Modernization as an important scientific and industrial problem. The third stage of modernization Theories of political modernization

13. Political development of society

§ 13.3. Stages and problems of modernization of Russia

Russia is a country of inorganic modernization. The country took shape in a zone of risky agriculture, a collision of two world religions, two types of civilization, in a zone not developed by previous civilizations, away from world trade and information communications. The need for the survival and development of the Orthodox state in these conditions required maximum concentration and centralization of resources in the hands of a tough, authoritarian government. To create conditions for the development of Russia and implement a specific minimum of natural rights of citizens, government officials used various borrowed socio-political technologies. In this process, the following stages must be distinguished.

Eastern Orthodox (from the baptism of Rus' to the end of the 17th century). Modernization was carried out on the basis of borrowing the socio-political technologies of Byzantium, the East and the priority use of trade and economic ties between the countries of the East and the South.

West. Reorientation of trade, economic and cultural ties from East to West. Borrowing political technologies and principles of social organization from the West. The private interests of the elite become dominant (beginning of the 18th century and until 1917).

Soviet. An attempt to modernize the country based on the Eastern model of civilizational development and reproduction, traditional communal-patriarchal models of life within the entire state. Unconditional dominance of general interest over private interest.

Post-Soviet. An attempt has been made to create conditions for accelerated development based on the active introduction of Western principles of social organization of society and management technologies.

A feature of Russia's modernization is consistent attempts to use borrowed production and management technologies at all stages of historical development. To implement borrowed technologies, state power must create powerful bureaucratic structures to control the process of introducing these technologies (for example, the reforms of Peter I, Alexander II, V.V. Putin). The main problem of modernization is that any bureaucracy, under conditions of strong authoritarian power and a politically illiterate population, begins to degenerate and work for itself, thereby hindering the development of society. Janos Kornai, a respected economist and passionate advocate of a free economy, believes that the general approach used in all countries involved in the transformation process includes the following points inextricably linked: 1) a shift in property relations (privatization); 2) a set of measures necessary for stabilization, liberalization and macroregulation (macroeconomic stabilization); 3) political support for these changes.

The concept of the medium-term program for the revival of Russia relies on self-government and self-organization of the economy, accelerated liberalization and financial stabilization with targeted state support for strategically important sectors of the economy (energy, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, railway transport, space, defense, information technology). Supporters of the program for a liberalized and open economy 2020 believe that compliance with these conditions will automatically lead to changes in the structure of production, the creation of a competitive environment, and the emergence of an innovative economy.

The main tasks of the current stage of modernization are the search for mechanisms for rationalizing the activities of the bureaucracy and creating systems of public control over the activities of government bodies; development of systems of representative power based on the principles of separation of powers and responsibilities; encouraging the creative activity of citizens while maintaining the values ​​of social stability of society.

1. Auzan, A.A. "Rut" of Russian modernization / A.A. Auzan // Social sciences and modernity. - 2007. - No. 6. - P. 54-60.
2. Batalov, E. Without a mandate: (political crisis in Russia) / E. Batalov // Free Thought. - 1999. - No. 10. - P. 21-30.
3. Grachev, G.V. Information technologies of political struggle in Russian conditions // Polis. - 2000. - No. 3. - P. 151-156.
4. Grachev, G.V. Psychology of manipulation in a political crisis / G.V. Grachev // Social sciences and modernity. - 1997. - No. 4. - P. 106-115.
5. Gromyko, A. Images of empire in Russian history / A. Gromyko // Free Thought. - 2007. - No. 11. - P. 163-177.
6. Evstigneeva, L.P. The theory of economic transformation as a research program / L.P. Evstigneeva, R.N. Evstigneev // Social sciences and modernity. - 2007. - No. 5. - P. 5-17.
7. Kryuchkova, P.V. Assessing the regulatory impact and modernization of the state regulation system / P.V. Kryuchkova, A.E. Shastitko // Social sciences and modernity. - 2006. - No. 4. - P. 21.
8. Potseluev, S.P. Ritualization of the conflict (Based on materials from the “rail war” of 1998) / S.P. Kisses // Polis. - 2004. - No. 3. - P. 83-94.
9. Russian militarism - an obstacle to modernization ("round table") // Social sciences and modernity. - 2006. - No. 3. - P. 55-66.
10. Tikhonova, N.E. Russians at the present stage of sociocultural modernization / N.E. Tikhonova // Social sciences and modernity. - 2006. - No. 1. - P. 33-45.
11. Turonok, S.G. Information and communication revolution and a new spectrum of military-political conflicts / S.G. Turonok // Polis. - 2003. - No. 1. - P. 24-38.
12. Yakhnin, E.D. Evolution and the future of human society (the national idea of ​​Russia in the global context) / E.D. Yakhnin // Questions of Philosophy. - 2006. - No. 5. - P. 165-175.

