FSB rules. Academy of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation. What happens after concluding a contract for service in the border troops of the FSB of the Russian Federation
In October 2006, Anna Politkovskaya, a famous Russian journalist who published more than one book in many languages, and an uncompromising critic, was killed in the entrance of her house. Russian government, Russian policy in Chechnya, Russian army in Chechnya and President Putin as the head of state who allows crimes to be committed in Chechnya. It was natural to assume that the murder of Politkovskaya was primarily related to some pro-Kremlin Chechen leaders, for example, the current President of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, who was then just negotiating with Putin to become president, bypassing the constitution of the Chechen Republic (formally, Ramzan Kadyrov was too young to his occupation of this position, he was born in 1976). It was appropriate, quite in the Eastern tradition, to give Putin a gift, to do something nice for him. On Putin’s next birthday, in keeping with the best Eastern traditions, this gift was presented to Putin: the head of a killed enemy. On Putin's birthday, October 7, 2006, Anna Politkovskaya was assassinated. In the form of a gift.
Those who killed Politkovskaya had a choice. They could have killed her on October 5th or the 8th. But they knew that Putin would like the gift they gave. And obviously he liked the gift. On March 2, 2007, Ramzan Kadyrov became president of the Chechen Republic.
We began writing a biography of Putin in 2003. As often happens, we did not plan to complete this book in the coming years; we wanted to wait for Putin to leave power in order to consider the period of his rule over. But at the end of May 2007, the Federal Security Service of Russia (the successor to the KGB) searched the apartment of Vladimir Pribylovsky, who lives in Moscow, and confiscated all his computers, materials, and our correspondence. If our book is confiscated and read by the FSB without our consent, do we have the right to deprive the ordinary reader of the opportunity to familiarize the average reader with its contents?
The past twentieth century has gone down in history as the century of tyrants. Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, Mao Zedong... Small and large, absolute and moderate, communist and nationalist, they brought incredible evil to their victims and provided ample ground for numerous studies. Having become accustomed to resorting to analogies, we are still trying to fit the new phenomena that we encounter into known old ones. In relation to Putin, we want to answer the question of whether he is a despot or not; will it recreate some semblance of the old Soviet Union; Will the world witness a new cold or even nuclear war?
Meanwhile, we are dealing with another experiment in Russia, which this time is being carried out not by the Communist Party, but by the FSB. The goal of the experiment is to gain absolute control over Russia. For the sake of unlimited power, which gives access to unlimited money, which, in turn, gives the opportunity for unlimited power. In the Soviet Union, everyone was poor, even members of the ruling nomenklatura. Stalin and Brezhnev had power, but no money. Their apartments, cars, and dachas belonged to the state. They did not have yachts or planes and could not go on holiday abroad. They did not appoint their children to the boards of directors of the largest Russian corporations. Members of the new ruling corporation - the FSB - want power and money for themselves and their children and close relatives. You don't have to look far for examples. The son of former Prime Minister (and future head of the Foreign Intelligence Service) Mikhail Fradkov sits on the board of directors of the state-owned Vnesheconombank. Former director FSB Nikolai Patrushev arranged for his son Andrey as an adviser to the head of Rosneft. The youngest son of Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov ended up as deputy president of Gazprombank.
Putin himself also represents a completely new phenomenon that humanity has never yet encountered. All the dictators we know were self-nominated. At the risk of their lives, they seized power and with even greater difficulty retained it, most often dying, like Trotsky, Hitler, Mussolini and Ceausescu... Less often, dying a natural death, like Franco, Mao, Tito and Pinochet. In some cases, it is still not entirely clear to us whether the dictator died a natural death or was killed by competitors (Lenin and Stalin).
Putin did not make his way to the presidency. He was selected by the Russian Federal Security Service. It was this structure, often called the “office” by the FSB officers themselves, that secured President Yeltsin and the Russian oligarchs’ approval of his candidacy as a successor.
Putin's biographer can't help but catch himself thinking that writing about him is boring. Putin seems like a dull little man, neither bright nor charismatic. He has no self. He does not crave power and does not enjoy it. Rather, he seems like an obedient toy in someone's hands. The oligarchs who helped Putin become president believed that these hands were theirs. But it turned out that the hands directed by Putin belonged to a completely different department - the “office”. And these hands installed Putin as president precisely because they were not looking for a bright, charismatic, independent person. Because an extraordinary person can fall in love with power and want to become a dictator. And dictators, as you know, always kill, and they start with those who are nearby, who brought them to power, with their comrades, comrades-in-arms and colleagues. Stalin's experience in this sense turned out to be very instructive. Not only new businessmen, but also old secret services do not want a new Stalin. Gray Putin suits everyone.
Under Soviet rule, the country was led by a political party armed with communist ideology. Under Putin, the numerous political parties that make up the Russian parliament ( State Duma) are weak. This is no accident. The FSB does not need a strong political party, since a powerful political party will inevitably become a competitor for power and, by definition, can pose a threat to the FSB. The same can be said about the Duma - weak, disunited and controlled by the president; and about the missing ideology, in which the FSB is also not interested, since any ideology sooner or later leads to the creation of a political party, and a political party is called political because it strives for power (which in the case of Russia will need to be taken away from the FSB).
One of the features of the FSB as a system is the eternal desire to control everything and everyone. Control at the individual level is difficult, if not impossible. Easier to control groups. The active part of the country's adult population is one way or another gathered into groups, and all these groups (businesses, non-governmental organizations, political parties) are embedded with FSB personnel, who notify their organization about everything that is happening. It's more difficult with young people. It is difficult to gather into groups, difficult to control and certainly difficult to infiltrate, since FSB employees, agents and informants are, as a rule, adults. Here, of course, both the old Soviet experience and new ingenuity help. The FSB has been successfully nurturing various youth organizations from a very early stage. Those of them that are gaining strength, like the Nashi movement, are taken under full control and connected to the apparatus of strengthening power. A controlled organization, of course, is not capable of becoming a competitor to power.
Today it is obvious that the operation “Successor” carried out by the FSB - to install Putin as President of Russia - will have its continuation. The FSB plans to create a clone of Putin, the same as Putin, only different, who will also rule Russia on behalf of and on behalf of the FSB for the next 4-8 years. In place of Putin, who simply had to leave in 2008 so as not to become the second Stalin, the FSB corporation chose another gray person for whom the FSB is higher than his own “I”.
In the modern world, the FSB thinks and acts like a corporation. She prefers to subjugate or buy rather than kill. Nevertheless, the FSB is an organization of murderers. And if she believes that she must protect herself from an impending danger, and she can no longer control this danger, she kills. It was for this reason that Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko were killed. They posed a serious danger to the FSB corporation and could not be taken under control or purchased.
