When was the East Prussian operation. In the battles for East Prussia. Start of the operation. Breaking through the border defense line

East Prussian operation

As a result of “Stalin’s ten strikes,” by the end of 1944, Soviet troops reached the borders of Nazi Germany, liberating Soviet territory from the Nazi invaders. The Soviet Army was given a new task to complete the defeat of the Nazi army, finish off the fascist beast in its own lair and hoist the banner of victory over Berlin. However, looming over the troops preparing to storm Berlin was a large enemy group entrenched in East Prussia, without the destruction of which an attack on Berlin would have been very risky.

According to the plan of the Supreme High Command, the overall goal of the operation was to cut off the troops of Army Group Center from the rest of the forces, press them to the sea, dismember and destroy them in parts, completely clearing the territory of East Prussia and Northern Poland from the enemy.

The German command attached great importance to the retention of East Prussia. There have long been powerful fortifications here, which were subsequently improved and supplemented. By the beginning of the Red Army's winter offensive in 1945, the enemy had created a powerful defense system up to 200 km deep. The strongest fortifications were on the eastern approaches to Koenigsberg.

During this strategic operation, the Insterburg, Mlawa-Elbing, Heilsberg, Koenigsberg and Zemland front-line offensive operations were carried out. The most important goal of the East Prussian strategic offensive operation was to cut off the enemy troops located there from the main forces of Nazi Germany, dissect them and destroy them. Three fronts took part in the operation: the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and the 1st Baltic, commanded by Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky, generals I.D. Chernyakhovsky and I.X. Bagramyan.

They were assisted by the Baltic Fleet under the command of Admiral V.F. Tributsa.

The offensive was initially scheduled for January 20, but was launched ahead of schedule, since it was necessary to save our then allies from the catastrophic situation that had arisen for them in connection with the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes.

prisoners in the Ardennes

The first to go on the offensive on January 13 were the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Despite careful preparation, it was not possible to keep an event of such a large scale completely secret. The enemy, who became aware of the time of the front's offensive, on the night of January 13, hoping to prevent the systematic development of further events, began heavy artillery shelling of the battle formations of the front's strike group. However, the enemy's artillery was soon suppressed by retaliatory strikes from artillery and night bombers. As a result, the enemy was unable to prevent the front troops from taking their initial positions and going on the offensive according to plan.

At 6 o'clock in the morning, successful actions of the advanced battalions began. Having rushed to the front line, they found that the first trench was occupied by only minor forces, the rest were withdrawn to the second and third trenches. This made it possible to make some adjustments to the artillery preparation plan, which lasted from 9 to 11 o’clock.

Since there was thick fog over the battlefield and the sky was covered with low clouds, planes could not take off from the airfields. The entire burden of suppressing enemy defenses fell on the artillery. In two hours, Soviet troops spent large number ammunition: the 5th Army alone fired more than 117,100 shells. But the increased consumption of ammunition did not ensure the complete suppression of enemy defenses.

After artillery preparation, infantry and tanks, supported by artillery fire, went on the attack. The Nazis offered fierce resistance everywhere. In conditions of poor visibility, they brought tanks to close range, and then made extensive use of faust cartridges, anti-tank artillery and assault guns. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance and repelling his continuous counterattacks, formations of the 39th and 5th armies by the end of the day wedged 2-3 km into the enemy’s defenses; The 28th Army of General A.A. Luchinsky advanced more successfully, advancing up to 7 km.

The fascist German command, trying at all costs to delay the advance of the Soviet troops, during the 13th and on the night of January 14, transferred two infantry divisions from unattacked areas to the breakthrough site, and pulled up a tank division from the reserve.

Individual points and centers of resistance changed hands several times. Reflecting counterattacks, the front troops persistently moved forward. On January 14, the weather cleared up somewhat and the planes of the 1st Air Army made 490 sorties: they destroyed enemy tanks, artillery and manpower, and conducted reconnaissance to the Ragnit, Rastenburg line.

IL-2 on attack

By the end of the next day, the troops of the front’s strike group, having broken through the main line, wedged 15 km into the enemy’s defenses.

The wedging of Soviet troops into the enemy’s defenses created a threat of encirclement of his group, which was defending between the Neman and Inster rivers. The commander of Army Group Center was forced to allow the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, General E. Rous, to withdraw the 9th Army Corps from this area to the right bank of the Inster River.

On the night of January 17, the formations of the 39th Army operating here, having established the beginning of the enemy’s retreat, began to pursue him. The troops of the main group of this army also intensified the pressure. In the morning, with a strong blow, they completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone and began to develop an offensive in the north-west direction. At the same time, the advance of the troops of the 5th and 28th armies slowed down, as the fascist German command, trying to hold the second line of defense at all costs, continuously reinforced its units with tanks, assault guns and field artillery.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, General I.D. Chernyakhovsky, taking into account the current situation, decided to immediately use the success of the 39th Army to introduce a second echelon.

Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovsky

The 1st Tank Corps of General V.V. Butkov, and then the formations of the 11th Guards Army under the command of General K.N. Galitsky, were first moved to this direction. A powerful blow to strongholds and concentrations of enemy infantry and tanks was delivered by aviation, which carried out 1,422 sorties that day.

PE-2 in a dive

On January 18, the 1st Tank Corps entered a breakthrough on the left flank of the 39th Army. Destroying scattered enemy groups along the way, formations of the tank corps reached the Inster River and captured bridgeheads on its right bank. Using the success of the corps, the troops of the 39th Army advanced 20 km in a day. By the end of the day, its advanced units reached the Inster River.

On January 14, the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive from bridgeheads on the Narew River, north of Warsaw, in the Mlawa direction. At 10 o'clock a 15-minute artillery preparation began.

The advanced battalions of the first echelon divisions, deployed on the Ruzhany bridgehead, energetically attacked the front line of the enemy’s defense and broke into the first trench. Developing their success in depth, by 11 o'clock they had captured the second and partially the third trenches, which made it possible to reduce artillery preparation and begin the period of artillery support for the attack with a double barrage of fire to the entire depth of the second position.

On the very first day, the troops of the 2nd Shock Army of General I.I. Fedyuninsky advanced 3-6 km, and the formations of the 3rd Army under the command of General A.V. Gorbatov and the 48th Army of General N.I. Gusev advanced with battles 5-6 km.

Ivan Ivanovich Fedyuninsky

Alexander Vasilievich Gorbatov Nikolai Ivanovich Gusev

The 1st Baltic Front was preparing to go on the offensive on February 20, with the task of clearing the Zemland Peninsula of Germans within a week. However, a day earlier, the Germans themselves launched converging attacks from Fischhausen and Königsberg (Operation West Wind) against units of the 39th Army of General I. Lyudnikov with the forces of several infantry and 5th tank divisions, as a result of which the land connection between Zemland and Koenigsberg and thwarted the Soviet offensive.

On February 24, the 1st Baltic Front, having transferred troops to the 3rd Belorussian Front, was abolished. Having taken command of the front, A. M. Vasilevsky ordered to stop the futile attacks, replenish supplies by March 10 and carefully prepare the final blows.

Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky

Given the limited forces, the marshal decided to destroy the surrounded groups sequentially, starting with the strongest - the Heilsberg one.

Having created the necessary superiority, the troops resumed the offensive on March 13. Fogs and low clouds continued to limit the use of artillery and aircraft. These difficulties were added to by the spring thaw and flood. Despite difficult conditions and stubborn German resistance, Soviet troops reached Frisch Gaff Bay on March 26. The German command began a hasty evacuation of troops to the Zemland Peninsula in advance. Of the 150 thousand German soldiers and officers who defended southwest of Koenigsberg, 93 thousand were destroyed and 46 thousand were taken prisoner. On March 29, the remnants of the Heilsberg group stopped fighting. After the completion of the Heilsberg operation, six armies were freed from the 3rd Belorussian Front: three of them were sent to Königsberg, the rest were withdrawn to the reserve of Headquarters, beginning a regrouping in the Berlin direction.

