The commission will keep an eye on the official. The President has strengthened the fight against corruption in the regions. Additional agreement to the employment contract

NatBez.ru

When forming state anti-corruption policy, it is necessary to understand that corruption is a systemic phenomenon and only a system built by the state together with civil society can resist it. The main element of the anti-corruption system should be the body that first of all formulates this policy. According to our plans, at the first stage such a body could become the Council on Anti-Corruption Policy under the President of the Russian Federation. However, the recently created Council and the principles of its personnel formation give reason to believe that this structure will be ineffective and, moreover, will not be able to become the basis of the state anti-corruption system. First of all, this fear is caused by the principle of formation of governing bodies. Participation in the Council and Commissions of senior officials, combined with their main public service, may entail a conflict of interest, thereby reducing the effectiveness of their activities in the anti-corruption body.

Analytical note

The idea of ​​creation specialized anti-corruption body is based on the understanding of the fight against corruption as full-fledged and immanent to the modern state functions. This is not just about one of the tasks facing the state, which should be solved and “close the topic”, but namely about the formation and institutionalization permanent areas of government activity, such as basic functions such as defense, security, social security, etc., i.e. O politics.

When it comes to a state function, the question naturally arises about the corresponding public institutions that can be entrusted with responsibility for its implementation. Of course, none of the state functions is implemented by any single state body (as a rule, the executive branch), especially in a system based on the principle of separation of powers. Thus, not only the Ministry of Defense is responsible for the country’s defense function, but also, of course, the President, the Government, and the chambers of the Federal Assembly. However, this function is the main one only for the Ministry of Defense. Therefore, if there is no government body specializing in the anti-corruption function, we can conclude that it is not identified as one of the basic, generic tasks of the state.

The creation of a specialized anti-corruption body is, of course, not a panacea. Likewise, this should not be the usual bureaucratic response to the challenge of the time: “there is a problem - let’s create an authority.” This is exactly what we're talking about on the institutionalization of a new basic function states. Moreover, a function in which the dominant part is not its repressive part, but coordination of anti-corruption policy and control over its implementation, which involves the development and implementation of a system of measures aimed at eliminating (reducing) the conditions that generate, provoke and support corruption in all its manifestations. In other words, the ideology of the fight against corruption cannot be based only on identifying and bringing to justice corrupt officials. Moreover, in conditions when the state is not yet able to fully rely on law enforcement and judicial bodies, it cannot guarantee that all employees of these bodies are always and exclusively focused on the law. This does not mean that it is necessary to temporarily reduce activity in identifying corrupt officials and bringing them to justice. On the contrary, such activity should be increased. But without organizing systemic counteraction, we will not be able to solve the problem of cutting down the very roots of corruption.

The number of countries that have established specialized anti-corruption bodies is small. As a rule, they are born where corruption has penetrated into the police and intelligence services themselves. Therefore, almost all such bodies were established in Asian countries that realized the degree of the threat of corruption (only one such body was created in New South Wales, one of the states of Australia).

The Chairman of the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission of Hong Kong, the most powerful of the anti-corruption bodies, outlined this: basic conditions that are necessary for the creation and successful work anti-corruption body:

The level of corruption in the country must reach a certain level critical point when the political leadership of the country realizes the need for a special body to combat corruption;

The organ must be independent from the structures of the executive branch and submit only to the highest leader of the country;

Rules personnel selection should promote the recruitment and retention of the most worthy and impeccable;

Since corruption is one of the most difficult to detect, the new body must have emergency powers for carrying out operational and investigative actions;

Since there is an acute problem of control over those in control, an effective system must be created public supervision over the activities of a specialized body;

An anti-corruption body can only be created if the state able it accordingly finance.

Now let’s take a quick look at how similar bodies are structured in different countries.

Hong Kong

Independent Anti-Corruption Commission was founded in 1973. The need to create such a commission has been recognized in Hong Kong for a long time. All that was missing was an external reason. It appeared in the form of the so-called “Godberg case.”

Peter Godberg served in the police logistics department. In 1973 he disappeared. This was due to the effective operation of the 1971 ordinance to prevent bribery. He toughened liability for corruption crimes, and also transferred to the category of criminal offenses a number of actions that were not previously considered corruption. For two years, employees of the Hong Kong Police Anti-Corruption Department investigated the reason for the discrepancy between his lifestyle and the salary he received. It turned out that the official's fortune totals at least 4.3 million Hong Kong dollars in banks in six different countries. This amount was six times his total income for twenty years of “impeccable service.” On June 4, 1973, P. Godberg was ordered to explain the origin of his capital within seven days. Three days after that, he disappeared and, using his connections and position, penetrated into another state. Society was shocked. The governor of Hong Kong prepared a detailed report, which described the shortcomings of the anti-corruption police department. The governor himself drew conclusions from the report - on October 17, 1973, one of the most effective specialized bodies to combat corruption was established - the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission.

The Commission reports only to the Governor of Hong Kong. Members of the commission are appointed by him for six years without the possibility of re-election.