To be fair, it should be said that the system of corporate governance was conceived and created not by the FSB, but by the oligarchs. In June 1996, Yeltsin, who, as everyone thought, had no chance of being democratically re-elected president, was inclined to declare a state of emergency in the country, cancel the elections, and thus prevent the victory of the Communist Party candidate Gennady Zyuganov in the elections and remain hostage to supporters of a forceful solution to the issue - the head of the presidential security service, Alexander Korzhakov, the director of state security, Mikhail Barsukov, and their partner in power, Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets. This was the second (after the unsuccessful August 1991 coup) clumsy attempt by the Russian special services to seize power in Russia. But this attempt was unsuccessful.
In the hours when the presidential decree on canceling the elections and introducing a state of emergency in the country had already been signed, one of the power corporations in Russia - the corporation of oligarchs - offered Yeltsin money, newspapers and television controlled by the oligarchs, numerous managers hired by them, ready to organize Yeltsin's election campaign, but with the condition that Yeltsin refuses to solve the problem by force, withdraws the already signed decree canceling the elections and introducing a state of emergency in the country, dismisses Korzhakov, Barsukov, Soskovets and holds democratic elections. Yeltsin listened to the members of the oligarch corporation, accepted their help, entered into a formally fair fight with Zyuganov and won. Of course, critics argued that Yeltsin’s victory was not fair, that the newspapers and television bought by the oligarchs played on Yeltsin’s side. But no one had any particular pity for the communists. The recent events of August 1991 and October 1993, which were considered by the population as attempts at communist revenge, were too memorable.
In July 1996, Yeltsin was re-elected president. But this victory had its price. The shares of power were received by a corporation of oligarchs. For the next four years, until the 2000 elections, this corporation ruled the country. Yeltsin was the president of this corporation. Surrounded by intelligence agencies on all sides, bickering and competing with each other, inexperienced in politics (in which everyone in democratic Russia was inexperienced), despising the people, not believing in democracy in general and in Russian democracy in particular, the corporation of oligarchs came to the conclusion that In the 2000 presidential elections, the head of the intelligence service should be elected president. For some reason, it was believed that the oligarchs could easily control and buy this leader.
Each oligarch had by 1999-2000. there was a respectable, proven intelligence officer. And each intelligence officer has his own proven oligarch. Roman Abramovich, Boris Berezovsky and Anatoly Chubais had Colonel Vladimir Putin, director of the FSB. Vladimir Gusinsky has the first deputy chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Army General Filipp Bobkov. Yuri Luzhkov has First Deputy Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Director of the Central Intelligence Service of the USSR, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia Yevgeny Primakov. Mikhail Khodorkovsky has KGB General Alexei Kondaurov... Oligarchs and special services close to Yeltsin explained to the president that the only one who can guarantee the personal integrity of Yeltsin and his family after Yeltsin leaves power is the former head of the FSB. It doesn’t matter which former leader (here Yeltsin was given a choice), but definitely the former head of the FSB. Because if the communists come to power, they will imprison Yeltsin for dispersing parliament with tanks in October 1993; if the democrats are for the start of the first and second Chechen wars and for the genocide of the Chechen people; and whoever comes to power will certainly try to imprison Yeltsin and members of his family for the privatization carried out in Russia and the large-scale corruption that followed.
Yeltsin believed, and with his own hands, the same ones that wrested power from the communists in August 1991, he transferred control of Russia to the head of the FSB as his successor. Over the course of a year, he tried three people for the role of successor. The first candidate for the post of future President of Russia was Yevgeny Primakov. He was appointed prime minister in August 1998, but was fired in May 1999 because he did not suit the oligarchs, since he openly promised after his victory to release 90 thousand criminals from prison and put 90 thousand businessmen in the vacated cells. The next presidential candidate was Sergei Stepashin, director of the FSB in 1994-1995. He did not suit Yeltsin’s “family,” or rather its individual representatives: oligarch Roman Abramovich, presidential adviser and future son-in-law of the president Valentin Yumashev, and head of the presidential administration Alexander Voloshin. It seemed to them that Stepashin was going over to the side of Yeltsin’s rival for power in the country, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov. In August 1999, Stepashin was removed. Putin, who until then was the director of the FSB, was appointed in his place. Both Yeltsin and the oligarchs liked Putin. It was he who was selected on December 31, 1999 to be Yeltsin’s successor, the next president of Russia.
The oligarchs (with the exception of Vladimir Gusinsky, who bet on the wrong horse) believed that their corporation was still in power. In the end, it was they who unanimously supported Putin and put at his disposal during the election campaign the same mechanisms and the same managers who ensured Yeltsin’s victory in the 1996 elections. But there was another corporation that, unnoticed by the public, supported Putin and ensured his victory on their own and using their own methods: FSB Corporation. And Putin’s first steps as president were distinguished by emphasized loyalty to members of both corporations.
Gradually, however, the balance of power changed in favor of the FSB. First, the empire of Gusinsky and the empire of Berezovsky, who went over to the opposition to Putin, were destroyed, and Gusinsky and Berezovsky found themselves in exile abroad. Then the empire of Mikhail Khodorkovsky was destroyed, and Khodorkovsky himself was arrested and sentenced. At the same time, a number of elected regional positions were replaced by those appointed by the president. In corrupt Russia, where corruption especially flourished in local elections, the abolition of regional elections and the introduction of positions appointed by the presidential administration seemed to many to be correct and acceptable. But to all vacant positions, as well as to all more or less important government and political posts, Putin began to appoint KGB-FSB officers.
Not everyone immediately understood what was happening. And when they realized, it was too late. Between 70 and 80 percent of all top positions in the state were captured by the intelligence services and the military. For the first time in history, power in the state was gained by the FSB, i.e. people who served their entire adult lives in the KGB-FSB system, who hated America and Western Europe, and who had no positive program and construction experience; accustomed only to destroy, control, subjugate and kill. As about smoking and cancer, as about the Gestapo in Nazi Germany, about the FSB, in defense of this structure, not a single kind word can be said. The FSB is an absolute evil, which, due to a pure historical misunderstanding, was not destroyed in August 1991.
Ironically, statesmen often go down in history for events that they themselves probably considered petty and unworthy of mention. We know that President Putin will be remembered in Britain as the man who poisoned his political opponent in central London with a homemade atomic bomb containing radioactive polonium. The rest will be forgotten.
FSB institutes are one of the most prestigious educational institutions that many high school students dream of enrolling in. After all, in addition to a quality education, you will receive a highly paid and qualified job. But to get into such a university, you must meet a number of criteria. Let's look at the main ones.
Which faculty should I go to?
FSB institutes today offer applicants a greater number of directions and specialties to choose from. Deciding which faculty is right for you is not easy right away.
It is worth noting that such education is often followed by followers of family traditions. Or those who dream of the romance of this profession and want to protect the interests of their state. In the future, such romantics, as a rule, create their own family traditions.