On April 6, the 3rd Belorussian Front began the Königsberg operation. After a powerful artillery barrage, infantry and tanks attacked the German positions. Due to bad weather, aviation made only 274 sorties during the day. Having overcome stubborn enemy resistance, the troops advanced 2-4 km and by the end of the day reached the outskirts of the city. The next two days became decisive, when flying weather settled in. 516 heavy bombers of the 18th Air Army, commanded by Air Chief Marshal A.E. Golovanov, dropped 3,742 large-caliber bombs on the fortress in just the evening of April 7 within 45 minutes. Other air armies, as well as naval aviation, also took part in the massive raids. It is necessary to note the worthy contribution of the pilots of the 4th Air Army, General K. A. Vershinin. In its composition, under the command of Major E. D. Bershanskaya, pilots from the night bomber regiment fought bravely U-2 . Their courage and heroism were highly appreciated by the Motherland: 23 female pilots were awarded the title of Hero Soviet Union. 2.1 thousand bombs of various calibers were dropped on the heads of the enemy.

The commandant of the Koenigsberg fortress, General O. Lasch, seeing the futility of further resistance, asked the commander of the 4th Army, General Muller, to allow the remaining forces to break through to the Zemland Peninsula, but was refused. Müller tried to help the Königsberg garrison with a strike from the peninsula to the west, but Soviet aviation thwarted these attacks. By evening, the remnants of the garrison were sandwiched in the center of the city and in the morning they found themselves under crushing artillery fire.

Soldiers began to surrender in thousands. On April 9, Lasch ordered everyone to lay down their arms. Hitler regarded this decision as premature and sentenced the general to death penalty by hanging.

Otto von Lasch

On April 9, the Königsberg garrison capitulated. Lasch himself surrendered, which saved him from Hitler’s sentence. Together with Lasch, 93,853 soldiers and officers were captured. About 42 thousand German soldiers from the fortress garrison died.

General Müller was removed from his position as commander.

In East Prussia, the Red Army destroyed 25 German divisions, the other 12 divisions lost from 50 to 70% of their strength. Soviet troops captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers. The trophies included about 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1,442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment. The loss of large forces and a militarily-economically important area accelerated the final defeat of Germany.

in defeated Königsberg

medal “For the capture of Königsberg”

The main political goal of the East Prussian operation was to eliminate the nest of reactionary Prussianism - the eastern bridgehead of German militarism - and liberate the northern regions of Poland. Based on this, the Supreme High Command set a strategic task for the Soviet troops: to defeat one of the largest enemy groupings - Army Group Center, to reach the sea and capture East Prussia with the most important naval ports of Koenigsberg and Pillau. The solution to this problem was supposed to contribute to the successful offensive of Soviet troops on other sectors of the front, and primarily in the Warsaw-Berlin direction.

Taking into account the situation, the goals set and the preliminary considerations of the front commanders, the Headquarters developed an operation plan, which provided for the delivery of two powerful enveloping attacks from the areas south and north of the Masurian Lakes on the flanks of Army Group Center. The troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses, defeat his forces and, developing an offensive in the direction of Marienburg and Koenigsberg, reach the sea in order to cut off the troops defending here from the main forces of the German army, dismember the encircled formations, and liquidate them and occupy the entire territory of East Prussia.

In accordance with the plan of the operation, the Headquarters supplied the troops specific tasks. She ordered the 2nd Belorussian Front to prepare and conduct an offensive operation with the aim of defeating the enemy's Przasnysz-Mlawa grouping and on the 10th-11th day of the offensive to reach the line Myshinets - Naydenburg - Dzialdowo - Bielsk - Plock, and then advance in the direction of Marienburg. The front was supposed to deliver the main blow with the forces of four combined arms armies, a tank army and one tank corps from the Ruzhany bridgehead to Przasnysz-Mława. The defense breakthrough was planned to be carried out in an area 16-18 kilometers wide by the forces of three armies with the involvement of three artillery divisions, creating an artillery density of at least 220 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. To develop success after the breakthrough in the main direction, it was ordered to use the tank army and most of the tank and mechanized corps. In the second echelon of the front, one army was allocated to introduce it into battle from the Ruzhany bridgehead after breaking through the enemy’s defenses. Advancing on Myshinets, it was supposed to roll up the Nazi defense in front of the right wing of the front and provide a strike group of Soviet troops from the north.

In addition to the main strike, it was ordered to launch a second strike with the forces of two combined arms armies and one tank corps from the Serotsky bridgehead in the direction of Belsk. To break through enemy defenses in a 9-kilometer-wide area, it was planned to attract two artillery divisions and create a density of at least 210 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. To assist the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the Warsaw group, it was planned to strike the enemy with the forces of at least one army and one tank or mechanized corps, bypassing Modlin from the west, in order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing from the Warsaw region beyond the Vistula. The mechanized and cavalry corps were allocated to the front reserve.

The 3rd Belorussian Front received the task of defeating the Tilsit-Insterburg group and capturing the Nemonien-Darkemen-Goldap line on the 10th - 12th day of the operation. In the future, the front forces had to develop an offensive against Koenigsberg along the Pregel River, with the main forces on the southern bank of the river. The headquarters ordered the main attack to be made by four armies and two tank corps from the area north of Gumbinnen in the direction of Wehlau. The breakthrough of the enemy defense was planned to be carried out in a zone of 18-19 kilometers by the forces of three first-echelon armies with the participation of three artillery divisions, creating an artillery density of 200 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. The second echelon army and tank corps were supposed to be used after breaking through the enemy’s defenses to build up the attack on the main direction. The actions of the main group were ensured by the strong defense of troops on the flanks of the front and the offensive of part of the forces in secondary directions.

The 1st Baltic Front was ordered to assist the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in defeating the enemy's Tilsit group, concentrating at least 4-5 divisions on the left wing of the 43rd Army for an offensive along the left bank of the Neman.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered the Red Banner Baltic Fleet to block the enemy bridgehead on the Courland Peninsula. For this purpose, torpedo boats and submarines were supposed to interrupt the enemy’s sea communication with his group in Courland, and the fleet’s bomber aircraft were to strike the port of Liepaja. To complete the task, the fleet commander needed to speed up the relocation of light forces to Sventoji harbor and aviation to Palanga airfields.

Strategic support for the combat operations of Soviet troops in East Prussia was carried out by the simultaneous transition to the offensive of fronts throughout the entire space from the Baltic to the Carpathians according to a single plan and active actions Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Coordinated strikes against the enemy of the 1st Belorussian Front in Poland were of great importance for the successful offensive. In turn, the 3rd Belorussian Front was supposed to strike with part of its forces at Tilsit, collapsing the enemy defenses in front of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front, and the 2nd Belorussian Front had the task of assisting the 1st Belorussian Front in defeating the Warsaw group.

In preparation for the offensive, major regroupings of formations were carried out. Back at the end of 1944, the 2nd Shock Army was transferred from the 3rd Baltic Front to the 2nd Belorussian, and the 2nd Guards Army was transferred from the 1st Baltic Front to the 3rd Belorussian. At the beginning of 1945, the 5th Guards Tank Army, previously part of the 1st Baltic Front, joined the 2nd Belorussian Front. In addition, a significant number of breakthrough artillery formations and formations of other types of troops from the Reserve of the Supreme High Command arrived in the operation preparation area.

When planning the East Prussian operation, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, based on the situation and the overall goal of the campaign, developed a clear operation plan. At the same time, it did not bind the creative initiative of front commanders in preparing and planning combat operations of troops, as was the case in some operations of the first and second periods of the Great Patriotic War.

However, there were also shortcomings in the operation plan. They consisted primarily in the weak organization of strategic interaction between the Baltic fronts and the fronts operating in East Prussia: on January 13, when the East Prussian operation began, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Baltic fronts were ordered to switch to “hard defense.” It should also be noted the untimely transfer of the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front to the 3rd Belorussian Front, its late entry into battle and the not entirely successful choice of the direction of its initial attack. Instead of delivering a decisive blow from the area north of Tilsit to the south along the railway to Insterburg in order to assist the 3rd Belorussian Front surrounded by the Lazden enemy group, the army had to launch a frontal attack from the Sudargi area along the left bank of the Neman.