Commission staff have the right:

Arrest a suspect of corruption if there are sufficient and reasonable suspicions of his guilt;

IN special cases take into custody without an arrest warrant;

Receive any information that a commission employee considers necessary for operational investigative activities;

Freeze bank deposits of suspects and their transport documents.

Structure The commission is fully consistent with those goals, which were formulated by its first leader:

1 Increased risk of involvement in corruption crimes.

2 Restructuring the bureaucracy to reduce the causes of corruption.

3 Changing the population's attitude towards corruption.

In accordance with these goals, the Commission has three departments:

a) Operational investigative activities;

b) Corruption Prevention Department;

c) Public Relations Department.

Department of Operational Investigative Activities is engaged in “catching” corrupt officials. For this purpose, two departments are organized in its structure. The General Objectives Department is engaged in operational-search activities against corrupt officials at all levels of government and in all areas public administration. The Personnel Supervision Department is responsible for monitoring the financial situation of civil servants. The attention of this department includes employees who clearly live beyond their means. As a rule, department employees widely use interrogations of suspects (as well as their friends, relatives and colleagues), wiretapping, covert surveillance, as well as information from commercial banks about the accounts of government employees. As in “mainland” China, the burden of proving innocence (disclosing sources of income) lies with the suspected officials.

Corruption Prevention Department engages in a detailed analysis of the activities of the Hong Kong bureaucracy, systems, and management methods. The purpose of such an analysis is to develop proposals to simplify procedures and introduce new management techniques that would reduce the conditions for corruption. The Department identifies areas of excessive discretionary powers of officials, weaknesses in the control system, and legal norms imposing excessive restrictions. The department's staff consists of 65 people (lawyers, systems analysts, engineers, economists, accountants and management systems experts).

Public Relations Department is the only department that has territorial divisions. With their help, information is collected about the mood in society, and propaganda campaigns are organized to increase public interest in the problem of corruption. Since the work is of a creative nature and requires creative qualities, the principal decision of the director of the commission was to limit the age of department employees. These are mostly young university graduates.

The department commissions plays, films, and organizes programs in the field of anti-corruption education. In addition, the department organizes “going to the people”, during which its employees visit schools, hospitals, religious organizations, enterprises and talk about the activities of the Commission and what corruption is.

The activities of the commission are controlled citizen advisory committees. They were formed along with the formation of the Commission itself at the insistence of its first leader, who was justifiably afraid of the possibility of turning this body into a structure isolated from society, closed and, as a result, corrupt.

Civil committees consist of representatives of government agencies, business associations, social services and the intelligentsia. Five similar committees were formed: on anti-corruption policy; on supervision of operational-search activities; on preventing corruption; on control over relations with society (presents its developments for planning media campaigns to combat corruption); on appeals from citizens (considers complaints received against Commission employees).

From the very beginning of its activities, experienced British police officers were appointed to the Commission, as well as a number of senior Hong Kong police officials with an impeccable reputation. Such personnel decisions are quite natural in a country plagued by corruption from top to bottom. Before hiring, each employee was subjected to a thorough background check.

Commission employees are not ordinary employees within the meaning of Hong Kong civil service law. Members of the Commission are paid high salaries (on average 10% higher than the salary of a civil servant of the same category). Service relations are regulated fixed-term contract, expiring 2.5 years after conclusion. The extension of contracts is conditional on the fulfillment of the duties enshrined in them (primarily, effective work to eradicate corruption).

The head of the Commission has the authority to dismiss its employees without giving reasons. System internal control records every change that occurs with employee income, primarily in the banking sector. If necessary, a surveillance procedure may be applied to each employee.

Already the first two years of the Commission’s work have shown its effectiveness. In 1975, the second year of its activity, the Commission increased the number of cases brought to court to 218 (108 in 1974). From 1974 to 1977, the Commission contributed to the conviction of 260 police officers. The qualitative result of the activity was the disappearance of the corruption network in the police.

However, it was not only civil servants who came to the attention of the Commission staff. In 1975, a well-known supplier of goods for government needs in the protectorate was convicted of bribery. And in March 1976, the Hong Kong business community was shocked by the news that the country's most famous and one of the largest corporations was fined for bribing employees of other corporations.

The Department for the Prevention of Corruption did not waste any time either. By the end of 1981, he had conducted about 500 studies of management operations, followed by recommendations for simplifying and increasing the efficiency of work state apparatus. 10 thousand officials managed to take part in trainings and seminars conducted by the department.

One of the main shortcomings in the Commission's activities was its huge budget. From 1974 to 1982 it grew sevenfold. Commission employees have been repeatedly held accountable for exceeding their official powers.

But the main drawback of the Commission’s activities was the dominance of the fight against specific corrupt officials over the fight against the conditions that give rise to corruption, which remained on the periphery of attention. Thus, during the investigative activities, the Commission’s staff established that bribery had become widespread during the issuance of driver's licenses. Bureaucratic procedures encouraged red tape, and bribes were paid to speed up transactions. Although the Commission had the power to review bureaucratic procedures that facilitated corruption, the emphasis was placed on catching specific corrupt officials.