The highest passing grades are traditionally found in the investigative and counterintelligence faculties. It is most difficult to enroll in them without preliminary thorough preparation.
The situation is somewhat simpler at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and at the Institute of Cryptography, Communications and Informatics, which operates at the FSB Academy. This is where the aces come from information security. Get ready right away: in order to have a real chance of entering the FSB Institute of Russia, it is advisable to know some rare language. For example, Hindi, Portuguese or Chinese. Fortunately, language courses are very popular today. In this case, your chances over competitors increase significantly.
Admission rules
If you decide to enroll in any FSB border institute, then be prepared for difficulties. The selection of applicants is carried out very carefully. Only every seventh of those who want to enroll make it to the decisive examination tests.
The first test is a medical examination. You need to have excellent health, because studying at such a university requires physical training. Training and physical tests await students almost every day. They approach this issue very strictly. This is the case when connections will not help. After all, if later one of the students turns out to be unprepared for serious physical activity, they will ask the doctors.
The third test is a test of physical readiness. The standards are serious: you need to pull yourself up 11 times without shortness of breath, run 100 meters in no more than 13.5 seconds, and cover a distance of 3 kilometers in a maximum of 12 minutes.
Passing all these tests is not easy. Therefore, it is better to take good advice - enroll in preliminary courses, which are now organized by FSB institutes. On them, the future applicant will understand what the requirements will be and whether he is ready for the exams.
Entrance exams
The final tests of knowledge that you have to pass in order to enter the FSB institutes are almost identical. First of all, you need to provide a list of documents. This is an order from a security authority, a birth certificate, a citizen’s passport Russian Federation, a military ID or a document replacing it, a compulsory health insurance policy, a certificate of secondary education and a university graduate diploma (if you have one). You must have sportswear with you.
The Golitsyn Institute of the FSB of Russia accepts as an entrance exam Unified State Exam results passed at school, as well as the results of additional exams that you will take directly at the institute. They will differ depending on which faculty you choose.
The results of the Unified State Examination will be counted for applicants entering the specialty “border activities”. The results of exams in the Russian language, social studies and history are suitable for those who wish to study in the field of legal support national security. For applicants to the Faculty of Psychology of Professional Activities, excellent scores in mathematics and the Russian language are required.
In addition, those applicants to study to become border guards will have to take history and physical training, and those who go to study to become psychologists will have to take biology and physical training, while those wishing to obtain a legal education will have to take the results of the social studies exam.
The difference between additional exams and school exams and the Unified State Examination is that these exams are considered tests of increased complexity. Here they will test not only the level of your knowledge, but also how you can cope with non-standard situations and quickly find solutions to unexpected problems.
About entrance examinations for individual faculties
At the Faculty of Investigation - social studies and Russian language. At the Faculty of Counterintelligence, a written exam in a foreign language is added to them.
At the Faculty of Foreign Languages, in addition to the written exam in Russian, you will have to complete written and oral assignments in the language you are studying.
Education
Already from the first year, a student who entered the Moscow FSB Institute feels that he has entered the system. Almost all steps and actions will be outlined and strictly regulated. Moreover, you clearly know what you will be doing for the next ten years. First, get an education for five years, and then pay off the debt for it. After all, you were trained on a budget basis. 5 years is the minimum period that you must work in the state security agencies after graduating from university.
Students will have to master a high level of training in almost all subjects: foreign languages, mathematics, law - and at the same time show excellent physical indicators. Among the teachers there are many professors, as well as holders of the titles of Hero of Russia and even Hero of the Soviet Union.
Much of what they teach is classified as "secret". Therefore, it is often impossible to take anything out of the classrooms in which classes are held. Right down to the handle.
Special attention is paid to legal training. The lectures are rich and informative. Sometimes you have to write 30-40 pages of notes in one academic hour.
Scholarship
A scholarship is provided if the applicant comes to study at the Border Guard Institute of the FSB of Russia. Admission is over, it’s time to devote yourself entirely to your studies. Therefore, financial support will not hurt.
Compared to other universities, scholarships here are much higher. They amount to about 15 thousand rubles. However, we should not forget that students at these universities do not just study, but are on duty almost around the clock, which is difficult and exhausting.
Features of studying at the FSB Institute
Perhaps the main feature of studying this at a university is that it is not customary to talk about it, especially on social networks.
Another distinctive feature is that the training is so unifying, and the system itself is so closed, that many find their soul mates here.
After graduating from university, you need to serve in the authorities for at least five years. Moreover, people from the capital are often sent to work in the regions. For example, to Volgograd or Krasnodar. If an employee manages to prove himself, he may be returned to Moscow or promoted to his place of duty.
The main thing is that they often find true friends here, who subsequently support them throughout their lives and provide the necessary assistance.
Employment issues
After five compulsory years served in the authorities, further fate It works out differently for everyone. Some remain in the Federal Security Service in federal or regional departments. Others move on to the Alpha Special Forces Detachment, where FSB university graduates are always welcomed with open arms.
Others go into the civil service and specialize in matters related to jurisprudence. After all, training in this area is one of the strongest in the country. It is quite possible to become a successful lawyer or prosecutor, and in the future, count on getting a position as a judge.
Almost no one experiences problems with finding a job, since people with a diploma from the FSB Institute are hired almost everywhere, often even without an interview.
In modern Russia, political power belongs to the FSB, the successor agency to the KGB.
On the evening of August 22, 1991 - 16 years ago - Alexei Kondaurov, a KGB general, stood in his Moscow office by the window, without turning on the light, and watched as a jubilant crowd approached the KGB headquarters on Lubyanka Square. A victory has just been won over the putschists who tried to remove Mikhail Gorbachev from power. The head of the KGB, who had participated in the preparation of the coup, was arrested, and Kondaurov turned out to be one of the highest-ranking officers remaining in the building, which was quickly emptying. For a moment, it seemed to him that a colossal crowd of people was rushing almost towards him.
Then the indignation of these people found another object - a monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky, the founding father of the KGB. Two men climbed onto the statue and threw a rope around its neck. Then Dzerzhinsky was picked up by a crane and lifted. Watching “Iron Felix” sway between heaven and earth, Kondaurov, who had served in the KGB since 1972, felt betrayed - “betrayed by Gorbachev, betrayed by Yeltsin, betrayed by the powerless organizers of the coup.” As he himself recalls, the thought flashed through his head: “I will prove to you that your victory will not last long.”
500 thousand KGB officers throughout Russia and abroad felt humiliated by the victims of betrayal, including Vladimir Putin, whose resignation from service with the rank of lieutenant colonel of this service was approved only a day earlier. Eight years later, however, the KGB apparently prepared to take revenge. Shortly before taking office as president, Putin told his former colleagues from Federal service Security (FSB), the organization that became the successor to the KGB: “A group of FSB operatives, covertly infiltrated into the government of the Russian Federation, successfully fulfills its tasks.” There was some truth in this joke.
