The mechanism of shock therapy for the Russian economy includes: Shock therapy policy. Shock Therapy in Russia and in the world

A quarter of a century ago, they tried to transfer the Soviet economy to a market economy. This was one of the largest economic reforms in history. The dispute about its results and the methods used by the reformers has not stopped to this day. Lenta.ru recalls how “shock therapy” was carried out and what it led to. The first part of the material is available at.

Polish sample

The Chinese development model was rejected - the example of “brothers forever” did not inspire Soviet leaders. Much closer to Russia was the transition economy model implemented in Eastern European countries. Moscow looked especially closely at Poland. There was no longer any gap in mentality here. Slavic state, for a long time located in the same economic and military bloc with the USSR, is an ideal role model.

“Then reforms were carried out in Poland. In the fall, the communists liberalized prices and transferred power to the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Leszek Balcerowicz (Prime Minister of Poland and head of the Ministry of Finance, respectively - approx. "Tapes.ru"). The concept of “shock therapy” arose precisely at that time - this is what Balcerowicz’s reforms were called. After the liberalization of prices, they took the most stringent measures to achieve financial stabilization. We decided that we needed something like this,” says Evgeniy Yasin.

Indeed, Poland managed to pull off an economic miracle in less than five minutes. Reforms started on January 1, 1990, and within two years the country switched to a market economy.

Shock therapy worked in Poland. In 1990, GDP fell by 11 percent, in 1991 by 7 percent. And already in 1992, the economy began to grow and by the mid-1990s it was leading the region in this indicator. The reforms turned out to be so effective that Poland still stands out among its neighbors (it is the only country in Eastern Europe that managed to avoid the recession during the financial crisis of the late 2000s).

At a steep peak

Acting according to the Polish scenario, January 2, 1992 Russian government announced the end of price regulation and free trade. Within a few days, the shelves were filled with goods. But this is where the similarity between the reforms in Poland and Russia ended - then, as they say, “something went wrong.”

In Poland, prices rose 3-4 times within a year after liberalization. In Russia, such a leap occurred simultaneously. And then inflation did not stop, quickly acquiring the prefix “hyper”. Financial system rapidly dollarized. Despite the growth of the money supply, barter schemes became widespread.

The next stage is privatization, which began back in 1991, but really took off a couple of years later. In theory, every Russian citizen received the right to public property through the issue of vouchers. But most of the potential “people's investors” quickly sold their privatization checks. And as it later turned out, this was almost the optimal solution - many of those who tried to invest vouchers in something ended up receiving nothing at all. Almost all the “fat” pieces of state property went to people close to the authorities through loans-for-shares auctions. This is how Russian oligarchs appeared.

As a result, the Russian economy found itself in a protracted peak. It was possible to return to sluggish growth only in the second half of the 90s, but literally immediately there was a “control shot” in the form of the 1998 default. Only a year later, recovery growth and a gradual rise from the bottom began.

Why did this happen? Many believe that the concept of shock therapy was fundamentally wrong and was not suitable for Russia.

“The option with the immediate entry of foreign money and subsequent modernization, which is good for small economies, is not suitable for the large industrial economy that Russia was, very complex, with a large military-industrial complex. It’s like throwing a cart down a mountain instead of carefully lowering it,” says Yakov Mirkin.

In the early nineties, American economist Jeffrey Sachs advised first Poland and then Russia on reforms. And if the expert speaks of the Polish stage of his activity as a great success, then he qualifies the work in Russia as a failure, explaining this by the fact that most of his recommendations fell on deaf ears of Russian reformers.

American indifference

Sachs writes that, unlike Poland, Russia did not take measures to contain the money supply. On the contrary, it grew by leaps and bounds, which provoked hyperinflation. Russia's neighbors from the former USSR are largely to blame for this; they had the right to issue rubles for a year. It is not difficult to guess that they used this right to the maximum.