Philippines

From the early fifties to the present, there have been 13 anti-corruption agencies in the Philippines, which fully reflects the instability of the political situation in this country. In February 1979, President Marcos formed a special anti-corruption court and ombudsman position.

The system of anti-corruption measures in the Philippines is a vivid example of how not to organize the anti-corruption fight. Due to insufficient human resources, the office of the ombudsman, which was entrusted with law enforcement functions in the field of bribery, soon became known as a hotbed of red tape. In addition, “catching corrupt officials” quotas were established for investigators of the ombudsman’s office. This system encouraged investigators to take on easy cases, to the detriment of unraveling complex corruption tangles. As a result, the office was inundated with complaints awaiting investigation, as well as crime cases awaiting resolution.

India

Corruption Prevention Committee The Indian Union was formed in 1962. Its main tasks were to assess the effectiveness of the measures taken to combat corruption and develop new methods of anti-corruption. As one of these measures, the Committee proposed the creation Central Vigilance Commission, whose primary function was to conduct investigations into any complaint or other evidence of “improper conduct” by a civil servant. In fact, the Commission is a separate body specifically dedicated to the fight against corruption. To do this, she is vested with the following powers:

- investigate any situation where an official is suspected of acting in pursuit of “improper goals”;

- request information from ministries, departments or state enterprises to investigate corruption crimes;

- delegate the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

The commission is managed by a director who is appointed by the President of the country (and in fact, the Prime Minister) for 6 years.

In 1963 it was formed Central Bureau of Investigation Indian Union. The CBI included the Delhi Police Special Branch as one of its six departments, which, before the formation of the bureau, was involved in investigating corruption along with the Central Vigilance Commission. In addition to these organizations, anti-corruption units also exist at the state level. They are part of the police as separate departments.

Singapore

Corruption Investigation Bureau was created by the British colonial government in October 1952. The Prevention of Corruption Act, which came into force on June 17, 1960, gave a second life to the Anti-Corruption Bureau.

For example, Article 15 gave bureau employees the authority to make arrests and search arrested persons. Article 17 authorized the State Attorney to authorize the Director of the Bureau and his Chief Deputy to inspect “any bank accounts, share accounts and checking accounts” if anyone is suspected of committing an offense under the Act.

According to Article 18, the Bureau has the right to check the bank books of civil servants, and according to Article 19, also their wives, children and agents, if necessary. The Bureau is authorized to carry out arrests, searches, and check the bank accounts and property of those suspected of corruption crimes.

In addition, the Bureau:

Investigates complaints alleging corruption in public and private spheres;

Investigates cases of negligence and negligence committed by government employees;

Reviews the activities and transactions carried out by government officials in order to minimize the possibility of corrupt practices.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore reports to the Prime Minister, but has significant political and functional independence from all bureaucrats, including political officials at ministerial rank.

The Bureau consists of 71 employees (including 49 investigators and 22 administrative employees). It is much smaller in number than a similar institution in Hong Kong. Essentially, it is a division of the Office of the Prime Minister of Singapore.

The bureau has three departments: investigative, reference and information and auxiliary.

Investigation Department(largest) is responsible for conducting Bureau operations. Members of this unit submit investigative cases to the Bureau Director, who contacts the State Attorney and recommends appropriate action based on the available evidence. However, if there is insufficient evidence to bring the case to trial, the director will refer the case to the head of the disciplinary department after obtaining permission from the State Attorney.

Reference and information department responsible for two blocks of functions. The first includes: selection of candidates for appointment to government positions and their further promotion; conducting advanced training courses.

The second block of functions consists of: analysis and identification of those weaknesses in government bodies that cause corruption. In addition, the reference and information department examines completed cases to establish a modus operandi for corruption among public servants and recommends necessary preventive measures.

So, there are two types of specialized anti-corruption agencies in the world:

a) having exclusive competence to investigate corruption (Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines);

b) sharing their functions with other departments (India).

It should be noted that the dilemma: “primarily law enforcement (intelligence service)” or “primarily analytical” is the traditional “Riddle of the Sphinx” for any country that has taken the path of creating a specialized anti-corruption institution. In the early nineties of the last century in France two high-profile corruption scandals broke out. At the center of one of them was G. Emannuelli, treasurer of the French Socialist Party and former minister. The main person involved in the second was A. Carino, the mayor of Grenoble. These cases, as well as the high level of public concern about corruption (largely due to the active position of the media), led the Bocherie Commission in 1993 to recommend the establishment of a specialized anti-corruption agency with the following tasks:

1) collection of information;

2) conducting investigations;

3) formation of a database on types of corruption;

4) coordination of the activities of other law enforcement agencies;

5) judicial and financial audit, if required by the court.

However, during the discussion of the project within the walls of the French National Assembly, it met friendly resistance from the right, who feared a violation of human rights and freedoms (although the anti-corruption agency was supposed to have much less operational investigative powers than law enforcement agencies). As a result, the project faced a sad fate. At the request of the right, he was subjected to preliminary constitutional control. The Constitutional Council (a kind of analogue of our Constitutional Court) recognized the norms giving the commission investigative powers as contrary to the Constitution.