During Putin's two presidential terms, this "group of FSB operatives" consolidated its political power and along the way built a new type of corporate state. People from the FSB and related organizations control the Kremlin, the government, the media and large parts of the economy, as well as the military and security forces. According to research by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist from Russian Academy sciences, a quarter of high-ranking officials in the country are “siloviki” ( Russian word, roughly translated meaning “powerful people” and referring not only to FSB employees, but also to the military, as well as employees of other intelligence services). If we include in this list people simply connected with the special services, then this share will grow to three quarters. These are representatives of a psychologically homogeneous social stratum, true to its roots - the Cheka, the first political police of the Bolsheviks. As Putin often says: “There are no former security officers.”
There are many signs that modern intelligence chiefs have both power and money that are unprecedented in the world. Russian history. The Soviet-era KGB and its pre-revolutionary predecessors thought little about money—power was what mattered. For all its influence, the KGB was a "combat unit" Communist Party and obeyed her. Being an agency that combined elements of intelligence service, management state security and the secret political police, he was often better informed than other bodies, but could not act of his own free will; he could only make “recommendations.” In the 1970s and 1980s, the KGB was not even allowed to spy on the party leadership and had to act within the framework of Soviet laws, even though they were inhumane.
The KGB carried out the vital task of surveillance and suppression; he was a state within a state. However, now the intelligence service has turned into the state itself. With the exception of Putin, “today there is not a single person who can say no to the FSB,” Kondaurov testifies.
Nowadays, all important decisions in Russia, Kryshtanovskaya notes, are made by a small handful of people who served with Putin in the KGB and come from his native St. Petersburg. In the next few months, this clique may well predetermine the results of the presidential elections scheduled for next year. But whoever succeeds Putin, real power will most likely remain in the hands of the organization. Of all the Soviet institutions, the KGB weathered Russia's transition to capitalism best and emerged the strongest. “Communist ideology is a thing of the past, but the methods and psychology of its secret police remain,” says Kondaurov, now a member of parliament.
Incapacitated but not killed
Putin's rise to the Russian presidency was the result of a series of events that began at least a quarter century before Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB, succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary of the CPSU. Andropov's attempts to reform the Soviet economy - to bring it out of stagnation in order to preserve the Soviet Union and its political system, - served as a role model for Putin. In the first years of his presidency, Putin solemnly unveiled a memorial plaque in memory of Andropov on the headquarters building on Lubyanka. The inscription on it says that he was an "outstanding political figure."
The KGB, whose staff consisted of highly educated, pragmatic thinking people, attracted there in the 1960s and 1970s, were well aware of the difficult situation the Soviet economy and the outdated state of party bosses were in. Therefore, the KGB was one of the main driving forces perestroika, the less than methodical restructuring policy initiated by Gorbachev in the 1980s. It was assumed that as a result of perestroika reforms, the Soviet Union would get a second wind. When the reforms became a threat to the existence of the USSR, the KGB organized a coup against Gorbachev. Ironically, this move hastened the collapse of Soviet power.
The defeat of the GKChP-ists provided Russia with a historic chance to liquidate the KGB. “If Gorbachev or Yeltsin had had the courage to abolish the KGB in the fall of 1991, they would have encountered almost no resistance,” wrote Evgenia Albats, a journalist who fearlessly covers the darkest chapters of the agency’s history. But instead, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to reform it.
"Aristocracy" of the KGB - The first main department in charge of espionage was separated into an independent intelligence service. The rest of the department was divided into several parts. There was talk of openness for several months, but then the doors of the secret service were slammed shut again, and the man tasked with trying to reform it, Vadim Bakatin, was expelled. His grim conclusion was made at a conference in 1993: although the myth of the KGB's invincibility had dissipated, the agency itself was alive and well.
And so it was. The Ministry of Security—as it was renamed—continued to “delegate” “active reserve” officers to government agencies and commercial firms. Soon KGB officers began working in the tax police and customs service. As Yeltsin himself admitted at the end of 1993, all attempts to reorganize the KGB were “superficial and cosmetic”; reforming it was practically impossible. “The structure of the political police has been preserved,” Yeltsin said, “and it can be resurrected.”
However, Yeltsin, although he allowed the department to survive, did not use it as a pillar of his power. Actually, the KGB was not allowed to redistribute property in the post-Soviet period. What’s even worse is that he was outmaneuvered and outwitted by a small group of enterprising people, among whom were many Jews (representatives of a nation that the KGB doesn’t really like). Later these people were called oligarchs. The oligarchs have seized much of the country's natural wealth and other privatized assets. KGB officers watched as the oligarchs grew fabulously rich, while they themselves sat on starvation rations, sometimes not even receiving a salary.
Some employees, however, succeeded in life, but only due to the fact that they offered their services to the oligarchs. To protect themselves from rampant crime and racketeering, the oligarchs tried to privatize part of the KGB. Their large and expensive security services consisted of both management and rank and file former KGB officers. The oligarchs also hired high-ranking department officials as “consultants.” Filipp Bobkov, head of the Fifth Directorate (which dealt with dissidents), worked for media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky. Kondaurov, a former KGB official, is with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who led Yukos and owned a significant stake in this company. “Those who remained in the FSB were second-class citizens,” says British analyst Mark Galeotti, who studies Russian intelligence services.
Low-ranking employees worked as bodyguards for the Russian rich. (Andrei Lugovoi, the main suspect in the murder of Alexander Litvinenko last year in London, once guarded Boris Berezovsky, an oligarch who now lives in Britain because he faces arrest in Russia). Hundreds of private security agencies staffed by KGB veterans mushroomed across the country, most, though not all, maintaining ties to their alma mater. Igor Goloshchapov, former employee special forces detachment of the KGB, and now an official representative of almost 800 thousand employees of private security firms (chairman of the board of the Coordination Center for Heads of Security and Detective Structures) says: “In the 1990s, we had one goal - to survive and maintain our professional qualifications. We do not We believed that we were somehow different from those who remained in the FSB. We shared everything with them and saw in our work simply another form of serving the interests of the state. We knew that the moment would come when we would be called back into service.”
That moment came on December 31, 1999, when Yeltsin resigned and, despite his relationship with the KGB, handed over the reins of power to Putin, the man whom he put in charge of the FSB in 1998 and appointed prime minister a year later.
Inner Circle
The new president believed that his primary task was to restore the country's governance system, consolidate political power and neutralize alternative sources of influence: oligarchs, regional governors, the media, parliament, opposition parties and non-governmental organizations. His KGB friends helped him with this.