According to the general plan of the East Prussian operation, the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front decided to break through the enemy’s defenses in the Mlava direction from the Ruzhany bridgehead in an area 18 kilometers wide with the forces of the 3rd, 48th and 2nd shock armies and develop an offensive towards Mlava - Marienburg. To expand the breakthrough area to the right, the 3rd Army received the task of delivering the main attack on Allenstein and a secondary attack in the northern direction; on Aleksandrov, the 2nd Shock Army with part of its forces was supposed to bypass Pułtusk from the west and in cooperation with the 65th Army, advancing from Serotsky bridgehead, eliminate the enemy's Pultus group. The 5th Guards Tank Army was intended to enter the breakthrough in the 48th Army zone in the Mlawa - Lidzbark direction.

Mobile formations were given the task of being ready to enter a breakthrough in the army zones and develop their success in the main direction: the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps was scheduled to enter the breakthrough in the 3rd Army zone, the 8th Mechanized Corps - in the 48th Army zone and the 8th Guards Tank Corps - in the zone of the 2nd Shock Army. To support the actions of the front's strike group from the Masurian Lakes and expand the breakthrough area, it was planned to bring the 49th Army into the battle in the direction of Myszyniec on the second day of the operation.

From the Serotsky bridgehead on a 10-kilometer stretch, the 65th and 70th armies were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses. In the offensive zone of the 65th Army, it was planned to introduce the 1st Guards Tank Corps into the breakthrough. To expand the breakthrough area from the south and interact with the right-flank army of the 1st Belorussian Front, part of the forces of the 70th Army struck in a southwestern direction, bypassing Modlin from the north, in order to then cross the Vistula. The 50th Army, located on the right wing of the front, occupied a strong defense at the line of the Augustow Canal and the Beaver River. Two rifle divisions and three anti-tank artillery brigades were assigned to the front reserve.

The breakthrough of the main line of enemy defense was planned to be carried out at a rate of advance of 10-12 kilometers, and in the future - up to 15 kilometers per day.

The 4th Air Army received the task of covering the combat formations of its troops with fighter aircraft, carrying out at least 1,000 sorties the night before the offensive in order to exhaust enemy manpower, destroy his firing points on the front line, disrupt the work of headquarters, and control dirt roads and railways. . On the first day of the operation, front aviation was supposed to concentrate its main efforts in the zones of the 48th and 2nd Shock Armies. With the introduction of mobile formations into the breakthrough, attack aircraft were assigned to accompany them.

Thus, the plan of the front operation was to break through the enemy’s defenses in two directions, defeat the Przasnysz-Mlawa group and, delivering the main blow in the north-west direction towards Marienburg, bypass and cut off the entire East Prussian group from the central regions of Germany. At the same time, it was envisaged to encircle small enemy groups: one in the Pultusk area by troops of adjacent flanks of the 2nd shock and 65th armies, the other in the area of ​​the Modlin fortress by the 70th Army with the assistance of the 47th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front.

It should be noted that the 2nd Belorussian Front had to advance in more favorable conditions than the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front. Here the troops had convenient operational bridgeheads on the right banks of the Narev and Western Bug. In the front zone, the defense system and the grouping of Nazi troops were weaker than in the offensive zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The main fortified areas - Letzen and Allenstein - could be bypassed by troops from the south, and the Mlavsky fortified area, located on the path of movement of the main group of Soviet troops, was not powerful enough. A large number of mobile formations (tank, mechanized and cavalry) made it easier for the troops to complete the task.

The commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front decided to defeat the enemy forces consistently. First, the advancing troops were supposed to destroy the Tilsit group operating on the left bank of the Neman and reach the Tilsit-Insterburg line, and then defeat the Insterburg group and develop an offensive on Velau-Konigsberg. It was assumed that this task could be solved only if the left wing of the front’s strike group was in a stable position in the Darkemen region, from where a counterattack could be expected from enemy reserves located under the cover of the Masurian Lakes. It was planned to break through the enemy's defenses in a 24-kilometer area north of Gumbinnen with the forces of the 39th, 5th and 28th armies. The 11th Guards Army was in the second echelon. She received the task of following the troops of the 5th and 28th armies and, from the morning of the fifth day of the operation, in cooperation with the 1st Tank Corps, which was in the front reserve, enter the battle on the line of the Inster River, delivering a swift blow to Velau, and part of the forces in cooperation with the 28th Army to capture Insterburg. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was supposed to enter the breakthrough of the morning of the second day of the operation in the offensive zone of the 5th Army. The 2nd Guards Army was to go on the offensive on the third day of the operation, taking advantage of a breakthrough in the enemy’s defenses made by its neighbor on the right, the 28th Army. The 31st Army, operating on the left wing of the front, east of the Masurian Lakes, had the task of taking a strong defense and being ready to go on the offensive if the strike force was successful. The average rate of attack when breaking through enemy defenses in tactical depth was planned to be 10 kilometers, and in operational depth - 12-15 kilometers per day. The 1st Air Army received orders to support the offensive of the 5th Army and allocate one assault aviation division each to assist the 28th and 39th armies, and with the beginning of the offensive of the second echelon army, to support its actions. In the depths of enemy defenses, aviation was supposed to bomb warehouses, bases and airfield hubs. When enemy reserves appeared, air army formations were supposed to destroy his manpower and equipment. Thus, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to deliver one deep frontal attack on Konigsberg, overcome the Ilmenhorst and Heilsberg fortified areas, storm the Konigsberg fortress and, together with the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front, complete the defeat of the East Prussian enemy group. At the same time, it was envisaged to encircle and defeat enemy groups in the Tilsit area by the 43rd, 39th armies and part of the forces of the 5th Army and in the Insterburg area by formations of adjacent flanks of the 11th Guards and 28th armies.

The operational formation of the armies of both fronts, as a rule, was single-echelon. The army commanders had one rifle division in their reserve. However, rifle corps, divisions and regiments formed their battle formation in two echelons. The 49th Army had an original operational formation, in which one corps was located in the first echelon on a wide front and two corps in the second echelon on the left flank, closer to the breakthrough site. This formation of the army made it possible to use its main forces as the second echelon of the front. The deep formation of troops fully corresponded to the current situation and was supposed to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses and the development of an offensive in depth.

The preparation of the fronts for the upcoming offensive took place over a month and a half. During this time they regrouped their forces. The offensive zones of the shock grouping armies were narrowed in order to increase the density of troops. To achieve surprise in the offensive, the concentration and movement of troops was carried out at night and in cloudy weather using various camouflage measures.

By the beginning of the offensive, powerful groups had been created in the directions of the main attacks. The troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the breakthrough areas outnumbered the Nazi armies in manpower by 5 times, in artillery by 7-8 times, and in tanks by 9 times. To successfully break through enemy defenses, 88.7 percent of the tanks available at the front were concentrated here; average operational density of 70 armored units per kilometer of front. Separate tank and self-propelled artillery regiments were moved into infantry combat formations to directly support it. The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front in the breakthrough sector outnumbered the enemy in manpower by 5 times, in artillery by 8 times, and in tanks by 7 times. 50 percent of all rifle divisions of the front, 77 percent of artillery, 80 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery units were concentrated there. The operational density of tanks and self-propelled artillery units was 50 armored units per kilometer of front. The density of artillery in the breakthrough areas in the 2nd Belorussian Front was from 180 to 300, and in the 3rd Belorussian from 160 to 290 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. The main task of the artillery was to ensure a breakthrough in the tactical depth of the defense and accompany the infantry throughout the operation. When the troops went into pursuit, it was planned to transfer heavy artillery to the army reserve for use in breaking through subsequent fortified lines of enemy defense.

To break through the main line of enemy defense, artillery groups were created in units and formations: regimental, divisional and corps. In addition, there were army groups of long-range artillery, destruction artillery, and rocket artillery. In the 3rd Belorussian Front, a long-range front artillery group was created, which carried out tasks in the interests of the entire strike group under the leadership of the front artillery commander. This group was supposed to destroy enemy reserves, conducting massive fire at the most important railway junctions, headquarters and other objects located in the depths.

Artillery preparation for the attack was planned in the 3rd Belorussian Front for 1 hour 45 minutes, in the 2nd - 85 minutes. The operation was allocated 4-5 rounds of ammunition, which amounted to 9 million shells and mines of all calibers on both fronts, the transport of which would have required about 60 thousand one and a half ton vehicles. For the first day of the battle, 2 ammunition loads were allocated.