As a result, what was essentially created was an analytical agency to combat corruption. The deprivation of investigative powers prompted a number of French researchers to call him a “degenerate” of the political scandals of the early nineties.

Concept of the lead coordinating body state power anti-corruption

Based on international experience, but taking into account the specifics of Russia, we will try to outline our vision of a specialized anti-corruption body. First of all, you need to understand what tasks should be assigned to this body.

You should not strive to find the optimum here from the very beginning. We cannot say in advance how well the new center will integrate into the existing system state institutions, how feasible the assigned functions will be for him, how effective their implementation will be, and finally, how our society, which has little faith in the possibility of solving the problem through the creation of some new institution, will greet its appearance. That's why It’s hardly right to immediately create a specialized law enforcement agency in the field of fighting corruption or a special service, although many perceive the meaning of an anti-corruption body in exactly this way.

This may be countered by the example of France described above, where the refusal to give the anti-corruption body “police” powers led to criticism of its incapacity. However, it seems to us that today in Russia, on the contrary, the creation of another law enforcement agency or intelligence service will have a negative effect. Let's try to explain.

Firstly, it is inappropriate to combine purely police functions with others, at least in the first stages of the existence of such a body. This is evidenced by the experience described above in the functioning of specialized anti-corruption bodies in a number of Asian countries, where purely police tasks clearly dominate over preventive and control ones. This is especially true for Russia. Now it is important to reverse the widespread opinion in the country about the effectiveness of a “strong hand” in the fight against corruption. It is necessary to prepare society for the fact that corruption can only be resisted through planned and systematic activities. Therefore, although one will have to go through a period of inevitable criticism in creating an “unnecessary bureaucratic structure,” as the anti-corruption body succeeds (subject to its political support), this criticism will be replaced by public trust.

Secondly, the emphasis on the “police” function of the new body will cause significant opposition (jealousy) among existing law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This is all the more dangerous because our police system is already in need of serious institutional, functional and personnel reform. Adding another element to it will only add to the procedural and operational confusion.

Thirdly, in order to ensure the maximum possible independence of this body, it is proposed to form it through the quota principle, i.e. appoint its members by delegation from various government bodies (the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, State Duma of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation). This approach resembles the procedure for forming the Central Election Commission Russian Federation. At the same time, members of the anti-corruption body must be appointed without the right to recall them. Early termination of their powers will be possible only upon the occurrence of conditions clearly specified in the law, which should further guarantee their independence. Thus, the anti-corruption body will be located in the system of government, but outside a specific branch of it(like the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation or the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation). Therefore, by the way, it is proposed to name the future body with a word that is not applied today to any of the public government institutions in Russia - the Council on Anti-Corruption Policy under the President of the Russian Federation). If we give the future anti-corruption body the status of a law enforcement agency, we will have to agree that it should be located in the system of executive power.

Fourthly, the status of a law enforcement agency presupposes the right of this body to conduct a preliminary investigation and its own jurisdiction. But this means that the anti-corruption body as a police structure will supervised by the prosecutor's office. It is more expedient, on the contrary, to place this organ in a certain sense over the prosecutor's office so that he has the opportunity to point out corruption in its activities.

As for the actual preventive and control tasks, they appear as follows:

Development or organization of development of directions, forms and methods of state anti-corruption policy;

Monitoring and organizing public control over the implementation of state anti-corruption policy;

Coordination government agencies and organizations for the implementation of state anti-corruption policy;

Support for public associations whose activities are aimed at fighting corruption; assistance in organizing an anti-corruption front;

Development or organization of development of anti-corruption program projects federal significance and exemplary anti-corruption programs;

Development or organization of the development of draft laws aimed at eliminating conditions conducive to corruption, and submitting them to the President of the Russian Federation for inclusion as a legislative initiative;

Organizing an anti-corruption examination and conducting an anti-corruption examination of federal laws and legal acts of federal government bodies that have entered into legal force;

Organizing an anti-corruption examination and conducting an anti-corruption examination of draft federal laws and legal acts of federal government bodies;

Conducting an anti-corruption examination of materials in specific criminal, civil cases and cases of administrative offenses for which it was accepted judgment or for which the relevant body has stopped conducting an inquiry or preliminary investigation and issuing conclusions on the degree of likelihood of corruption during the consideration of these cases;

Public assessment of decisions and actions of persons holding public positions in the federal public service system from the point of view of public service ethics in order to identify and suppress corruption;

Control over the dynamics of the property status of persons holding public positions in the federal public service system;

Organization of monitoring and monitoring of corruption in the Russian Federation;

Organization of anti-corruption education of citizens;

Cooperation with international and foreign governmental and non-governmental anti-corruption organizations.

At the same time, despite the fact that our concept of the anti-corruption body does not provide for endowing it with law enforcement (police) functions, this does not mean that we are proposing the creation of a deliberately weak, “masquerade” structure.

What is the guarantee of the expected effectiveness of the anti-corruption body, its real influence?