The most politically active oligarchs - Berezovsky, who helped Putin come to power, and Gusinsky - were expelled from the country, and their television channels were returned to the state. Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest man, became stubborn. Despite several warnings, he continued to support opposition parties and non-governmental organizations and refused to leave Russia. In 2003, the FSB arrested him and, after a show trial, contributed to sending him to jail.
To deal with wayward regional governors, Putin has appointed special representatives charged with oversight and control. For the most part they were KGB veterans. Governors lost their budgets and their seats in the upper house of the Russian parliament. Voters later lost the right to choose them by popular vote.
According to Kryshtanovskaya, all strategic decisions were and continue to be made by a handful of people who made up Putin’s informal “Politburo.” Among them are two deputy heads of the presidential administration: Igor Sechin, who is officially in charge of official documents but also oversees economic issues, and Viktor Ivanov, who is responsible for personnel in the Kremlin and beyond. Nikolai Patrushev, head of the FSB, and Sergei Ivanov, ex-minister of defense and now first deputy prime minister, belong to the same circle. All of them are from St. Petersburg, and all served in intelligence or counterintelligence. Sechin is the only one of them who does not advertise his past.
The fact that two of the most influential people - Sechin and Viktor Ivanov - occupy rather modest positions (deputy head of administration) and rarely take part in public events should not mislead you. After all, it was common Soviet practice for a deputy, often associated with the KGB, to carry more weight than his nominal superior. “These people feel more comfortable in the shadows,” explains Kryshtanovskaya.
In any case, each of these KGB veterans has a host of supporters in others state institutions. One of Patrushev’s former deputies, also a former KGB officer, now holds the post of Minister of Internal Affairs - that is, he leads the police. Sergei Ivanov still enjoys authority in the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Sechin has close family ties with the Minister of Justice. The prosecutor's office, which in Soviet times at least nominally controlled the work of the KGB, has now become its tool. The same thing happened with the tax service.
The political power of these security forces is supported state companies with enormous financial resources (or gives rise to such companies). For example, Sechin is the chairman of the board of directors of Rosneft, Russia's largest state-owned oil company. Viktor Ivanov heads the boards of the Almaz-Antey company, the country's largest manufacturer of air defense missiles, and the national airline Aeroflot. Sergei Ivanov oversees the military-industrial complex and heads the newly created monopoly aircraft manufacturing corporation.
But the long arms of the security forces extend even further, into all spheres of Russian life. They can be identified not only in law enforcement agencies, but also in the ministries of economy, transport, natural resources, telecommunications and culture. Several KGB veterans hold positions in the top management of Gazprom, Russia's largest company, and its pocket bank, Gazprombank (of which Sergei Ivanov's 26-year-old son is vice president).
Alexey Gromov, Putin's press secretary, who enjoys the president's great confidence, is on the board of directors of Channel One, the main television channel in Russia. The railway monopoly is headed by Vladimir Yakunin, an ex-diplomat who served his country at UN headquarters in New York and is believed to have a high rank in the KGB. Sergei Chemezov, an old KGB friend of Putin's from the Dresden period (where the president worked from 1985 to 1990), runs Rosoboronexport, the government agency for the arms trade. Under Chemezov, it grew, turning into a huge conglomerate. The list goes on and on.
Many employees from the active reserve were sent to large Russian companies, both private and public, where they receive a salary while remaining on the staff and on the payroll of the FSB. “We must be sure that companies do not make decisions that are contrary to the interests of the state,” explains one serving FSB colonel. Getting into a company as an active reserve employee is a dream, not a job, says another KGB veteran: “You get a huge salary and keep your FSB ID.” Among such employees is Patrushev’s 26-year-old son, who last year was seconded from the FSB to Rosneft, where he is now Sechin’s adviser. (After seven months of Andrei Patrushev’s work at Rosneft, Putin awarded him the Order of Honor for success in his professional activities and “many years of conscientious work”). After the destruction of this company, the assets of YUKOS went mainly to Rosneft.
The attack on Yukos, which entered its decisive phase just at the moment when Sechin was appointed to Rosneft, was the first and most blatant example of the redistribution of property in favor of the security forces - but not the only one. Mikhail Gutseriev, owner of Russneft, a rapidly growing oil company, was recently forced to abandon his company after being accused of illegal activities. Gutseriev resisted for some time, but, as he himself explained, “they tightened the nuts,” and one government agency after another - General Prosecutor's Office, the tax service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs - began checking his activities.
From oligarchy to espionage
The transfer of financial wealth from the oligarchs to the security forces was, perhaps, inevitable. The majority of Russians, who do not have much sympathy for the “robber barons,” certainly did not object to him. Thanks to this campaign, the security forces even gained some popularity. But will they be able to successfully manage their newly acquired assets? This is doubtful. “They know how to destroy a company or confiscate something. But they don’t know how to run a business. They use force simply because they don’t know any other way,” says a former KGB officer who is now involved in business.
It is curious that the concentration of so much power and economic resources in the hands of a handful of security officials who identify themselves with the state has not turned ordinary intelligence officers against them. These people have received something from above: over the past ten years average salary FSB operational worker was promoted several times, and outside work is tolerated within certain limits. In addition, many Russians - both intelligence officers and ordinary citizens - believe that the transfer of property from the hands of private owners to the security forces is in the interests of the state. “They are returning their property and have the right to it,” says Goloshchapov.
However, the rights of security forces have nothing to do with those formal rights that are written down in laws or in the constitution. The security forces themselves claim that they are carrying out a special mission to restore the power of the state, save Russia from collapse and undermine the efforts of enemies who could weaken it. Such idealistic aspirations, according to Kondaurov, coexist with an unprincipled and cynical desire to extract personal or narrow official benefit from the situation.
Security service employees position themselves as a friendly brotherhood that has the right to break any laws in the name of their mission. Their pompous speeches are peppered with abuse, their nationalism is often combined with contempt for ordinary people. At the same time, they are devoted to each other.
Competition for employment in the intelligence services is extremely high. The KGB carefully selected its recruits. They were recruited from a number of institutes and universities and sent to study in special KGB schools. Today, the Moscow FSB Academy attracts children of high-ranking security officials; After the commissioning of a huge new building, the scale of this educational institution will double. According to British analyst Galeotti, it is important “not only what you learn, but also who you meet within these walls.”
Graduates of the FSB Academy may well agree with this. “Chekists are a special breed,” says one retired FSB general. Modern security forces highly value a respectable KGB background: it’s good if your father or grandfather served there. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged.
Viktor Cherkesov, head of the State Drug Control Service, who was still catching dissidents in the late 1980s, summed up the psychology of FSB officers in an article that became a manifesto for the security forces and a call for unity.
"We (the security forces) must understand that we are one whole. By the will of history, the burden of support was placed on our shoulders Russian state. I believe that when we sense danger, we can put aside all the little things and remain true to our oath."