VKO No. 5, 2009

V.Burenok Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor

The only general rule for the modernization of weapons and military equipment should be to ensure acceptable values ​​of the “effectiveness-cost” criterion

When the appearance of a promising model of a new generation is not obvious, then in this case, phased modernization with a simultaneous assessment of possible “technical breakthroughs” is the least risky way to shape this appearance.

One of the ways to maintain the required equipment of organizational formations with weapons, military and special equipment (AMST), maintain or achieve high efficiency of both individual types of military and military equipment and the weapon system as a whole is modernization. This direction of improving military and military equipment is especially relevant in modern conditions, when a lack of appropriations is holding back the development of a new generation of weapons, and the previous generation is morally outdated.

Existing encyclopedic publications, when considering the concept of “modernization,” focus on the actual constructive refinement of military equipment.

For example, in the “Military Encyclopedia” modernization is understood as updating outdated military equipment by improving the design of its individual parts, changing the composition of the equipment in order to improve tactical and technical characteristics (performance characteristics) and (or) increasing operational and technological qualities) without changing the intended purpose of this equipment (Military Encyclopedia. M.: Voenizdat, 2001. volume 5. p. 190).

It should be noted that giving a model of military equipment a “modern look” (the latter is the meaning of the term “modernization”) does not come down to a trivial improvement of its design according to the principle “where the scientific and technical reserve has been accumulated”, for example, replacing the engine with a more powerful one, installing radio-electronic equipment created on a new element base, installation of more effective reconnaissance and surveillance devices, etc.

Any model of military and military equipment has its own intended purpose, is “built-in” into the weapon system, is quantitatively and qualitatively focused on countering the opposing weapon system of a potential enemy, etc., therefore, improving its design and changing the performance characteristics should be carried out taking into account these factors.

That is, if we consider modernization in a broader sense, then this is a complex scientific problem that requires a systematic solution, taking into account the results of the analysis of the combat missions for which the model is intended, the achieved effectiveness of solving them with existing and modernized models, the place and role of the modernized model in the weapons system , its relationships and mutual influence with other elements of the weapons system, the costs of carrying out modernization measures, possible options for constructive improvement of the model, the capabilities of defense industry enterprises to carry out the actual design modifications (production of a modernized) model of military and military equipment, etc.

Consequently, if we methodically correctly build the sequence of actions for modernizing military equipment (in the broad sense), it will look like this:

1. Formation of requirements for the weapon system and individual models of military equipment for the long term.

2. Determination of compliance of the level of performance characteristics of existing samples with the requirements for this period.

3. Formation of possible options for the modernization of military equipment samples to meet the specified requirements.

4. Determination of the type of modernization, taking into account the state of the military equipment located in the troops: modernization of military equipment, production of modernized models at enterprises of the military-industrial complex (DIC).

5. Military-economic analysis of modernization options (according to the “efficiency - cost” criterion) and selection of preferable (rational) ones.

6. Development of design documentation for modernization of air and military equipment according to a rational option.

7. Refinement of existing samples (building equipment) at industrial enterprises, or production of modernized samples.

THERE IS NO SENSE TO MODERNIZE THE SAMPLE IF SUCH A DECISION WILL LEAD TO AN INCREASE (OR RETENTION OF AN UNACCEPTABLY LARGE) RANGE OF VAST AND ITS SPARE PARTS, WILL CAUSE THE NECESSARY TO PRESERVE OUTDATED PRODUCTION AND REPAIR CAPACITIES, WILL COMPLETE COMBAT MANAGEMENT, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND STORAGE, WILL INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MILITARY ACCOUNTING SPECIALTIES AND THUS WILL COMPLICATE THE PREPARATION OF CREWS (CALCULATIONS), ETC.

The formation of requirements for the weapons system of the RF Armed Forces as a whole and for military and military equipment models is carried out within the framework of the development of a unified source data system (USID) for software-targeted support of the military-technical policy of Russia. The ESID, as one of the most important blocks, includes military-strategic and operational input data (WSOID).

From a systemic point of view, VSOID determines the requirements for the weapons system of the RF Armed Forces as a whole, for the weapons systems of the branches of the Armed Forces (arms), and for individual most important weapon systems. This approach to developing requirements is very important, since it allows us to avoid the mistakes of a departmental approach to determining the level of characteristics and achieve balance in the development of all elements of the weapon system.