The American specialist emphasizes the poor competence in economic matters of most Russian officials and experts of that time, pointing out direct dishonesty. In particular, he accused Andrei Shleifer, adviser to the Federal Property Management Agency on privatization issues (also a US citizen), of having a material interest in the sale of state assets. By the way, in 2005, American justice forced Shleifer to pay a fine of two million dollars, ruling that he had no right to do business in Russia. In addition, Sachs considers the idea of privatizing mining to be extremely unsuccessful, which he objected to throughout his entire period of work in Moscow.

But still, Sachs places the main blame for the failure of Russian reforms on external players, primarily on the leadership of the United States and the IMF. Poland, according to him, in 1990 received all possible concessions and preferences from the international community. Thus, its colossal foreign debt ($30 billion) was written off by half. And literally right there Warsaw was provided with new stabilization loans on very generous terms. All this helped ensure the influx of private investment into the country and lay the foundation for future development.

Nothing similar was done in relation to Russia. Debts were collected down to the last penny (and, moreover, the G7 countries threatened to stop all humanitarian aid at the slightest delay in payments), and if financial support was provided, it was on completely market terms. Sachs explains this by the position of the United States, which essentially imposed its reluctance to help Russia on the IMF. The fund itself did not really analyze the events in the Russian Federation.

As for America, in 1992 the administration of President George H. W. Bush did not even want to talk about providing support to Moscow because of the pre-election vicissitudes. The cabinet of Bill Clinton that replaced it was not interested in Russia at all, perceiving it as a weak, defeated enemy. The people who were appointed by Clinton to positions related to Russia did not understand economics at all. Russia had to survive solely on its own efforts and modest resources, and reforms here brought a completely different result than in Eastern Europe.

“At that time there was a high point of good relations with the West, but there was no massive flow of investment that would integrate the economy. There were objective reasons for this. At this time, West Germany had to “digest” the GDR, and the EU was engaged in the integration of the former socialist countries. And besides, Russia continued to remain closer to the “strangers” in the “friend or foe” identification system. Its risks have always been assessed as prohibitive. And we were not ready for such integration as for Eastern Europe, when, say, banking systems became the property of foreigners,” explains Yakov Mirkin.

Despite severe criticism (both from within and from without) of the reform course implemented in Russia, many believe that in the end everything was done correctly. “I cannot allow myself to say that we followed the only correct path. But I have no doubt at all that we generally did everything right and, most importantly, achieved success,” emphasized Evgeniy Yasin.

The cost of the reforms carried out by Gaidar and his followers turned out to be high for Russia. Largely because the reformers did not take into account the real situation in the country’s economy, preferring to act according to the principle “to the ground, and then...”, says Ruslan Grinberg.

“Yegor Timurovich is a tragic figure. He was a decent man, a man of ideas, unfortunately too ideological. In the bird language of science, this is called the ontologization of theoretical schemes, when a person puts fashionable doctrines into practice without any hesitation. Just like the Bolsheviks in 1917 introduced a doctrine that was supposed to lead everyone to happiness through repression and famine. Then they preached wild equality without freedom, and in the 90s they preached wild freedom without any equality. And it couldn’t end differently than it ended now,” he concludes.

Submitting your good work to the knowledge base is easy. Use the form below

Students, graduate students, young scientists who use the knowledge base in their studies and work will be very grateful to you.

Shock Therapy in Russia and in the world

Methods of market transformations in different countries had different consequences, although they followed the same scenario.
In Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru), reforms were accompanied by hyperinflation. This happened in the 1980s of the twentieth century.
In Russia, macroeconomic stabilization took place in the early 1990s of the twentieth century. Then the mass privatization of state property became the reason that the place of absent economic entities was taken by criminal elements. In addition, issues of savings and investment have been relegated to the background, which has had a negative impact on the state of the economy.
Only in Poland and Germany did the use of “Shock Therapy” bring the country out of the crisis, improve the national economy, and increase production.

Russian scenario of “shock therapy”

In 1991, the government assumed that a set of radical measures aimed at improving the economy would take a few weeks, no more. However, in practice, the process lasted until 1993.