In the face of a breakthrough of the enemy's heavily fortified defenses great value purchased by aviation. It was supposed to destroy the enemy's reserves, disrupt the command and control of his troops, ensure the introduction of mobile troops into the breakthrough, reliably cover the advancing units from the air and conduct aerial reconnaissance. Aviation training was planned to be carried out the night before the offensive with the involvement of formations of the 18th Air Army.

Engineering units were supposed to conduct engineering reconnaissance of enemy barriers to ensure the passage of all types of troops through the minefields in front of the front line and in the depths of the defense, as well as the rapid passage of troops through difficult areas and crossing of rivers. To carry out these tasks, 254 engineer battalions were involved, not counting the pontoon-bridge units. The bulk of engineering resources were concentrated on the breakthrough areas.

The sappers conducted continuous surveillance of the enemy, carried out hydraulic reconnaissance, and made passages in minefields and other enemy obstacles. Units of all types of troops equipped the starting areas for the offensive on the right bank of the Narev. Before the start of the operation, there were 25 bridges across this river and 3 bridges across the Western Bug. This made it possible to timely concentrate troops on bridgeheads for the offensive. In the 3rd Belorussian Front, 1,767 kilometers of trenches, 404 kilometers of communication passages were dug at all lines, 2,058 command and observation posts, 10,429 dugouts and dugouts were equipped, 283 kilometers of wire barriers were installed. The successful solution of engineering support tasks for the operation contributed to reducing the losses of friendly troops and made it easier for them to break through enemy defenses.

During the preparation of the operation, work was carried out to train troops. During combat training classes, issues of attacking prepared defenses with crossing large rivers, breaking through fortified areas, and repelling enemy counterattacks were worked out. Particular attention was paid to the preparation of assault battalions designed to break through the positions of fortified areas and fortresses.

Significant work was carried out on medical support for the upcoming operation. By mid-January, a large number of hospitals had been created at the fronts and evacuation transport had been prepared. Each army of the 3rd Belorussian Front had 15-19 hospitals with 37.1 thousand beds, and under the direct jurisdiction of the military sanitary department of the front there were 105 hospitals with 61.4 thousand beds. In the 2nd Belorussian Front there were 58 hospitals with 31.7 thousand staff beds, and in the armies there were 135 hospitals with 50.1 thousand staff beds. The reserve of medical institutions on both fronts was insufficient.

The involvement of large forces to carry out the operation, its spatial scope, the great distance of the combat area from the main economic centers of the country, the sparse network of railways and roads located in the rear of the troops, complicated the work of the military rear and the organization of logistics. But despite this, by the beginning of the operation, the Soviet troops received a sufficient amount of ammunition, food, fodder, technical equipment and building materials. There was only a shortage of gasoline, diesel fuel and some types of food.

During the preparation of the operation, commanders, political agencies, party and Komsomol organizations of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts and the Baltic Fleet widely launched party-political work in order to cultivate a high offensive impulse, strengthen the political-moral state and discipline of soldiers, as well as increase vigilance . The troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to operate on enemy territory, and the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front - first on the soil of friendly Poland, and then in East Prussia. Commanders and political workers explained to the soldiers of the Red Army how to establish correct relationships with the German and Polish populations, how to tell the people about the goals of the Red Army, which entered East Prussia and Poland. Taking into account the peculiarities of military operations outside their homeland, political authorities, party and Komsomol organizations paid great attention to instilling Soviet patriotism and a sense of national pride among soldiers.

Before the offensive, the police forces were reinforced with personnel. At the political departments of divisions, corps and armies, the command created reserves of party workers. The best communists and Komsomol members from the rear units and reserves were sent to the party and Komsomol organizations of combat units, especially rifle and machine-gun companies. For example, more than 300 communists were transferred from rear organizations to the combat units of the 28th Army of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

In the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts, communists and Komsomol members made up almost half of the total personnel. In the 28th Army, 6 weeks before the offensive, the number of party and Komsomol organizations, thanks to the entry of soldiers into the party and Komsomol, increased by 25-30 percent. In the 372nd Rifle Division of the 2nd Shock Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front alone, party organizations received 1,583 applications for admission to the party within a month. The heads of political departments of divisions and brigades handed out party cards in units at the forefront.

During the preparation for the offensive, special attention was paid to the units that received reinforcements. Political workers, party and Komsomol organizations, as well as experienced soldiers, sergeants and officers helped young soldiers master the best practices of offensive operations, study weapons and military equipment. When working with new recruits, commanders and political workers encountered great difficulties, since its composition was heterogeneous and differed sharply from the main contingent. In the 2nd Belorussian Front, for example, at the beginning of the operation there were 53 thousand people mobilized from the regions liberated from the Nazi occupation, more than 10 thousand released from captivity, 39 thousand discharged from hospitals and 20 thousand arriving from rear units and institutions. These fighters had to be brought together and trained in military affairs; in each of them it was necessary to cultivate high fighting and moral qualities.

One of the most important tasks of party-political work in the troops continued to be the inculcation of burning hatred towards the Nazi occupiers. Commanders and political workers understood well that it was impossible to defeat the enemy without learning to hate him with all your soul. Leaflets and newspaper articles described the atrocities of the Nazi invaders on Soviet and Polish soil. Many military personnel had families that suffered from the Nazi occupation. In the 252nd Guards Rifle Regiment of the 83rd Guards Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army, the Nazis killed and tortured close relatives of 158 soldiers and officers, the families of 56 people were taken to hard labor in Germany, 162 were left homeless, 293 - The Nazis plundered household property and stole livestock. Anger and hatred were born in the hearts of soldiers when they visited former Nazi death camps located in Lithuania, East Prussia and Poland, or listened to the stories of Soviet citizens freed from fascist slavery.

Among the soldiers, the immortal feat of the guard private of the 77th Guards Rifle Regiment of the 26th Guards Rifle Division of the 11th Guards Army Yuri Smirnov, who was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, was widely popularized. The soldiers and officers of the guards regiment, where Yuri Smirnov served, greeted the hero’s mother, M. F. Smirnova, who arrived at the front with great honor. In honor of her arrival, a parade of regiment units took place in the German city of Melkemen. Addressing the guardsmen, Maria Fedorovna stated: “Having arrived at the front, to my Yuri’s comrades in arms, I did not feel lonely. Every day, with every meeting, I became more and more imbued with the idea that a friendly soldier’s family is my family and every soldier is my son... I was on German soil and I curse this land and the Germans who crucified my son. I ask you, my sons, go forward, drive, beat the Germans, take revenge on them for all their atrocities...” M. F. Smirnova’s stay at the front was reported in many Red Army newspapers.

The political bodies of the formations also carried out active work to undermine the morale of enemy troops. To do this, leaflets were thrown at the enemy’s location, which spoke of the pointlessness of his further resistance. Through powerful sound installations located near the front line, on German There were broadcasts about the brilliant victories of the Red Army, about the inevitability of Germany's defeat, and the futility of further resistance. Not only were they sent to the location of enemy troops soviet people, but also anti-fascist German prisoners of war.

The night before the attack, short meetings were held between party organizers and unit Komsomol organizers, where combat missions and how to quickly accomplish them were explained.

Immediately before the battle, political workers read to the troops the appeals of the military councils of the fronts and armies to all soldiers and officers. The appeal of the Military Council of the 2nd Belorussian Front stated:

“Dear comrades! Fighting friends! Faithful sons of the Soviet Motherland - Red Army soldiers, sergeants, officers, generals!..

The time has come to fully reckon with the worst enemy of our Motherland - the Nazi invaders for all their atrocities and atrocities, for the suffering and torment of our people, for the blood and tears of our fathers and mothers, wives and children, for Soviet cities and villages destroyed and plundered by the enemy ... At this decisive hour, our great Soviet people, our Motherland, our dear party ... call on you to fulfill your military duty with honor, to translate the full force of your hatred of the enemy into a single desire to defeat the German invaders.

With a new powerful blow we will hasten the death of the enemy! From now on, your battle cry should be only one: “Forward to defeat the enemy!” Forward to Berlin!

