to replenish rifle divisions.

The work “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century: A Statistical Study” notes: “In connection with the change for the better for the Red Army after 1943, the general situation on the fronts also completely eliminated the need for the further existence of barrage detachments. Therefore, all of them were disbanded by November 20, 1944 (in accordance with the order of the USSR NKO No. 0349 of October 29, 1944).

From the first days of its existence, the Red Army had a tradition of forming national military units (continuing trends that existed before the revolution), but on March 7, 1938, by a special resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On national units and formations of the Red Army" a single national the procedure for military service for representatives of all nationalities of the country. However, the difficult situation at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War forced the Soviet government to abandon this principle. The formation of national units resumed.

The defeats suffered by the Red Army during the first months of the war were catastrophic for the Soviet Union. consequences. By December 1941, the enemy occupied over 1.5 million square meters. km. Soviet territory, where 74.5 million people lived before the war. It was possible to evacuate or conscript only part of this population. Military mobilizations carried out in territory not occupied by the enemy significantly depleted the country's human resources by the fall of 1941. The situation at the front was such that additional mobilization of forces and accelerated training of combat reserves were required. Among the conscription contingents of a number of union and autonomous republics, especially the Caucasus, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Bashkiria, and Kalmykia, there were many people who had little command of the Russian language or did not know it at all. As a result, their training in military affairs was complicated, and the time frame for training combat reserves was extended. Therefore, it was important to establish work with personnel in their native language.

A decision was made to form national units and formations. The first national formation was the 201st Latvian Rifle Division, created by special decision State Committee Defense of August 3, 1941. The formation of the division took place in the Moscow Military District. The composition of the first formation of this division is of interest. 70% were volunteers, 90% were citizens of the Latvian SSR, including 51% Latvians, 26% Russians, 17% Jews, 3% Poles, 6% other nationalities. Every fifth person was a communist or Komsomol member. By the end of November the division was formed.

On the morning of December 20, 1941, near the Nara River (about 70 km from Moscow), she entered into battle. During their three weeks at the front, its soldiers liberated 23 settlements. After the Battle of Moscow, the 201st Latvian Division distinguished itself in the battles of Demyansk and Velikiye Luki, then liberated the Latvian SSR from the enemy. For heroic actions, it was transformed into the 43rd Guards and awarded the honorary name “Rizhskaya”.

At the request of the party and government leadership of Estonia and Lithuania, on December 18, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted resolutions on the formation of the 7th Estonian and 1st Lithuanian rifle divisions, and in February 1942 - another national formation - the 249th Estonian rifle division. Personnel commanders of the Red Army, as a rule, of Estonian and Lithuanian nationality, as well as officers of the former Estonian and Lithuanian armies, were appointed to senior positions. At the end of September 1942, on the basis of the 7th and 249th divisions, the command of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps was formed, the commander of which was General L. Pern. Among the management officers there were 61.3% Estonians, 30.7% Russians, 4.6% Ukrainians, 3.4% Jews. The combat path of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps began in December 1942 near Velikiye Luki, where it participated in the defeat and capture of an enemy group. Since February 1944, the corps was on the Leningrad Front. His soldiers thoroughly prepared for the liberation of their native republic. On the eve of this decisive test, among the corps personnel there were 79.5% Estonians, 17.3% Russians, 3.2% soldiers of other nationalities. 82% of the fighters and commanders were citizens of the Estonian SSR. In the 7th and 249th Rifle Divisions, the proportion of soldiers of Estonian nationality was even higher and reached 89.5%.

On September 22, 1944, soldiers of the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps hoisted red banners over Tallinn, for the liberation of which the corps, like all of its units and formations separately, received the honorary name “Tallinn”. Residents of Estonia welcomed their liberator - the Red Army, in which their compatriots fought. Rallies spontaneously arose in populated areas. Almost every Estonian regiment on the third or fourth day of the offensive was accompanied by dozens of carts: peasants voluntarily helped the advancing units in transporting ammunition and food. Subsequently, the corps distinguished itself in the battles for the liberation of the islands of the Moonsund archipelago and in the defeat of the Courland enemy group. For special services in the Great Patriotic War, he was awarded the rank of guards.