Socio-economic effect of “shock therapy”

As a result, reforms in Russia resulted in the following consequences:
1) The elimination of restrictions on wages led to its rapid increase in all sectors of the economy.
2) Artificial increase in the money supply (money was “printed” without collateral).
3) The increase in consumer activity led to a rapid rise in prices. As a result, the money supply began to depreciate.
4) Instead of overcoming the economic crisis, “Shock Therapy” was aimed at solving political problems: establishing a new regime and the final elimination of the administrative-command system of the national economy.
5) Limitation

In January 1992, the “government of young reformers” headed by E.T. Gaidar began implementing radical market reforms, called “shock therapy.” The situation in Russia required urgent dramatic changes: the country's foreign exchange reserves were depleted, gold reserves decreased almost 10 times, foreign debts exceeded $70 billion, the ruble exchange rate was rapidly falling, inflation was more than 20%, and the threat of famine became real.
Under these conditions, President Boris Yeltsin, who recently took office, decides to move to a market economy as soon as possible. Yeltsin's competence and professionalism causes a lot of controversy among modern historians. His reforms and their consequences turned out to be just as controversial. Nothing else but complete absence understanding of the Gaidar government and the president himself about the economic situation in Russia, it can be explained that inherently good transformations led the country to the brink of a social and economic catastrophe, the consequences of which have not yet been fully overcome.

“Shock therapy” involved three main steps:

Liberalization of prices.
Voucher privatization, the program of which was developed by A.B. Chubais. Its essence was that Russian citizens received vouchers, that is, privatization checks, for the share of state enterprises.
Conversion of the military-industrial complex. The transfer of military enterprises to the production of civilian products was supposed to help overcome the shortage in a short time and create the quantity of household goods necessary for the country.
On paper, this plan looked clear and quite feasible, but preventing it from being implemented at once, trying to build in a bloodless country what the strongest powers had been building for decades was a fatal mistake of Yeltsin and his associates.
Waking up on the morning of January 1st, after New Year's Eve In 1992, Russians were surprised to find an abundance of scarce goods on usually half-empty store shelves. But people’s refrigerators remained empty... Prices soared as quickly as such long-awaited products appeared on the shelves. The money literally turned into a useless pile of paper overnight. This phenomenon is called hyperinflation. It was just one of the catastrophic consequences of the new economic policy - “shock therapy”. This name more than justified itself: the people could not recover from the shock for a long time. The policy of “shock therapy” led to a sharp drop in the population’s income, and bank deposits and savings simply depreciated, as a result of which the standard of living of the population fell. Many families found themselves below the poverty line. This explains the decline in the birth rate in Russia in the nineties, which led the country to a “demographic hole”, which experts called the “Russian cross”. Uncontrolled price release led to a jump in prices for public utilities, reduction of the domestic consumer market, increase in prices on the wholesale market. Prices for goods from industrial enterprises and agricultural products have risen. Liberalization of foreign economic activity has made imports the basis of the Russian market. The quality of imported goods left much to be desired, and many domestic producers could not withstand the competition and were forced to cease their activities, which significantly worsened the unemployment situation.
Another sad result of “shock therapy” is the “gangster spring” in Russia. National wealth ended up in the hands of a narrow circle of large entrepreneurs - oligarchs, and the proceeds from their sale flowed uncontrollably into foreign banks, which only intensified the crisis in the country. Enterprises were plundered and sold, and the people who worked there found themselves on the street without a penny in their pockets. The state created a market system without providing it with the necessary legal framework, did not create corresponding clear taxation. Vouchers, which were designed to ensure some kind of fairness in the distribution of state property, became the subject of various frauds and deceptions. Desperate people, left without work and livelihoods, became easy money for scammers; so-called financial pyramids appeared, the most famous of which is MMM. The result of participation in such scams was tragic - hundreds of suicides among people who lost not only their last savings, but also gave their only home into the hands of scammers. Racketeering, gangster shootouts, and the elimination of bad competitors became a permanent feature of the new Russia. Not only entrepreneurs suffered from lawlessness, but also those who had nothing much to take from. Ordinary citizens were afraid to go out into the streets and leave their homes unattended. The number of robberies and murders has increased tenfold.
Of course, one cannot deny the positive results of “shock therapy” in Russia. Voucher privatization became the basis for the formation of a layer of medium-sized and private entrepreneurs, helped some sections of society improve their financial condition, and reduced the unemployment rate. The total shortage was eliminated, essential household goods and food products became freely available, and the threat of hunger was eliminated. Reductions in arms spending freed up funds to finance light industries. “Price release” made it possible to eliminate the surplus cash in circulation. Russian market gained access to world exports, economic ties were established with advanced Western countries.
But in comparison with the sacrifices and hardships that the Russian people have experienced over these years, all the positive aspects of “shock therapy” pale, especially if you know that all this could have been avoided by spending an extra couple of years on a smooth transition to a market economy. Despite all the advantages, “shock therapy” still remains one of the most serious mistakes of Russian politicians in the nineties.