However, after Stalingrad and Kursk, the Germans began to realize that soon the rear status of East Prussia could be replaced by a front-line one, and they began to prepare it for defense by building fortifications. As the front approached the borders of the region, these works became more and more intense. East Prussia was turned into a huge fortified area with a defense depth of 150-200 km. Koenigsberg was located behind many lines of fortifications (from three to nine in different directions).

The first battles on German soil

Soviet troops represented by the 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts reached the borders of East Prussia in September 1944 as a result of the triumphant Operation Bagration (by far the best strategic operation Soviet army for the entire Great Patriotic War) and the Baltic offensive operation (also quite successful). The Germans were going to defend East Prussia to the last possible opportunity, not only and not so much for military reasons, but for political and psychological reasons - this region meant too much to them in historically. Nevertheless, the Soviet command planned to capture East Prussia before the end of 1944.

The first offensive against East Prussia began on October 16, 1944. Two days later, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered the territory of this region for the first time, i.e. to the territory of Germany, which they have been striving for since June 41st.

However, from the first moment the operation turned into a frontal “gnawing through” of a very powerful German defense. Therefore, on October 27, the offensive was stopped. It cannot be called unsuccessful - the troops advanced 50-100 km deep into East Prussia. However, its complete capture was out of the question, and Soviet losses were twice as large as those of the enemy (80 thousand versus 40 thousand). But a bridgehead on enemy territory was created, and important experience was gained.

On the second try

The second attempt was made already in 1945. To carry out the East Prussian operation, the Soviet army concentrated 1.7 million people, 25.4 thousand guns, 3.8 thousand tanks and self-propelled guns, 3.1 thousand aircraft against approximately 800 thousand people, 8.2 thousand guns, 700 tanks and self-propelled guns, 800 aircraft as part of the German Army Group North (former Army Group Center).

The Soviet offensive by the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian and 1st Baltic fronts began on January 13 in two directions - through Gumbinnen to Königsberg (from a bridgehead captured in October 1944) and from the Narev area to the Baltic coast.

In contrast to the Vistula-Oder operation, which began at the same time and was developing triumphantly (already on January 31, troops crossed the Oder, only 70 km remained to Berlin), the offensive in East Prussia proceeded extremely slowly and in this sense resembled the offensive operations of the first half of the war. The reason for this was the deeply layered defense of the Germans prepared in advance and the fire of German ships. It was thanks to the fire of the ships (pocket battleships Lützow and Admiral Scheer, the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, about 20 destroyers, destroyers and floating batteries) that the Germans regularly launched counterattacks, which in other sectors of the front by this time was almost unthinkable . In addition, the German fleet managed to transfer as many as eight divisions from the Courland bridgehead to East Prussia; the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force could not prevent this.

By the beginning of February, despite fierce resistance, Soviet troops cut the German group into three parts. However, final victory was very far away. Thanks to the support of naval artillery, the largest of the German groups, the Heilsberg group (south of Königsberg), launched a successful counterattack and reconnected with the Königsberg group. During these battles, on February 18, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Army General Ivan Chernyakhovsky, died (he was only 38 years old).

What was happening in East Prussia led to the fact that the 1st Belorussian Front, under the command of Zhukov, stopped the attack on Berlin and turned north, launching an attack on East Pomerania together with the 2nd Belorussian Front.

Thus, the defense of Königsberg delayed the fall of Berlin, i.e. the end of the war for at least two months.

At the same time, in Eastern Pomerania, Soviet troops faced the same problem - crushing fire from German naval artillery, which made the ground offensive very difficult.

The German group in Eastern Pomerania and the Heilsberg group in East Prussia were eliminated only by the end of March. At the same time, Danzig fell, which led to the final isolation of German troops in East Prussia from the main forces of the Wehrmacht. In addition, the German fleet was forced to shift its efforts to the west, first to the area of ​​​​the Bay of Danzig, then to Eastern Pomerania. The departure of the German ships, which the Baltic Fleet was never able to cope with, facilitated the actions of the ground forces in East Prussia.

Capture of Königsberg

Objectively speaking, after this, the remnants of German troops in East Prussia did not pose any threat to the Soviet army; they could simply be ignored, throwing maximum forces at Berlin. However, this was not our rule. Now the target was the regional capital. Ahead was the battle for Königsberg.

The defense of Königsberg consisted of three lines and included 12 large and 5 small forts, plus many other defensive structures. The city was defended by a 134,000-strong German garrison. The assault on Königsberg began on April 6. Before this, for four days, artillery and aviation preparations were carried out in the capital of East Prussia, in which 5 thousand guns and 1.5 thousand aircraft were involved. This is what decided the outcome of the battle, especially since the shelling and bombing of the city continued during the assault itself.

Even the powerful German fortification could not withstand the amount of metal that fell on it. Koenigsberg fell very quickly - already on April 9, 92 thousand German troops surrendered, including the commander, General Lasch.

After the capture of Königsberg there was absolutely no need to fight in East Prussia, but the Soviet command did not think so. The last German group remained in the western part of East Prussia, on the Samland Peninsula. It was captured on April 25, and Pillau fell at the same time (note that at that time there were already battles in the center of Berlin!). The remnants of the German troops (22 thousand people) retreated to the Frische-Nerung spit, now bearing the name Baltic, where they surrendered on May 9.

Results of the East Prussian operation

Of all the operations of the last year of the war, it was in East Prussia that Soviet troops suffered the greatest losses - almost 127 thousand people. killed, 3.5 thousand tanks, almost 1.5 thousand aircraft. The Germans lost at least 300 thousand people killed. To the Soviet losses directly in East Prussia, we must add significant additional losses during the assault on Berlin at the end of April (at the beginning of February it was quite possible to take it “on the move”).

Thus, the “citadel of German militarism” cost us extremely dearly, although the assault on Königsberg itself was carried out almost flawlessly.

The reasons for this are indicated above - the extreme saturation of East Prussia with defensive lines and the complete inability of the Baltic Fleet and the Soviet Air Force to neutralize German ships (all of them were sunk by British aircraft in April-May 1945, but by that time they had already done their “dirty deed”).

However, it is not a fact that the East Prussian operation should have been carried out at all. In fact, the Stalingrad mistake was repeated here, when, while finishing off the “cauldron”, a much larger German group was missed from the Caucasus. Moreover, there was no need to finish off - Paulus's army was doomed to death from cold and hunger. Two years later, the German group in East Prussia was also doomed and no longer had any opportunity to strike the flank and rear of the Soviet troops advancing on Berlin; it could simply be restrained by fairly limited forces without any assaults. Then Berlin would inevitably fall in February, which would end the war. But alas.

As a result of the offensive in the summer and autumn of 1944, the troops of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts reached the borders of East Prussia in a wide zone, in a number of areas they wedged 20-45 km deep into its territory and at the same time captured bridgeheads on the river. Narew in northern Poland. Thus, they took an advantageous enveloping position in relation to the East Prussian enemy group.

By the beginning of 1945, Army Group “Center” (from January 26 - “North”), consisting of the 3rd Panzer, 4th and 2nd armies, was operating in East Prussia and the northeastern regions of Poland. They had 35 infantry divisions, two combat groups (each equal in size to half a division), three tank and three motorized divisions - a total of 580 thousand people, about 8,200 guns and mortars, up to 700 tanks and assault guns. Over 1 thousand aircraft of the 6th Air Fleet were intended to support them from the air. The group was faced with the task of preventing the further advance of Soviet troops and, under favorable conditions, delivering a powerful counterattack to the rear of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts deployed in the Berlin direction.