Following the 8th Estonian Rifle Corps, the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division under the command of General F.R. Zemaitis joined the active army. Its combat path began in February 1943 on the Bryansk front, and continued on the Central, Kalinin and 1st Baltic fronts. As part of the Central Front, the division took part in the famous Battle of Kursk, occupying positions near railway station Zmievka. From this line, she went on the offensive, during which she fought about a hundred kilometers, liberating 54 settlements. Since the autumn of 1943, the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division fought for the liberation of the eastern regions of Belarus. In these battles, the brave machine gunner Danute Staniliene, who was awarded the Order of Glory of three degrees, distinguished herself once again. Before the start of the battles for the liberation of Lithuania, in mid-March 1944, in the 16th division, soldiers of 29 nationalities fought, of which 39% were Russians, 32.3% Lithuanians, 22% Jews and 6.7% soldiers of other nationalities. 88% of the soldiers were citizens of the Lithuanian SSR. The division published the newspaper “Tivine Sauke” (“The Motherland Calls”) in Lithuanian and Russian. With the entry into the territory of Lithuania, the division was replenished with young citizens of the republic. In August 1944, another national unit was formed - the 50th Lithuanian Reserve Rifle Division, which trained thousands of soldiers for the Red Army. The combat journey of the 16th Lithuanian Rifle Division ended under the command of Colonel A. I. Urbshas in East Prussia. For heroism and courage, she was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and given the honorary name “Klaipeda”.

On the eve of the battles for the liberation of Latvia, in May 1944, it was decided to form the 130th Latvian Rifle Corps, the administration of which was created on the basis of the 43rd Guards (formerly 201st) Latvian Rifle Division. Together with the latter, the 308th Latvian Rifle Division entered the corps, the formation of which ended in early July. It received its personnel mainly from the 1st separate reserve Latvian Rifle Regiment. 47.8% of the soldiers of the new formation were Russians, 36.3% were Latvians, 7.8% were Jews, over 2% were Ukrainians, about 1% were Belarusians and 5% were other nationalities. Taking into account this national composition, the newspaper of the 308th Infantry Division “Padomju Strelnieks” (“Soviet Fighter”) was published in Russian in the amount of 900 copies. and in Latvian - 600 copies. Units of the 130th Corps were the first to enter the territory of Latvia. They acted decisively, proactively, and successfully completed combat missions. In October 1944, the corps distinguished itself in the battles for the liberation of Riga. Now he received reinforcements from the local population. In his divisions the proportion of soldiers of Latvian nationality increased sharply. At the end of March 1945, citizens of the republic who had previously lived in the occupied territory of Latvia accounted for 60 to 90% of the total number of soldiers in the units of the corps. His military journey ended after the defeat of the Courland enemy group.

In November and December 1941, taking into account the current situation in the country and at the front, the State Defense Committee obliged the command of the Central Asian and North Caucasus military districts to form, together with state, Soviet and public organizations of the corresponding union and autonomous republics, 15 separate rifle brigades and 20 cavalry divisions: 87 1st and 88th brigades, 97th and 98th cavalry divisions - in the Turkmen SSR; 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96th and 97th brigades, 99, 100, 101, 102nd and 103rd cavalry divisions - in the Uzbek SSR; 98th and 99th brigades, 104th cavalry division - in the Tajik SSR; 100th and 101st brigades, 96th, 105th and 106th cavalry divisions - in the Kazakh SSR; 107th, 108th and 109th cavalry divisions - in the Kirghiz SSR; 110th and 111th Cavalry Divisions in the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; 112th and 113th cavalry divisions - in the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; 114th Cavalry Division - in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic; 115th Cavalry Division - in the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

In the spring of 1942, part of the national cavalry divisions arrived in the active army. These were: the 110th Kalmyk, 112th Bashkir and 115th Kabardino-Balkarian cavalry divisions and the 255th Chechen-Ingush cavalry regiment, formed on the basis of the 114th cavalry division. Since July 1942, in connection with the breakthrough of enemy troops on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, the 110th, 112th and 115th cavalry divisions and the 255th cavalry regiment took part in battles to repel the Nazi offensive in the direction of the North Caucasus and Stalingrad . They did not flinch in the face of superior enemy forces, although often the Nazis’ offensive was supported by tanks and aircraft. The feat of Sergeant E. Delikov, commander of an anti-tank rifle crew from the 110th Cavalry Division, became a symbol of the tenacity, courage and courage of Soviet soldiers. Defending the crossing of the Don near the Pukhlyakov farm, E. Delikov destroyed three German armored cars with precise shots and set fire to three trucks with machine gunners. Being seriously wounded, he found the strength to take another aimed shot. For this feat he was awarded the highest award of the Motherland - the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. For its distinction in the Battle of Stalingrad, the 112th Cavalry Division was reorganized into the 16th Guards Division. Her fighting career ended in the battle for Berlin. For outstanding services in the Great Patriotic War, she received the honorary name “Chernigov” and was awarded the Orders of Lenin, Red Banner, Suvorov and Kutuzov, II degree. 75 of its soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them are representatives of ten nationalities: 33 Russians, 13 Bashkirs, 10 Ukrainians, 6 Tatars, 5 Turkmen, 3 Uzbeks, 2 Chechens, an Armenian, a Jew and a Kazakh.