Firstly, in publicity his very activity. Of course, even today the media publish all kinds of materials that present facts of corruption. But for now, our political system is structured in such a way that these signals are often perceived as manifestations of “information wars”, attacks of one “clan” on another. There was even some devaluation of this kind of materials. It’s a different matter when the state anti-corruption body, after a thorough investigation (in the form of public hearings with the mandatory presence of officials and their obligation to answer questions), makes its verdict. Of course, this verdict will not be prejudicial, i.e. obligations for law enforcement agencies and courts to accept, without verification and evidence, the facts established by this decision. But this kind of official opinion of a state body can no longer be ignored by other state bodies (the draft law also establishes sanctions for this legal liability). The role of such decisions will radically increase as real political competition and real political responsibility are established in the country, which should replace the current non-public competition of apparatus and near-apparatus groups.

The anti-corruption body will also issue orders to eliminate detected conditions conducive to corruption in a particular body; make submissions on the imposition of disciplinary sanctions on relevant officials, up to and including dismissal from office; transfer the materials of their inspections to law enforcement agencies to initiate criminal proceedings.

Secondly, the key to influence lies in a certain subordination of this body to the law enforcement and judiciary in the sense of possible manifestations of corruption in them. For these purposes, it is proposed to give the anti-corruption body the right to request criminal, civil cases, cases of administrative offenses, materials of operational-search activities, conduct an examination on them and demand the initiation of a criminal case against officials suspected of corruption during the inquiry, preliminary investigation or judicial review.

Thirdly, in the relative imperativeness for government bodies take into account the results of anti-corruption examinations draft legal acts or acts that have entered into legal force.

Fourthly, the anti-corruption body has the right to monitor the conduct of bidding, competitions, auctions etc., carried out under government orders, public procurement, sale of state property.

Fifthly, the anti-corruption body, in our opinion, should become the center where they receive and analyze special declarations civil servants and senior officials, indicating the dynamics of their property status, as well as the correspondence of real expenses and income.

Thus, the anti-corruption body takes control of the most important points in the activities of the state apparatus, where corruption is possible, and at the same time constantly informs the society about the results of its activities. Such a paradigm will be able to make this body much more dangerous for corrupt officials, than even law enforcement agencies, intelligence services and courts, especially today, when no one can say with confidence that the attention of these bodies to certain persons is an objective and completely legal inclusion of the legal mechanism for suppressing corruption, or that the termination of a criminal case, an acquittal , decision on civil case completely based on the law and objective.

We have named only the main factors of the real influence of the future anti-corruption body. There are more of them in the bill being presented and, moreover, appropriate legal levers are proposed there to ensure the realism of the proposed functions and powers.

But why do we expect that the new government body will not accept the “existing rules of the game”, i.e. will not become another bureaucratic structure, “trading”, like many others, with her powers of power?

Firstly, this is precisely why it is proposed formation principle of this body by different branches of government, and without the right to recall a member appointed by the relevant government bodies.

Secondly, quite short term of office(3 years) plus frequent rotation, and multi-stage, i.e. renewal of an organ in parts.

Thirdly, the impossibility of re-taking the position of a member of the anti-corruption body without three-year break.

Fourthly, significant material and social guarantees for members of the anti-corruption body and employees of its apparatus.

Finally, (and this is perhaps one of the main distinguishing properties of the proposed anti-corruption body) - not formal, but real interaction with institutions civil society specializing in anti-corruption. We are not talking about “duty” declarations of cooperation, but about the functional impossibility of an anti-corruption body to carry out its activities without anti-corruption social forces. In fact, we are talking about some experiment to test a new philosophy of public-government activity. Thus, on the one hand, there are much more opportunities to increase the effectiveness of the anti-corruption activities of the future body. On the other hand, additional guarantees are created against the lack of control of the anti-corruption body itself.

Of course, all this cannot completely exclude the possibility of unscrupulous people appearing in this body. But such guarantees (a number of other guarantees are provided for in the bill) still minimize the possibility of corruption.

The last thing that should be said when describing the concept of a specialized anti-corruption body is limits of its jurisdiction. The attached bill states that these limits are limited federal public service and federal government organizations. Are we interpreting these limits narrowly?

Yes, ideally I would like to have a body that would have the right to control both the regional and municipal levels of government. But in this case, the creation of its territorial divisions will inevitably be required. It is quite possible that such a design may appear after a certain time. However, after weighing all the pros and cons, we came to the conclusion that such a model was premature.

Firstly, the creation of a new body will require quite a lot of funds from federal budget. It is clear that the creation of a system of territorial bodies will increase these costs quite significantly. And although we have no doubt that the activities of the new body will not only pay off, but will also bring tangible financial benefits (not to mention political and social effects), nevertheless, this process is inertial. And funds will be needed immediately. That is why realism required some narrowing of the limits of jurisdiction.

Secondly, given the current state of relations between society and government, given the current virtual absence of civilized political competition, one cannot fully rely on the fact that members of the regional branches of a given body will not fall under the influence of “pressure groups” in the regions (even if we apply the district principle to their dislocation ). Of course, this danger also exists at the federal level. But this danger is mitigated by the fact that the proposed body, being small in size (12 members) and being the only one of its kind, will be under close civilian control. This cannot be achieved with its extensive territorial system.