The leadership of the Russian special services not only appeals to secular patriotism, but also easily finds allies among the clergy. Next to the FSB building on Lubyanka Square stands the Church of St. Sophia of the Wisdom of God, built in the 17th century and, as a sign on its wall says, “restored in August 2001 with the zealous help of the FSB.” Inside, freshly painted icons sparkle with gold. “Thank God that there is the FSB. All power is from God, including its power,” says Father Alexander, who conducts the service here. One retired KGB general agrees: “They really believe that God chose them and directs their activities, and even high prices the oil from which they benefit is a gift from God."
Sergei Grigoryants, who was frequently interrogated by the KGB and imprisoned twice (for anti-Soviet propaganda), says intelligence service leaders believe “that they are the only ones who have a true picture of the world.” At the center of this picture is an exaggerated sense of the enemy environment, which justifies the very existence of these people: who will need them if there are no enemies? "They believe they can recognize enemies where ordinary people I’m not able to see them,” says Kryshtanovskaya.
In 1999, Putin said something like this to FSB officers: “Several years ago we succumbed to the illusion that we have no enemies, and we paid dearly for it.” This point of view is shared by the majority of KGB veterans and those who replaced them. The greatest danger comes from the West, which hypothetically seeks to weaken Russia and sow confusion. “They want to make Russia dependent on their technology,” says one current FSB officer. “They have flooded our market with their goods. Thank God, we still have nuclear weapons" The security forces' "siege mentality" and their anti-Western sentiments resonated with the broad masses in Russia. Goloshchapov, the official spokesman for private security guards, puts these views this way: "Under Gorbachev, Russia was liked by the West, and what did we get out of it? We passed everything: Eastern Europe, Ukraine, Georgia. NATO has moved closer to our borders."
If you look at things this way, anyone within the country who plays into the hands of the West is an internal enemy. In this category are the last free-thinking journalists, the last Western-sponsored NGOs, and the few liberal politicians who still embrace Western values.
The intensity of these feelings can be seen in the reaction of one FSB officer to the murder of Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist whose books critical of Putin and his brutal war in Chechnya are better known outside Russia than within its borders. "I don't know who killed her, but her articles were useful to the Western press. She was deservedly punished." By this logic, Litvinenko, a former KGB officer who was poisoned with polonium in London last year, also deserved his death.
In such an atmosphere, the idea that Russian intelligence services have the right to ruthlessly deal with enemies of the state wherever they are found has won widespread approval and is supported by new laws. Thus, one law directed against “extremism” gives the FSB and other departments ample opportunity to persecute anyone who speaks or deeds against the Kremlin. It has already been used against independent analysts and journalists. A lawyer who complained to the Constitutional Court that the FSB illegally tapped his client's phone was accused of disclosing state secrets. Several scientists who collaborated with foreign firms were jailed for treason.
Despite their devotion to old Soviet roots, modern intelligence leadership differs from its predecessors. The current bosses do not want the return of communist ideology, they do not want to abandon capitalism, the fruits of which they enjoy. They do not at all like the asceticism of their ancestors. There is no need for them mass repression: In a country where fears lie deep in the subconscious, selective attacks are enough to frighten others. But the concentration of such power and such money in the hands of the special services does not promise anything good for Russia.
And they don't do their job very well
The work of creating enemies may smooth over divisions between clans and fuel nationalism, but it does not improve the security of the country or contribute to its prosperity. While the FSB reports on an ever-increasing number of foreign spies, accuses scientists of treason and praises its “brotherhood,” Russia remains one of the most criminalized, corrupt and bureaucratic countries in the world.
During emergency at the Beslan school in 2004, the FSB did a good job of harassing journalists who were trying to get to the bottom of the truth. But she couldn’t even cordon off the school where the hostages were being held. Under the leadership of Putin's former FSB colleague, Ingushetia, a republic bordering Chechnya, has become a new theater of war. There is an epidemic of crime and abuse of young soldiers in the army. Private businessmen are regularly persecuted by law enforcement agencies. Russian foreign policy is developing according to the principle: “What you believe will come true”: by permanently exposing enemies on all fronts, Russia is helping many countries turn from potential friends into alarmed adversaries.
The rise to power of KGB veterans should not surprise anyone. In many respects, argues Inna Solovyova, a specialist in the history of Russian culture, it is determined by the qualities that appeal to Russians in their rulers: firmness, restraint, authority and a touch of mystery: “The KGB met this definition, or at least knew how to create such an appearance ".
But do they benefit the country? “People from the KGB are tacticians. We were never taught to solve strategic problems,” says Kondaurov. The main problem, according to Kondaurov and several other sources, is that the department has lost its professionalism. Speaking about the polonium blunders in London, Kandaurov blushes. “We have never sunk so low,” he sighs. “What a blow to the country’s reputation!”
In Russia, the centenary of the state security agencies was celebrated, which was marked by the head of the FSB, Alexander Bortnikov, in which he spoke about the current merits of the department and the achievements of its predecessors - the Cheka, the NKVD and the KGB.
About what role the FSB actually plays in modern Russia, Present Time was told by journalist Andrei Soldatov, political scientist Ekaterina Shulman, as well as Vladislav Surkov’s former assistant, and now an analyst at the Center for Social Research, Andrei Kolyadin.
How are the modern FSB and the Soviet KGB connected - journalist and co-author of the book "The New Nobility: Essays on the History of the FSB" Andrei Soldatov
Soldatov: What Mr. Bortnikov said in this interview says absolutely the opposite. In general, his desire, let’s say, to present the FSB as the direct heir of the Soviet intelligence services and, above all, the Cheka, which was created as a political organization to protect the political regime, this, of course, means that the FSB still considers itself an organization which believes that the main thing in its activities is to protect the stability of the political regime that exists in Russia, and all other tasks are rather secondary.
Therefore, I repeat, we must be extremely careful about what ritual phrases Mr. Bortnikov spoke about the current state of the FSB. If we even look at, for example, what language, what terminology is used in the intelligence services, it is amazing how many things invented during the KGB are still used within the FSB.
I remember well how surprised I was in the early 2000s when FSB special forces officers spoke to me with approval about the security and military operations carried out at one time by the NKVD on the territory, for example, of Ukraine. And imagine my surprise when even now in Bortnikov’s interview this term “Chekist-military operation” continues to be used, albeit to describe the past. But even in regulatory documents The FSB still has traces of this Soviet legacy.
Within the limits of power
In Russia, besides the FSB, there are at least seven more influential security services, the total number of whose employees can consider themselves heirs of “Iron Felix” is approaching 5 million people.
How the Federal Security Service differs from all the others, and where the myth of power ends and reality begins - say Ekaterina Shulman and Andrey Kolyadin.