Using favorable terrain conditions (a large number of lakes, swamps, rivers, canals, forests), the German command well prepared the territory of East Prussia in engineering terms. A number of defensive lines (lines) and fortified areas were created here to a depth of 150-200 km. The main line consisted, as a rule, of two positions, each of which had from three to five trenches. At a distance of 10-20 km from the front edge there was a second strip, consisting of one or two trenches. Further inland there were fortified areas (UR). Three of them - Ilmenhorst, Letzensky and Heilsberg - covered the approaches to Konigsberg from the east, southeast and south. The most powerful was the Heilsberg UR, which had 911 long-term firing points (pillboxes) with a density in some areas of up to 10-12 units per 1 km. The enemy turned the cities of Gumbinnen, Insterburg, Tilsit, Wehlau, Königsberg, Darkemen, Letzen, Mlawa, Ciechanów, Heilsberg and others into powerful centers of resistance. Directly around Koenigsberg there was a fortified line, which included two or three trenches. In addition, in the city itself there were two lines of forts - external and internal. The forts were in mutual fire communication. Each of them housed a garrison of 250-300 people. Caponiers and half-caponiers were connected by underground corridors.

The idea of ​​the East Prussian operation was to break through the enemy’s defenses with attacks from the 3rd Belorussian Front in the Koenigsberg and 2nd Belorussian Front in the Marienburg directions and, developing the offensive, cut off his East Prussian group from the main regions of Germany, cut it into pieces and successively destroy. In addition to the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts, the 43rd Army of the 1st Baltic Front and the forces of the Baltic Fleet were involved in the operation - a total of about 1,670 thousand people, 25,426 guns and mortars, 3,859 tanks and self-propelled guns, 3,097 aircraft.

The commander of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, the army general, decided, in order to defeat the Tilsit-Insterburg enemy group, to deliver the main blow with the forces of four armies and two tank corps against the adjacent flanks of two German army formations. This made it possible to disrupt the interaction between them at the very beginning of the operation, as well as to bypass powerful resistance centers from the north - Gumbinnen and Insterburg.

In accordance with the decision of the commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union, three armies, a tank army and a cavalry corps were allocated to the strike force that went on the offensive from the Rozhan bridgehead. Two armies were to strike from the Serotsky bridgehead.

On January 13, 1945, at 6 a.m., advanced battalions began operating in the zone of the 3rd Belorussian Front. During reconnaissance in force, it was established that the enemy had left only a military outpost in the first trench, and had withdrawn the main forces into the depths. Moreover, having made sure that the offensive of the Soviet troops had begun, he carried out a powerful artillery counter-training in the areas where army strike forces were concentrated.

Only at 11 o'clock, after artillery preparation, the rifle divisions, supported by tanks, went on the attack. But by the end of the day, the formations of the 39th and 5th armies of the lieutenant general and colonel general were able to wedge into the depth of the enemy defense only 2-3 km. The situation was not much better in the zone of the 28th Army of Lieutenant General A.A. Luchinsky, where individual units advanced up to 5-7 km. The introduction of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of Lieutenant General A.S. into the battle on the morning of January 14 did not bring a turning point in the course of hostilities. Burdeyny. Subjected to numerous counterattacks by German troops, by the end of January 15, the front’s strike group, having covered from 6 to 10 km, broke through the main line of defense, that is, in three days, with great difficulty, it completed the task of the first day of the offensive.

In the next two days, taking advantage of improving weather conditions, the 1st Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation, intensified its operations, which flew 3,468 sorties. Air support allowed the 39th Army and the 1st Tank Corps of Lieutenant General V.V. Butkov to increase the force of attacks and force the German 26th Army Corps, which occupied a defensive line south of the river, to withdraw. Neman. In general, by the end of January 18, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, as a result of intense fighting, broke through the enemy defenses north of Gumbinnen in a strip 65 km wide to a depth of 20-30 km. Thus, conditions were created for the introduction of the second echelon of the front into the battle - the 11th Guards Army of Colonel General K.N. Galitsky and the development of the offensive in the Koenigsberg direction.

Formations of the 2nd Belorussian Front went on the offensive on January 14. Over the course of two days, the strike groups that launched attacks from the Ruzhany and Serotsky bridgeheads advanced only 7-8 km. The turning point was reached on January 16, when the 4th Air Army, Colonel General of Aviation, launched massive attacks on the enemy with attack and bomber aircraft. On that day, more than 2.5 thousand sorties were flown and up to 1,800 tons of bombs were dropped. Aviation actions allowed ground forces to complete the breakthrough of the tactical defense zone and create conditions for the entry into battle of the 5th Guards Tank Army of Colonel General V.T. Volsky. Pursuing scattered enemy units, its formations blocked the Mlavsky fortified area and by the morning of January 19, in cooperation with the divisions of the 48th Army of Lieutenant General N.I. Gusev was released from Mlava. At the same time, the 65th and 70th armies operating from the Serotsky bridgehead, Colonel Generals and V.S. Popov rushed along the northern bank of the Vistula to the west and captured the Modlin fortress.

The breakthrough of the strike groups to Königsberg and the successful advance to the Baltic Sea created a threat of encirclement of the German 4th Army, and therefore it began to retreat to a fortified line along the Masurian Lakes. Pursuing the enemy, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front, in cooperation with the 43rd Army of Lieutenant General A.P. Beloborodov from the 1st Baltic Front defeated the Tilsit-Insterburg group, captured Insterburg on January 22 and reached the coast by January 29 Baltic Sea, bypassing Koenigsberg from the north, northwest and southwest.

Three days earlier, on January 26, the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front reached the coast of the Baltic Sea north of Elbing, cutting off the retreat routes of the East Prussian enemy group to the west. In order to release it, the German 4th Army launched a strong counterattack the next day with four infantry, two motorized and one tank divisions. To reflect it, Marshal of the Soviet Union K.K. Rokossovsky deployed the 48th and 5th Guards Tank Armies, the 8th Guards Tank (Lieutenant General A.F. Popov), the 8th Mechanized (Major General A.N. Firsovich) and the 3rd Guards Cavalry ( Lieutenant General N.S. Oslikovsky) corps, which by February 8 stopped the enemy and threw him back. This ended the participation of the 2nd Belorussian Front in the East Prussian operation. The next day, the Supreme High Command Headquarters ordered the commander of his troops to transfer the 50th, 3rd, 48th and 5th Guards Tank Armies to the 3rd Belorussian Front, and with the remaining forces to go on the offensive from February 10th to defeat the enemy in Eastern Pomerania.

After this, the 3rd Belorussian Front had to independently complete the defeat of Army Group North. By the beginning of February, it consisted of 32 divisions, which were part of three isolated groups - Heilsberg, Koenigsberg and Semland. The largest was the first of them. It united more than twenty divisions, which, occupying defense areas in a fortified area, had a large amount of artillery, tanks and ammunition. By that time, Soviet troops had suffered heavy losses during heavy fighting. The strength of most rifle divisions did not exceed 2500-2700 people. Therefore, the destruction of the encircled enemy was associated with great difficulties and took a long time.

The commander of the front forces planned to cut off the Heilsberg group from the sea by striking the 5th and 5th Guards Tank Armies in converging directions, and with other armies to cut it apart and destroy it piece by piece. However, this plan was not realized during February. Skillfully maneuvering reserves, the German command each time closed the gaps that had formed in the defense. On February 18, in the Melzak region, Army General I.D. was mortally wounded and died. Chernyakhovsky. In this regard, the Marshal of the Soviet Union took command of the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front.

On February 24, the Zemland operational group of troops, formed on the basis of the 1st Baltic Front, was included in the front. But weather conditions, the onset of mud and the lag of the rear did not allow the offensive to continue. It resumed only on March 13 after careful preparation and replenishment of the formations with people and material and technical means. Despite fierce enemy resistance, Soviet troops reached Frisch Gaff Bay on March 26. Three days later, the remnants of the Heilsberg group stopped fighting. During the fighting, 93 thousand German soldiers and officers were destroyed, and 46 thousand were captured. The Baltic Fleet (Admiral V.F. Tributs) provided active assistance to the ground forces, striking the enemy with aviation, submarines and light surface forces. During February - March, he sank 32 transports and seven warships.

Subsequent events unfolded in the Königsberg area, where significant enemy forces were blocked - the Zemland task force, four infantry divisions, several separate Volkssturm regiments and battalions. They numbered over 130 thousand people, about 4 thousand guns and mortars, 108 tanks and assault guns. These troops were supported from the air by 170 aircraft based on the Zemland Peninsula.