In the fall of 1942, during one of the most difficult periods of the war, the 87th Turkmen, 90th and 94th Uzbek, 100th and 101st Kazakh separate rifle brigades. During the historical offensive of the Soviet troops near Stalingrad, they courageously fulfilled their military duty. Two months after the start of hostilities, senior sergeant of the 87th Infantry Brigade Aydogdy Takhirov accomplished the feat. On the night of January 29-30, 1943, at the head of a squad of nine fighters, he entered a military outpost, from where the enemy was several tens of meters away. That night, the Nazis unleashed a barrage of mortar fire on the outpost positions and then went on the attack. A mine explosion damaged communications with the platoon. The soldiers steadfastly repulsed the attacks. The moment came when, against many enemies, only Takhirov remained, wounded in the leg. Moving from position to position, he shot the approaching fascists. The cartridges in the magazines of his machine gun and his fallen comrades were spent, leaving only a few grenades. And then the brave warrior launched his final attack. Having used up the grenades and received several more wounds, Takhirov lost consciousness. By morning, our rifle unit knocked the enemy out of the outpost trench. Only two remained alive from Takhirov’s squad, but they were seriously wounded. 47 fascist corpses remained at the battle site. The retreating Nazis took the wounded Takhirov with them. When our troops went on the offensive, they discovered Takhirov’s corpse in one of the villages with traces of brutal torture. Aydogdy Takhirov was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

National military formations were also created in the republics of Transcaucasia. The commander of the Transcaucasian Military District (later the front), Army General I.V. Tyulenev, wrote about this in his memoirs: “We had to decide no less important question— to replenish the district’s troops with personnel trained for combat operations.” The first among them was the 89th Armenian Rifle Division. And a month and a half later, by order of the command of the Transcaucasian Military District on February 3, 1942, they began to form six more national rifle divisions: the 223rd and 402nd Azerbaijani, the 392nd and 406th Georgian, and the 408th Armenian. Another month later, the formation of the 414th Georgian and 416th Azerbaijani rifle divisions began. In the fall, at the height of the battle for the Caucasus, four rifle divisions, which had suffered heavy losses, were recruited, as the order for the troops of the Transcaucasian Front said, “on a national basis.” These were: 77th Azerbaijani, 261st Armenian, 276th and 349th Georgian divisions. And in the summer of 1943, the 296th Infantry Division was staffed with personnel mainly of Georgian nationality, who arrived from spare parts. In total, thus, 14 national formations were formed in Transcaucasia. Losses in personnel of national formations and units during the Great Patriotic War were not taken into account separately. At the same time, they, as in all other troops, were inevitable. To replenish them, the republics created a network of reserve regiments and battalions in which conscripts and conscripts were trained in the relevant military specialties (riflemen, machine gunners, grenade launchers, signalmen and others). Such a training system made it possible to take into account national traditions and customs, allowed personnel to quickly adapt to the harsh conditions of a combat situation and significantly increase the cohesion and combat coordination of units. Conditions were also created for instilling in those called up a sense of pride in their fellow countrymen who showed courage and bravery on the battlefields, and a desire to increase their military glory. Subsequently, the importance of national military formations during hostilities increased so much that on February 1, 1944, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a law allowing each union republic to have its own military formations.

During the Great Patriotic War, the formation of national units and formations was one of the major unscheduled military mobilization events, thanks to which it was possible to successfully carry out additional mobilization of human and material resources into the active army.

In the post-war period, national military formations existed until the mid-50s. The emergence of new branches of the Armed Forces, branches of the armed forces, security interests and an increase in the country's defense capability showed the need to move to a more efficient, extraterritorial recruitment of the army and navy, abandoning national formations.

Gabriel Tsobekhia

Evgenia Grigorieva

Vladislav Zherebtsova

Military University of the Russian Defense Ministry

Literature:

1. Artemyev A.P. Fraternal combat union of the peoples of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War. M., 1975.
2. Kirsanov N. A. In the battle formation of brother nations. M., 1984.
3. Likas A.L. Brothers fight together. M., 1973.
4. 50 years of the USSR Armed Forces. M., 1968.
5. CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents 1917-1981. M., 1981.