Shulman: Its powers are great because it combines many functions. Eat federal law, which describes her activities, she protects our security, which concept is understood in our context in an extremely broad way. She is also involved in the fight against terrorism, and accordingly, all the powers that the anti-terrorism agencies have are also present in her. She is engaged in the fight against extremism, she is engaged in the fight against cybercrime, she is engaged in the fight against, let’s say, everything unsafe in the information, media and ideological sphere.
It has the powers of operational investigative activity - operational investigative activities, that is, the FSB is an investigator, it conducts cases. Not all law enforcement agencies have this right. For example, the Russian Guard does not have it, at least not yet. There are those that do, but, let’s say, their activities are limited to this, like, for example, the Investigative Committee, they do not have all those other powers that the FSB has. This concerns powers within the framework of the law.
Therefore, one can call the Federal Security Service first among equals, but nevertheless, due to the fact that it is so large, it itself has contradictions and internal struggles. We can see little of what is happening there, but something reaches us. For example, the Information Security Center, there was such a structure that was actually destroyed due to what was revealed to the public under the name of the “Humpty Dumpty” case, what it looked like from the inside - we can only guess.
There is an extremely powerful department of economic security, with which, among other things, General Feoktistov, who has acquired great public fame, is associated. There are all sorts of mysterious divisions “K” and “P”, which are busy with all sorts of different financial and economic issues; according to legend, their function is to somehow prevent the money of the Motherland from leaving the Motherland, except in cases where it is necessary.
Kolyadin: Like any organ of suppression, the FSB has quite serious capabilities to, let’s say, cause damage and bring a variety of problems to those people who do not like Russia and oppose it. Therefore, this influence can be extended to any other representatives of the political community, so it is, of course, impossible to say that this is a harmless organization.
New powers
On the eve of the centennial anniversary of the FSB, a bill was introduced into the State Duma that would allow the agency to investigate cases against judges, prosecutors, investigators and lawyers. How will the system of checks and balances work within the Russian law enforcement system if the influence of the FSB increases so noticeably.
Shulman: Do you understand what's the matter? Their power is limited by the very size of their service. I repeat once again, it is very large, and there is a lot of different things going on inside it. Therefore, to perceive the FSB as a kind of single political actor would, I think, be somewhat of an excessive generalization. But now, as far as I understand, new powers are being added to them in honor of the holiday, since a new draft law has been submitted to the State Duma, which expands the powers of the FSB as an investigator. I said that there are these same functions of operational intelligence activities, operational investigative activities.
- That is, now it is a super service with the possibility of investigation.
Shulman: It was a service with the possibility of investigation. Now, as far as I understand, the idea of the new project is that she can, let's say, choose which cases she can take on and further investigate them on her own.
Kolyadin: There are some interdepartmental structures that, one way or another, correlate their activities between a variety of security organizations. In the territory, this is partly the governor, who influences, one way or another, the political component, and together with the FSB, of course, resolves some issues.
Do you think that the governor works in conjunction with the FSB on equal terms? Because sometimes it seems that he is always afraid of the head of the regional FSB.
Kolyadin: He is clearly afraid if he does not behave too correctly in relation to the authorities, or if he is corrupt, or if he is up to something, something that is not approved in our state. Then, of course, he has something to fear. Of course, the FSB partly controls the activities of officials, because the anti-corruption events that took place in our country most often took place with the participation of the FSB, which detained governors. But nevertheless, I can say that in a fair number of issues that concern the domestic political bloc, the foreign policy bloc, there is still some kind of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and local authorities, because it is impossible otherwise.
Is it possible to “recapture” people from the FSB?
On the eve of the anniversary of the Cheka. The prosecutor's office is checking all cases of spying devices after the RT television channel asked Vladimir Putin a question about a criminal case against a Russian farmer. FSB officers tried to bring him to justice for buying a device to track his calf - the FSB considered it a spy device. There are quite a lot of similar cases in Russia.
However, there is an opinion that, unlike other law enforcement agencies, the FSB is capable of turning on reverse gear.
Kolyadin: I had to repeatedly encounter and communicate with a representative of this organization. I can say that this is one of the most intelligent structures of the power bloc in terms of personnel, attitude, and relationships with this organization. Therefore, to say that these are some unprecedented monsters sitting there - no, no, these are extremely smart, decent, I emphasize, people with whom you can always come to an agreement if you are not an enemy of the Fatherland.
Shulman: Investigative functions, let’s say, are not central for FSB officers, so the quality of their work in this area is not particularly high. Therefore, there were cases, no matter how frightening the phrase “the case is being handled by the FSB,” when they fought people off with the help of a public campaign and good lawyers. Let me remind you, for example, of the case of Daniil Konstantinov, who was accused of a murder that he did not commit; the case of Ilya Farber was also carried out by the FSB, and they also somehow managed to recapture him from there, not without losses, but more or less; the case of Svetlana Davydova, which ended before it began, was also conducted by the FSB. So there is always hope.
There is even such an idea regarding these cases, according to some lawyers, it was the FSB who really had to “beat them off”, and Investigative Committee It would not have been possible, because the FSB is more focused in Russia and understands what honor is, relatively speaking, of an officer from the secret service.
Shulman: Okay, listen, if lawyers manage to extract people from the jaws of the system, it matters under what pretext they do this? They say: “You know, you are so honest, you are much more honest than everyone else, so give up this person, you should be above this ".
For a leadership position - according to security officer
From the protector of Russian children to the president of Russia, many current leaders graduated from a KGB school or an FSB academy. How does this talent forge work and how effective is it?
Shulman: There are studies on this topic - about the percentage of presence of direct people from the FSB in senior positions. Here we are making some attempts to maintain balance. A lot of people have left the FSO, including a number of governors. This generalized law enforcement machine, of course, provides an extremely large number of personnel. The FSB, as such a large and prolific structure in this sense, yes. Again, depending on how you look. If all those who studied at the FSB Academy or all those who once worked there, there are also all sorts of their own: those who real employee, and who is not real, and who, on the contrary, is fake.
Some time ago we had a fashion: every new person appointed by anyone - a new governor, not a governor, an employee of whatever - it was somehow hinted that he served somewhere, went through something there, and in general he also did not just like that. Again, if you have ever been to government agencies, then December 21 is extremely large number people gives themselves a mysterious and festive look, in general, without any particular reason for this.
Kolyadin: Still, a good defender of the Fatherland from spies and a regional manager or manager-manager are not always the same thing. Undoubtedly, the FSB selects people who love their country, who are morally stable in the face of a wide variety of temptations, but nevertheless, this is not always the same thing as a good governor, a good head of a state corporation. Therefore, I would still consider FSB employees as a structure that protects our country from external and internal influence, terrorism, and not as managers.