Thirdly, today it is important to start somewhere and simply try out a completely new anti-corruption tool. Let it be only at the federal level. By the way, this does not mean that we are talking only about central authorities, because, as you know, federal structures are located in all constituent entities of the Russian Federation.

Fourthly, nothing prevents regional and municipal authorities from following the example of the Federation and creating similar bodies on the same principles (independence, openness, reliance on public institutions).

In conclusion, we should note that when discussing the concept of the main anti-corruption body and the corresponding bill, some members of the team of authors expressed doubts about the legality of creating a body that does not belong to any one branch of government and is called a state body. An alternative proposal was to create such a body under the President of the Russian Federation (while maintaining the quota principle of its formation).

It is likely that such doubts will arise if a political decision is made to create such a body. Therefore, we decided to take a closer look at the legality of the proposed design and came to the conclusion that this design does not violate basic constitutional restrictions and does not contradict legal principles.

Firstly, in our legal system there are government institutions (both those provided for and not directly provided for by the Constitution of the Russian Federation) that are not assigned to any of the branches of government - the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation, to a certain extent the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Russian Federation, Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, etc.

Secondly, the Constitution of the Russian Federation knows not only the term “state authority”, but also “state body” (Articles 33, 120, 125), although it is not applied to any specific body. The same generic name (“state body”) is used by Civil code RF.

Thirdly, we find even clearer analogies in the current legislation on specific government bodies. Thus, the Federal Law “On the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation” (Article 1) calls the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation a single federal centralized organ system. Article 2 of the Federal Law “On the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)” states that the latter exercises its functions and powers regardless from other federal government bodies, government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation and bodies local government. Finally, the Federal Law “on the basic guarantees of electoral rights and the right to participate in a referendum of citizens of the Russian Federation” (Article 21) names the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation federal government agency organizing the preparation and conduct of elections and referendums in the Russian Federation. The Law on Basic Guarantees also determines the procedure for forming the Central Electoral Commission of Russia on the basis quota principle

Vladimir Putin
(photo: press service of the President of the Russian Federation)

President Vladimir Putin signed a decree “On measures to improve the organization of activities in the field of combating corruption.”

According to the new decree, in each subject of the Russian Federation, within three months, it is recommended to create an anti-corruption commission, a special body for the prevention of corruption and other offenses, as well as units for the prevention of corruption and other offenses in federal government bodies.

Thus, in each region a special commission will be created, chaired by the governor, whose forces will determine the anti-corruption policy of the region and combat corruption. The commission will carry out its activities in cooperation with the Presidential Anti-Corruption Department. The commission will be the main body regulating conflicts of interest and ensuring the implementation of decisions of the Presidential Anti-Corruption Council. The commission is also entrusted with the functions of preparing regulatory legal acts and regional anti-corruption programs.

The body of the constituent entity of the Russian Federation, aimed at combating corruption, will work in each constituent entity of the Russian Federation. The responsibilities of the body will include combating corruption in the highest echelons of regional government, in executive authorities and organizations created to carry out government tasks.

A corruption prevention unit can be created in each federal government body. Such divisions will appear in state corporations and other companies created by the state. The list of their powers will include the prevention of corruption crimes and the provision of measures aimed at combating corruption in all structural organizations created by this body.

The functionality of the created body and anti-corruption units also includes ensuring compliance with legislation on cost control. A separate paragraph is dedicated to the work to protect the rights of persons alleging corruption. Also, employees of the departments will have to ensure that civil servants promptly contact law enforcement agencies in the event of inciting officials to commit corruption crimes.

Employees of the departments will monitor the accuracy of income information submitted not only by current officials, but also by candidates for civil service and persons dismissed from public service (ex-officials are required to file declarations before the end of the year during which they left office, and also comply with a number of measures to prevent conflicts of interest during subsequent employment).

Separately, the standard provisions on the creation of these structures stipulate the need for interaction with civil society and openness of activity. Thus, the media will be invited to the quarterly meetings of the anti-corruption commission, the annual reports of the commission will be published on the website of the head of the region and in the media.

The presidential decree also makes amendments to the system for providing information on income: information about the sources of funds from which the official acquired real estate is published if the total amount of such transactions exceeds the total income of the employee and his spouse for the last three years.

With the help of the measures recommended by the president, each subject of the federation should develop a system that comprehensively combats corruption. The creation of anti-corruption units will make it possible to implement anti-corruption policy measures not only at all levels of government, but also in those organizations that are created to carry out government tasks: unitary enterprises, companies with state participation. It is through these organizations that corruption schemes are usually implemented. An anti-corruption policy aimed at systematically combating corruption will not only allow us to identify individual facts of corruption, but also eliminate the conditions under which corruption ties arise and corruption flourishes.

Well-known politicians have already noted the systematic approach to the anti-corruption policy implemented by the state. Member of the State Duma Committee on Security and Anti-Corruption Anatoly Vyborny emphasized the importance of measures taken by the state aimed at combating corruption.