To carry out the task of defeating the Königsberg enemy group, the 39th, 43rd, 50th, 11th Guards Armies, 1st and 3rd Air Armies of the 3rd Belorussian Front, formations of the 18th Long-Range Aviation Army, the Baltic Fleet Air Force, two bomber aircraft were involved aviation corps of the RVGK (total of up to 187 thousand people, about 5,200 guns and mortars, 538 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 2,500 aircraft). Considering that fighting had to be conducted on terrain with a large number of engineering obstacles and in a fortified city, 47% of the artillery systems were heavy guns, guns of high and special power. For the same reason, more than 45% of the total number of aircraft were bombers.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevsky decided to attack Königsberg with the 43rd and 50th armies from the north and the 11th Guards Army from the south. The task of the 39th Army was to reach the coast of Frisch Gaff Bay and the mouth of the river. Pregel in order to exclude support for the German troops blocked in the city or to prevent their withdrawal in the direction of Pillau.

Four days before the start of the operation, the artillery began to destroy the enemy's long-term structures. True, the effectiveness of its fire destruction turned out to be lower than expected, since weather conditions did not allow the full use of aviation. On April 6 at 12 o'clock, after artillery preparation, the front troops went on the offensive. Already on the first day of the formation of the 39th Army, the Koenigsberg-Pillau railway was cut, as a result of which communication between the fortress garrison and the enemy Zemland group was interrupted. At the same time, divisions of the 43rd, 50th and 11th Guards armies captured 15 settlements directly adjacent to Konigsberg, and then broke into the city and liberated more than 100 of its neighborhoods.

The next two days became decisive, when flying weather settled in. During April 7, aviation carried out 4,758 sorties and dropped 1,658 tons of bombs on enemy fortifications. The next day, more than 6 thousand sorties were flown. 2,100 tons of bombs fell on the positions of the German troops, which had a significant impact on reducing their combat capabilities. By the end of April 8, assault groups created in rifle divisions and regiments captured the port and railway junction of the city, as well as a number of important military-industrial facilities. They finally cut off and isolated the fortress garrison from the Zemland Peninsula. Despite this, his command rejected the proposal transmitted through the parliamentarians to lay down arms.

On the morning of April 9, formations of the 43rd Army thwarted the attempts of individual enemy units to break through to the west. The attack on Koenigsberg, launched by the German 5th Panzer Division from the Zemland Peninsula, also did not bring results. After massive artillery and aviation strikes (about 1.5 thousand aircraft) on the surviving centers of resistance, the rifle divisions of the 11th Guards Army, with the support of tanks and self-propelled artillery, attacked the enemy in the city center and forced him to capitulate by 21 o’clock. During the battles for Koenigsberg, front troops destroyed about 42 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, captured 92 thousand people, and captured a large amount of weapons and military equipment.

By the end of the first ten days of April, the remnants of the East Prussian enemy group (65 thousand people, 1200 guns and mortars, 166 tanks and assault guns) continued to hold only the Zemland Peninsula. To defeat them, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front deployed all five remaining armies at his disposal, which by that time numbered only 111.5 thousand soldiers and officers, in a strip about 40 km wide. In an effort to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, A.M. Two days before going on the offensive, Vasilevsky turned to the German command with a proposal to stop resistance. However, there was no response.

On the night of April 13, bombers of the 1st and 3rd air armies carried out massive attacks on enemy strongholds, artillery firing positions and command posts. In the morning, with the support of artillery and aviation, formations of the 5th and 39th armies attacked his fortified positions, trying to cut the Zemland group into two parts. To exclude such a development of events, its command already on the second day began to withdraw its troops along the northern coast of the peninsula. Overcoming the resistance of the enemy rearguards, formations and units of the two armies began pursuit. Its success was facilitated by two tactical landings, landed by armored boats on the dam of the Koenigsberg Sea Canal.

By the end of April 17, the main part of the Zemland Peninsula was captured. At the same time, only up to 20 thousand German soldiers and officers were able to retreat to the Pillau area. Favorable terrain conditions for defense and the presence of a wide network of engineering barriers allowed them to successfully resist the offensive of the 2nd Guards Army of Lieutenant General P.G. Chanchibadze. On April 18, the commander of the front forces increased the force of the attack in this direction by introducing the 11th Guards Army into the battle. Its formations broke through the enemy’s defenses and, as a result of fierce battles, on April 25 captured the fortress and ice-free port of Pillau.

This completed the East Prussian offensive operation. Its results were of great military and political significance. Soviet troops captured East Prussia, liberated part of the northern regions of Poland, defeated 25 German divisions, and inflicted heavy damage on another 12 formations. They captured more than 220 thousand soldiers and officers, captured about 15 thousand guns and mortars, 1,442 tanks and assault guns, 363 combat aircraft and many other military equipment as trophies. The loss of significant forces and a militarily-economically important area accelerated the defeat of Germany.

The operation lasted 103 days and became the longest of all carried out in last year war. Despite the fact that the enemy group in East Prussia was pressed to the sea and cut into pieces, the further struggle to destroy it took more than two months. One of the reasons for this was the lack of a reliable blockade of German troops from the sea by the Baltic Fleet. The hastily organized interaction between ships and the armies that were advancing along the coast turned out to be ineffective. As a result, the enemy isolated from land had the opportunity to maneuver by sea, strengthening each time the threatened directions. Unfavorable weather and spring thaw did not allow the 3rd Belorussian Front's superiority in artillery, aviation and tanks to be fully exploited.

In East Prussia, Soviet troops suffered heavy losses. By the end of January, 2.5-3.5 thousand people remained in the rifle divisions of the 3rd and 2nd Belorussian Fronts out of 6-6.5 thousand available at the beginning of the operation. By the same time, the 5th Guards Tank Army had lost half of its tanks and self-propelled guns. There were almost no reinforcements during the fighting, since the Supreme Command Headquarters sent the vast majority of them to the Warsaw-Berlin direction. Total losses two Soviet fronts and the Baltic Fleet from January 13 to April 25 were enormous: 126.5 thousand soldiers and officers were killed or missing, more than 458 thousand soldiers were injured or were out of action due to illness. The troops lost 3,525 tanks and self-propelled artillery units, 1,644 guns and mortars, and 1,450 combat aircraft.

The land of East Prussia, which was transferred to Russia and Poland in the post-war period, is thickly watered with the blood of Red Army soldiers. Contemporaries are reminded of this by the names of cities that were renamed in their time in honor of the heroes who died here. For courage, heroism and high military skill demonstrated during the East Prussian operation, over 1 thousand of the most distinguished formations and units were awarded orders, and 217 of them were given honorary titles. To commemorate the victory, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established the medal “For the Capture of Koenigsberg.”

Sergey Aptreikin, leading researcher
Research Institute (military history)
Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces,
Candidate of Historical Sciences

One of the most significant operations carried out by the Red Army in 1945 was the storming of Königsberg and the liberation of East Prussia.

Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, Oberteich bastion after capitulation/

Fortifications of the Grolman upper front, Oberteich bastion. Courtyard.

Troops of the 10th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army of the 2nd Belorussian Front occupy the city of Mühlhausen (now the Polish city of Mlynar) during the Mława-Elbing operation.

German soldiers and officers captured during the assault on Konigsberg.

A column of German prisoners walks along Hindenburg Strasse in the city of Insterburg (East Prussia), towards the Lutheran Church (now the city of Chernyakhovsk, Lenin Street).

Soviet soldiers carry the weapons of fallen comrades after a battle in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers learn to overcome barbed wire barriers.

Soviet officers inspect one of the forts in occupied Konigsberg.

An MG-42 machine gun crew fires in the area railway station the city of Goldap in battles with Soviet troops.

Ships in the frozen harbor of Pillau (now Baltiysk, Kaliningrad region of Russia), late January 1945.

Königsberg, Tragheim district after the assault, damaged building.

German grenadiers are moving towards the last Soviet positions in the area of ​​​​the railway station in the city of Goldap.

Koenigsberg. Kronprinz Barracks, tower.

Koenigsberg, one of the inter-fort fortifications.

Ship aviation support"Hans Albrecht Wedel" receives refugees in Pillau harbor.

Advanced German troops enter the East Prussian town of Goldap, which was previously occupied by Soviet troops.

Koenigsberg, panorama of the ruins of the city.

The corpse of a German woman killed by an explosion in Metgethen in East Prussia.