You know, probably the only bonus in all of this is that it is easier to pass a variety of checks for all sorts of clearances and for all kinds of state secrets. As for the rest, everything depends on him. If he is smart, if he is professional, if he performs his duties well in his new place, then no one will remember that he is an FSB officer, they will say: he is a good governor, a good minister.
About how he was called to the FSB in the Tyumen region to “feel out” what kind of bird he was. I will probably seem old-fashioned, but if I were him, I would not go to the meeting, especially since he was summoned not by summons, but by telephone call, in violation of procedural norms. Over the past three years, the FSB contacted me three times, of which the meeting took place only once and absolutely spontaneously. Twice I ignored them, demanding strict adherence to procedural norms, which made them instantly lose all interest. Let me first tell you why you should NOT take the initiative and go to meetings with these people, and then I will tell you what these people wanted from me.
According to the old Soviet habit, people perceive the FSB as an analogue of the KGB, where a group of thugs in a cop basement will beat you up rubber batons, wrapped in a wet towel and threaten that if you don’t admit that you are an enemy of Russia, then they will plant heroin on you and you will trample the zone for the rest of your life. In addition, the people are convinced of the absolute limitlessness of this structure, the countless wealth of its employees (otherwise, so many people were given heroin, and their apartments and businesses were allegedly squeezed out), constant black glasses and immense power. This is the image that the FSB has among the people. So, this is complete bullshit and has no connection with reality. In fact, the FSB is a regular police-type structure, but with slightly more expanded powers. Like the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the structure suffers from a lack of qualified personnel willing to do serious work for a relatively low salary. As a result, they have more illiterate employees in their ranks than is acceptable.
These people often take advantage of the unreasonable fear of many fellow citizens of the magic word “FSB” and make their work easier. To summon a person, they are required to comply with a number of formalities, and the summoned citizen receives certain rights. The summons indicates the reason for the call, the time for which you were called, the name of the person calling, and the consequences of failure to appear. In addition, the summons implies the obligation to pay the summoned person the cost of travel to the meeting place and compensation for the lost day of work. Instead, they call from a blocked phone number and invite you to a meeting. Who's calling you? Is it really the FSB, or was your friend playing a joke on you?
So, I was first invited to the FSB in 2012. When I was visiting Yekaterinburg. They called on the phone. How did they find out the number? I bought a SIM card for my passport, so they figured it out. The conversation was very short. I asked to send a summons. The person on the other end of the line hesitates, saying that all this is very long, but the conversation is urgent. He replied that I personally am not in a hurry, send me a summons. They ask, where should I send them, since I have not had registration at my place of residence in Russia since 2007? I answer that I am registered at the Russian consulate in Israel, send a summons there and send plane tickets there - I will not fly at my own expense. The man laughs, saying, what’s the problem, you’re in Yekaterinburg now, why are you complicating everything? I answer, dear, send a summons. And I interrupt the conversation. They didn't call again.
The second time they “wanted” me was in 2013. First, one of my old readers wrote to LiveJournal privately and said that it would be “correct and reasonable” for me to communicate with the FSB if possible. He assured that no one was going to arrest or detain me, but simply (quote): “You are a fairly popular blogger and we want to get to know you and understand what kind of person you are. This is a common procedure, many of your fellow bloggers have gone through it and everything is fine, no one is in prison." I am writing in response that I see no reason to prevent me from being invited by summons. He writes in response that such meetings are unofficial and are not related to the conduct of a criminal case or investigation. Therefore, subpoenaing is problematic. I answer that in this case the meeting is impossible. He wrote something like “We are not your enemies, you need to calm down.” My friend didn’t write anything to me anymore. This correspondence approximately coincided with one unpleasant story, when I almost became a victim of the maniac Fedorovich, so there was no question of any unofficial meetings with strangers.
The third time the meeting took place in the summer of 2014, in Yekaterinburg. Nobody called me, no one called me. I went to meet a friend, we met in the center, next to the house where Yeltsin lived and there is a corresponding memorial plaque there. We took a walk along the Iset embankment. And then my friend “turned me over” to the FSB. Two men came up, said hello, and shook hands. The friend hesitated and threw out some bullshit like “...also readers of the blog.” The men were interested in the frequency and purpose of my trips to Ukraine and the presence of certain friends related to Ukraine on my Facebook. I asked them to introduce themselves and show their official IDs unfolded. And they showed their IDs, it really says FSB of Russia. After that, they asked me to show my passport myself. I show my passport, they look at it carefully and leaf through it. Then they returned it back. I answered them that the topic of Ukraine is interesting to me in the context of the fact that I am interested in geopolitics, history, and, among other things, I am involved in obtaining Ukrainian citizenship. They grinned, “Yes, yes, but they never gave it to you.” They prepared well for the meeting. They asked if I personally knew certain people. No, I don't know. But is he friended on Facebook? Maybe. I have thousands of people as friends, of whom I personally know about two dozen.
We walked with them around the center of Yekaterinburg for an hour and a half. What was the conversation about? Honestly, nothing valuable. They asked how my litigation with the Israeli special services ended (meaning my arrest in Israel on suspicion of visiting enemy Syria and Lebanon) and I answered that, as in Russia, there is no use in suing the Shabak (analogue of the FSB). They smile, “Well, in Russia it’s not completely useless.” True, they could not remember at least one positive precedent. Then they agreed that it was not necessary from a formal point of view to attend the meeting when called, and I was right in refusing to meet a year earlier. Is my file closed now? They replied that despite my exceptional sociability and formal openness, they did not feel absolute frankness in me and felt that there was a “wall” between us. Actually, that's all.
Who is cooler: Mossad or FSB?
To be fair, the correct question would be “Shabak, or FSB,” because in Israel this structure is the analogue of the FSB. It's hard for me to judge. I communicated with the FSB once in my life, and with Shabak many times. In addition, Shabak had specific suspicions about me about visiting enemy countries and they wanted to make sure that I was not collaborating with any terrorist organizations. In the case of the FSB, I think they are simply assessing how much this or that public person is ready to cooperate, that is, without any accusations of anything. The Shabak in Israel itself does not have the power to detain suspects; it is not a power structure, but rather an analytical one. In Russia, the FSB is quite a security force. On the other hand, the formal “toothlessness” of the Shabak is compensated by their absolute power, and if the Shabak investigator wants to detain you, the arrest will formally be formalized by the police and the latter has no right to vote at all, it is ordered to detain you - they will detain you. The same parsley, only in profile.
One more nuance: in Israel there is no need to “plant heroin on you” in order to detain you until the investigation is completed. Since 1948, the country has not repealed the martial law, which gives the intelligence services unlimited powers. The court will almost automatically extend your detention if Shabak recommends doing so and declares that you pose a danger to the state. Moreover, it is not necessary to prove in court why exactly you are dangerous for Israel; the judge will give you a couple of weeks (or even a month) based on just one “recommendation”.
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