— In fact, this decree established all-Russian standards for organizing activities in the field of anti-corruption, which, of course, is the next step in the development of national anti-corruption legislation, - commented

Position
on the Commission for Anti-Corruption Activities of the Federal State Budgetary Institution "Russian Academy of Sciences"

1. General provisions

1.1. This Regulation determines the procedure, tasks and competence of the Commission on Anti-Corruption Activities of the federal state budgetary institution "Russian Academy Sciences" (hereinafter referred to as the Commission).

1.2. The Commission in its activities is guided by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, Federal law dated December 25, 2008 N 273-FZ “On Combating Corruption”, decrees and orders of the President of the Russian Federation, decrees and orders of the Government of the Russian Federation, regulatory legal acts RAS, also by these Regulations.

1.3. The Commission is an advisory body that systematically carries out a set of activities to:

identifying and eliminating the causes and conditions that give rise to corruption;

developing optimal mechanisms for protecting against the penetration of corruption into an enterprise, reducing corruption risks in it;

creation of a unified system for monitoring and informing RAS employees on corruption issues;

anti-corruption propaganda and education.

1.4. Basic concepts used in these Regulations:

corruption (from Latin corruptio - bribery) is a socio-legal phenomenon that manifests itself in the use by civil servants and other persons authorized to perform government functions of their official position, status and authority of their position for personal gain or the acquisition of other opportunities or in group interests. Corruption is also interpreted as bribery, corruption of state, public, political figures and other officials, as abuse of official position for personal gain, as bribery, inflated expenses, misuse of funds entrusted to them, embezzlement of public funds, etc., as well as official patronage relatives and their people, nepotism, cronyism;

corruption offense is a separate manifestation of corruption entailing disciplinary, administrative, criminal or other liability;

subjects of anti-corruption policy - state and local government bodies, institutions, organizations and persons authorized to formulate and implement anti-corruption policy measures, citizens;

subjects of corruption offenses are individuals who use their status contrary to the legitimate interests of society and the state to illegally obtain benefits, as well as persons who illegally provide such benefits;

prevention of corruption - activities of subjects of anti-corruption policy aimed at studying, identifying, limiting or eliminating phenomena and conditions that give rise to corruption offenses or contribute to their spread;

anti-corruption - coordinated activities of federal government bodies, government bodies of constituent entities of the Russian Federation, local government bodies of municipalities, civil society institutions, organizations and individuals on preventing corruption, criminal prosecution of persons who have committed corruption crimes, and minimizing and (or) eliminating their consequences.

2. Tasks of the Commission

The main tasks of the Commission are:

2.1. coordination of the activities of the Russian Academy of Sciences to eliminate the causes of corruption and the conditions conducive to them, identifying and suppressing facts of corruption and its manifestations;

2.2. studying the causes and conditions contributing to the emergence of corruption in the RAS and preparing proposals for improving the legal, economic and organizational mechanisms for the functioning of the RAS and its divisions in order to eliminate the soil for corruption;

2.4. reception and verification of applications and appeals received by the Commission, and other information about the participation of RAS employees in corruption activities;

2.5. providing advisory assistance to RAS employees on issues related to practical application general principles official behavior;

2.7. consideration of other issues in accordance with the areas of activity of the Commission.

3. The procedure for the formation and activities of the Commission

3.1. Decisions on the creation of the Commission, its quantitative and personal composition, as well as the regulations on the Commission are made by the President of the RAS and approved by order of the RAS.

3.2. The Commission includes:

Chairman of the Commission;

Deputy Chairman of the Commission;

Secretary of the Commission;

members of the Commission.

3.3. The activities of the Commission are organized by the Chairman of the Commission, appointed by order of the RAS signed by the President of the RAS.

The Commission carries out its activities on the basis of these Regulations, collective, free and public discussion of issues within its competence.

3.4. Chairman of the Commission:

organizes the work of the Commission;

determines the procedure and organizes the preliminary consideration of materials and documents received by the Commission;

convenes meetings of the Commission;

forms draft agendas and manages the preparation of meetings of the Commission;

determines the composition of persons invited to meetings of the Commission;

conducts meetings of the Commission;

exercises other powers in accordance with these Regulations.

3.5. The Deputy Chairman of the Commission performs the duties of the Chairman of the Commission in the event of his absence.

3.6. Secretary of the Commission:

accepts and registers applications, messages, proposals and other documents from RAS employees;

prepares materials for consideration of issues at meetings of the Commission;

sends materials to the members of the Commission for the next meeting of the Commission;

keeps minutes of Commission meetings;

maintains Commission documentation;

on behalf of the Chairman of the Commission carries out business correspondence with structural divisions of the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as with state and local authorities, public organizations and other structures;

prepares a draft annual report of the Commission;

carries out other work on behalf of the Chairman of the Commission.

3.7. Member of the Commission:

participates in the work of the Commission;

submits proposals for consideration by the Commission, participates in their preparation, discussion and decision-making on them;

carries out the instructions of the Commission and the Chairman of the Commission;

performs other duties assigned to him by the Commission.