The Pz.Kpfw tank belonging to the 5th Panzer Division. V Ausf. G "Panther" on the street of the city of Goldap.

A German soldier hanged on the outskirts of Königsberg for looting. The inscription in German “Plündern wird mit-dem Tode bestraft!” translated as “Whoever robs will be executed!”

A Soviet soldier in a German Sdkfz 250 armored personnel carrier on one of the streets of Koenigsberg.

Units of the German 5th Panzer Division move forward for a counterattack against Soviet forces. Kattenau region, East Prussia. Ahead is a Pz.Kpfw tank. V "Panther".

Koenigsberg, barricade on the street.

A battery of 88 mm anti-aircraft guns is preparing to repel a Soviet tank attack. East Prussia, mid-February 1945.

German positions on the approaches to Koenigsberg. The inscription reads: “We will defend Koenigsberg.” Propaganda photo.

The Soviet self-propelled gun ISU-122S is fighting in Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front, April 1945.

German sentry on a bridge in the center of Konigsberg.

A Soviet motorcyclist passes by German StuG IV self-propelled guns and a 105 mm howitzer abandoned on the road.

A German landing ship evacuating troops from the Heiligenbeil pocket enters Pillau harbor.

Koenigsberg, blown up by a pillbox.

Damaged German self-propelled gun StuG III Ausf. G in front of the Kronprinz Tower, Königsberg.

Koenigsberg, panorama from the Don Tower.

Koenisberg, April 1945. View of the Royal Castle

A German StuG III assault gun destroyed in Königsberg. The dead man is in the foreground german soldier.

German equipment on Mitteltragheim street in Königsberg after the assault. To the right and left are StuG III assault guns, in the background is a JgdPz IV tank destroyer.

Grolman upper front, Grolman bastion. Before the capitulation of the fortress, it housed the headquarters of the 367th Wehrmacht Infantry Division.

On the street of Pillau port. Evacuated German soldiers throw their weapons and equipment before loading onto ships.

A German 88-mm FlaK 36/37 anti-aircraft gun abandoned on the outskirts of Königsberg.

Koenigsberg, panorama. Don Tower, Rossgarten Gate.

Koenigsberg, German bunker in the Horst Wessel Park area.

Unfinished barricade on Herzog Albrecht Alley in Königsberg (now Thälmann Street).

Koenigsberg, destroyed German artillery battery.

German prisoners at the Sackheim Gate in Königsberg.

Koenigsberg, German trenches.

German machine gun crew in position in Koenigsberg near the Don Tower.

German refugees on Pillau Street pass by a column of Soviet SU-76M self-propelled guns.

Koenigsberg, Friedrichsburg Gate after the assault.

Koenigsberg, Wrangel Tower, fortress moat.

View from the Don Tower on Oberteich (Upper Pond), Königsberg.

On the street of Koenigsberg after the assault.

Koenigsberg, Wrangel Tower after the surrender.

Corporal I.A. Gureev on duty border sign in East Prussia.

A Soviet unit in a street battle in Koenigsberg.

Traffic police officer Sergeant Anya Karavaeva on the way to Konigsberg.

Soviet soldiers in the city of Allenstein (currently the city of Olsztyn in Poland) in East Prussia.

Artillerymen of the guard of Lieutenant Sofronov are fighting on Avaider Alley in Konigsberg (now Alley of the Brave).

The result of an airstrike on German positions in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers are fighting in the streets on the outskirts of Koenigsberg. 3rd Belorussian Front.

Soviet armored boat No. 214 in the Koenigsberg Canal after a battle with a German tank.

German collection point for faulty captured armored vehicles in the Königsberg area.

Evacuation of the remnants of the "Gross Germany" division to the Pillau area.

German equipment abandoned in Konigsberg. In the foreground is a 150 mm sFH 18 howitzer.

Koenigsberg. Bridge over the moat to the Rossgarten Gate. Don Tower in the background

An abandoned German 105-mm howitzer le.F.H.18/40 at a position in Konigsberg.

A German soldier lights a cigarette near a StuG IV self-propelled gun.

A damaged German Pz.Kpfw tank is on fire. V Ausf. G "Panther". 3rd Belorussian Front.

Soldiers of the Grossdeutschland division are loaded onto homemade rafts to cross the Frisches Huff Bay (now Kaliningrad Bay). Balga Peninsula, Cape Kalholz.

Soldiers of the Grossdeutschland division in positions on the Balga Peninsula.

Meeting of Soviet soldiers on the border with East Prussia. 3rd Belorussian Front.

The bow of a German transport sinking as a result of an attack by Baltic Fleet aircraft off the coast of East Prussia.

The observer pilot of the Henschel Hs.126 reconnaissance aircraft takes pictures of the area during a training flight.

A damaged German StuG IV assault gun. East Prussia, February 1945.

Seeing off Soviet soldiers from Koenigsberg.

The Germans inspect a damaged Soviet T-34-85 tank in the village of Nemmersdorf.

Tank "Panther" from the 5th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht in Gołdap.

German soldiers armed with Panzerfaust grenade launchers next to an MG 151/20 aircraft cannon in the infantry version.

A column of German Panther tanks is moving towards the front in East Prussia.

Broken cars on the street of Königsberg, which was taken by storm. Soviet soldiers in the background.

Troops of the Soviet 10th Tank Corps and the bodies of German soldiers on Mühlhausen Street.

Soviet sappers walk down the street of burning Insterburg in East Prussia.

A column of Soviet IS-2 tanks on a road in East Prussia. 1st Belorussian Front.

A Soviet officer inspects the German Jagdpanther self-propelled gun that was knocked out in East Prussia.

Soviet soldiers sleep, resting after the fighting, right on the street of Königsberg, which was taken by storm.

Koenigsberg, anti-tank barriers.

German refugees with a baby in Konigsberg.

A short rally in the 8th company after reaching the state border of the USSR.

A group of pilots of the Normandie-Niemen air regiment near a Yak-3 fighter in East Prussia.

A sixteen-year-old Volkssturm fighter armed with an MP 40 submachine gun. East Prussia.

Construction of defensive structures, East Prussia, mid-July 1944.

Refugees from Königsberg moving towards Pillau, mid-February 1945.

German soldiers at a rest stop near Pillau.

German quad anti-aircraft gun FlaK 38 mounted on a tractor. Fischhausen (now Primorsk), East Prussia.

Civilians and a captured German soldier on Pillau Street during garbage collection after the end of the fighting for the city.

Boats of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet undergoing repairs in Pillau (currently the city of Baltiysk in the Kaliningrad region of Russia).

German auxiliary ship "Franken" after an attack by Il-2 attack aircraft of the Baltic Fleet Air Force.

Bomb explosion on the German ship Franken as a result of an attack by Il-2 attack aircraft of the Baltic Fleet Air Force

A gap from a heavy shell in the wall of the Oberteich bastion fortifications of the Grolman upper front of Koenigsberg.

The bodies of two German women and three children allegedly killed by Soviet soldiers in the town of Metgethen in East Prussia in January-February 1945. German propaganda photo.

Transportation of the Soviet 280-mm mortar Br-5 in East Prussia.

Distribution of food to Soviet soldiers in Pillau after the end of the fighting for the city.

Soviet soldiers pass through German locality on the approaches to Koenigsberg.

A broken German StuG IV assault gun on the streets of Allenstein (now Olsztyn, Poland.)

Soviet infantry, supported by the SU-76 self-propelled gun, attacks German positions in the Konigsberg area.

A column of self-propelled guns SU-85 on the march in East Prussia.

Sign "Motorway to Berlin" on one of the roads in East Prussia.

Explosion on the tanker Sassnitz. The tanker with a cargo of fuel was sunk on March 26, 1945, 30 miles from Liepaja by aircraft of the 51st mine-torpedo air regiment and the 11th attack air division of the Baltic Fleet Air Force.

Bombing of German transport and port facilities of Pillau by Red Banner Baltic Fleet Air Force aircraft.

The German hydroaviation mother ship Boelcke, attacked by an Il-2 squadron of the 7th Guards Attack Aviation Regiment of the Baltic Fleet Air Force, 7.5 km southeast of Cape Hel.