"Shock therapy" and its historical consequences. Discussions surrounding this phenomenon.

"Shock therapy" - propaganda (newspaper) name, with the light hand of some publicists, stuck to the policy that the reformist government of Yeltsin-Gaidar began to pursue after coming to power politicsstabilization of the economy. (Russia's attempt to move to a Market Economy)

They usually say that the content of the reform: liberalization, price liberation, but it was complex in nature:

Price release(though not all of them; unfortunately, it did not apply to fuel and energy resources)
enterprises were given the right to independently sell products and purchase raw materials and components;
trading enterprises were allowed to use negotiated prices for all types of goods and services;
enterprises and firms received the right to carry out foreign trade operations (subject to certain rules and restrictions);
government bodies logistics began to turn into trade and intermediary organizations interested in providing enterprises with everything they need;
Private trade and the activities of non-state trade and purchasing organizations were allowed.
Presidential Decrees were adopted on the abolition of restrictions on wages, on social partnership, on a single economic space and a number of others;
financial stabilization by limiting budgetary spending and contraction of the money supply.

Historical implications:

planning and distribution system collapsedcontrol systemthe economy collapsed.
the country has not yet become a market one, of course, but has made a decisive step in this direction.
All this radically changed the life of the country’s population, and far from better side, since it intensified decline in production (started back in 1990-91),price releaseled to increased inflation , hundreds of thousands of people have lost their jobs due to multiplereduction in military orders.
depletion of investments with the consequent erosion of fixed capital and large-scale “flight” of savings;
rising unemployment and huge levels of underemployment along with non-payment wages;
little remains of social security;
“shock therapy” destroyed the institutions of the socialist economy, but did not create the institutions of the market economy;
“Shock therapy” caused fierce resistance in the parliament elected in Soviet times and among the Soviet institutional nomenklatura, the majority of which remained in their seats;
on the contrary, the masses of workers showed long-suffering and faith in the success of the reforms: only isolated, sparsely attended rallies were observed on Russian territory, and the promised popular unrest did not occur;
After the VI Congress of People's Deputies, held in early April 1992, “shock therapy” was curtailed. As a result, Russia moved into the category of those post-socialist countries that carried out market reforms in a gradual, gradualist way (see. Gradualism
Some note the advantage of such an economy: the refusal of government. price regulation.

Opinions and discussions:

According to the academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. D. Nekipelova , shock therapy implemented in Russia led to the creation of a wretchedquasi-market system, the features of which were:

unprecedented naturalization economic activity, a persistent significant excess in the interest rate of the level of return on capital in the real sector and the inevitable orientation of the entire economy under these conditions towards financial and trade speculation and the dissipation of previously created wealth, a chronic fiscal crisis caused by the emergence of “bad consistency”: “ budget deficit reduction government spending decline in production and growing non-payments reduction in tax revenues budget deficit.”

Why did liberalization succeed in Poland, but not in Russia? (opinion of Yavlinsky G.)

In Poland, price liberalization worked because collectivization was not carried out there. There were large state-owned agricultural enterprises, but private farms and, to a large extent, private ownership of land remained. And after prices were released, many private farms immediately entered the market directly, without any intermediaries. And therefore liberalization only at first led to a large surge in prices, and then inflation began to gradually decline.

According to the West, Russia noun. the following obstacles:corruption, prohibitive level of taxation, unproductive labor of workers, communication problems, lack of financial and other institutions of market infrastructure, stable " environment» for business activities.