3.8. The presence of its members at meetings of the Commission is mandatory. Delegation by a member of the Commission of his powers in the Commission to others officials not allowed. If a member of the Commission is unable to attend a meeting, he has the right to express his opinion on the issues under consideration in writing.

3.9. A meeting of the Commission is valid if at least two thirds of the total number of its members are present. In case of disagreement with by decision, a member of the Commission has the right to express a dissenting opinion in writing, which is subject to inclusion in the minutes.

3.10. By decision of the Commission or at the proposal of its members, in agreement with the chairman, heads of departments and employees of the Russian Academy of Sciences may be invited to the meetings of the Commission, who can be heard on issues of anti-corruption work in the departments.

3.11. A member of the Commission voluntarily undertakes obligations not to disclose information affecting the honor and dignity of citizens and other confidential information that is considered by the Commission. Information received by the Commission can be used only in the manner prescribed by federal legislation on information, informatization and information protection.

3.12. Decisions of the Commission are made at a meeting by open voting by a simple majority of votes of the members of the Commission present and are advisory in nature.

3.13. Each meeting of the Commission is documented in the minutes of the meeting of the Commission, which is signed by the chairman of the meeting of the Commission.

3.14. Specialists, experts, representatives of organizations, and other persons may be involved in the work of the Commission with the right of an advisory vote.

4. Powers of the Commission

4.1. The commission coordinates the activities of the structural divisions of the Russian Academy of Sciences in implementing anti-corruption measures.

4.2. Commission:

makes proposals for improving activities in the field of anti-corruption for consideration by the leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and also participates in the preparation of draft local regulations on issues within its competence;

participates in the development of forms and methods for carrying out anti-corruption activities and monitors their implementation;

considers proposals to improve methodological and organizational work to combat corruption in the RAS;

monitors the implementation of decisions on anti-corruption issues made by the leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences;

carries out preliminary consideration of applications, messages and other documents received by the Commission;

requests information and clarification on the issues under consideration from RAS employees and, if necessary, invites them to its meetings;

makes decisions on the considered issues within its competence, and makes proposals and recommendations to the leadership of the RAS and the heads of structural divisions of the RAS.

5. Ensuring the activities of the Commission

The structural divisions of the RAS provide legal, informational, organizational, logistical and other support for the activities of the Commission.

6. Final clause

The regulation comes into force from the moment it is approved by the President of the RAS.

Document overview

It has been established how the Anti-Corruption Activities Commission of the Russian Academy of Sciences works.

The commission is an advisory body. It is engaged in identifying and eliminating the causes and conditions that give rise to corruption; develops optimal protection mechanisms against its penetration into the enterprise. The commission is creating a unified system for monitoring and informing RAS employees on corruption issues. She is responsible for anti-corruption propaganda.

Decisions on the creation of the commission, its quantitative and personal composition, as well as the regulations on the commission are made by the President of the RAS and approved by order of the RAS.

The decisions of the commission are made at a meeting by open voting and are advisory in nature. Each meeting is documented in minutes.

The President of the Russian Federation signed a decree according to which special commissions should be created throughout the vertical chain of government to comply with the requirements for official conduct of federal civil servants and resolve conflicts of interest. Essentially, these are anti-corruption commissions.

Such commissions have two tasks - to help ensure that government officials comply with the prohibitions and requirements imposed on them by law, and to prevent corruption. Commissions are created in federal bodies executive power and other government agencies and consider issues related to the official conduct of people holding positions in the federal public service. The exception is civil servants who are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as those occupying senior positions in the apparatus of the Federation Council, State Duma, Central Election Commission and Accounts Chamber. But this does not mean that VIP employees remain outside of control. Issues regarding such officials are considered by the Presidium of the Council under the President of the Russian Federation for Combating Corruption.

The commission must include the deputy head of the government body (he becomes the chairman); HR officer responsible for corruption prevention, representative of the legal department of a government agency; a representative of the Office of the President of the Russian Federation for Civil Service Affairs or the corresponding division of the Government Apparatus; representative of a scientific organization. It may include other representatives.

What can serve as a basis for holding a commission meeting? For example, materials received by the commission indicating that a civil servant provided false or incomplete information about income, property and property-related obligations. This may also be a statement from the civil servant himself about the impossibility, for objective reasons, to provide information about the income, property and property obligations of his spouse and minor children.

The reason for the commission meeting may also be an appeal from a citizen who held a civil service position if he decided to move to work in a commercial or non-profit organization, which he supervised while a civil servant, and if less than two years have passed since his dismissal from civil service.

When the commission receives such information, its chairman is obliged to schedule a meeting within three days and hold the meeting within a week.

If the commission has established that a civil servant has violated the rules of conduct, then it recommends that the head of the government agency apply a specific measure of responsibility to the civil servant. If the commission has identified signs in the actions or inaction of a civil servant administrative offense or corpus delicti, then the chairman of the commission is obliged to transfer the documents to law enforcement agencies within three days.

So, according to the decree, the heads of federal government bodies must form anti-corruption commissions within two months. The authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments are recommended to do the same.