The second most important block of the ESID is macroeconomic initial data, on the basis of which resource restrictions are formed on the development of both the weapons system of the RF Armed Forces as a whole, and the weapons systems of the armed forces and branches of the military.

These restrictions actually indirectly determine the scale of activities and types of modernization, since limited funding is precisely what forces us to pay more attention to modernization as a relatively less expensive way (compared to the development and serial production of new types of military equipment) of equipping the organizational formations of the RF Armed Forces with modern weapons.

A continuously modernized veteran of the Cold War, the B-52 strategic bomber is still very effective in military operations today. th

The next stage is to determine whether the level of performance characteristics of existing samples meets the requirements for them. Since resource limitations are currently very significant, it is important when performing this stage to determine the key areas for improving military hardware samples.

In other words, there is no need to make a decision to modernize all existing models of military equipment (for which, of course, there is not enough money), but to determine priority ones (based on the degree of non-compliance of their performance characteristics with the requirements or on the importance of the tasks they solve).

At the same stage, it is necessary to determine the list of performance characteristics that need to be improved. The solution to this problem should begin with the formation of tactical-technical requirements (TTT) for the modernized model based on the content of the VSOID, the place and role of the model in modern and future combat operations, assessing the compliance of the existing level of performance characteristics with the formulated technical specifications and determining ways to ensure compliance of the technical characteristics of the upgraded tactical model. technical requirements.

This task is very difficult and multi-criteria, since improving the values ​​of characteristics, as a rule, can be achieved in many ways. For example, increasing the firing range can be achieved by replacing a barrel with improved internal ballistics, using new powders with improved energy characteristics, using new types of projectiles, etc., or a combination of all of these methods.

It is clear that in each case of modernization of a model of military and military equipment, an exhaustive list of modernization options must be generated, each of the options must be assessed using methods of military-economic analysis according to the “effectiveness-cost” criterion, the feasibility of the option must be assessed by industrial enterprises and on this Based on the entire set, the optimal (rational) option is selected.

From the definition given at the beginning of the article it follows that modernization itself (as a set of actions for the constructive modification of a model of military hardware) should be understood as the following types of actions aimed at preventing the moral and physical aging of the model:

1. Constructive improvement of the military equipment model, aimed at increasing the level of basic performance characteristics characterizing its functional purpose, in order to maintain (achieve) high (required) values ​​of the “efficiency-cost” criterion.

2. Constructive improvement of the VVST sample, aimed at increasing the operational and technological qualities of the VVST sample, provided that the existing level of performance characteristics ensures the preservation of high (required) values ​​of the “efficiency-cost” criterion for the long term.

3. Constructive improvement of the military equipment model, aimed at increasing the level of basic performance characteristics, while simultaneously increasing its operational and technological qualities.

The B-52's service life could be 77 years.

The key direction (goal) of modernization is to achieve such values ​​of tactical and technical characteristics that ensure the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the military and military equipment model with the required (acceptable) values ​​of the “effectiveness-cost” criterion.

Other actions to update outdated military equipment (for example, increasing operational characteristics) make sense only when the main performance characteristics (characterizing the purpose of the model) meet modern and future requirements.

Indeed, it makes no sense to improve the performance characteristics, manufacturability, repair or maintenance of a military equipment model if, in terms of its basic characteristics, it is not capable of effectively performing tasks for its functional purpose.

ANY SAMPLE OF WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAS ITS PURPOSE, “BUILT IN” INTO THE WEAPONS SYSTEM, QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY ORIENTED TO COUNTER THE OPPOSING WEAPONS SYSTEM OF A POSSIBLE ENEMY, ETC. THEREFORE, IMPROVEMENT OF ITS DESIGN AND CHANGE OF PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS VALUES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITH THESE FACTORS IN CONSIDERATION.

Actions aimed at restoring its technical readiness cannot be considered a modernization of a model, involving the replacement of elements (components, materials) of a previously produced model of military equipment with structurally or technologically new elements, when the requirements for the degree of efficiency increase (performance characteristics level) are not specified. In this case, replacement may be due to the impossibility or inexpediency of producing such elements in their existing form.

Unfortunately, for the Russian Armed Forces, such “modernization” is carried out in many cases, which is due to the disintegration of pre-existing production ties and the need to reproduce components of military equipment at new enterprises, the long period of preservation of military equipment samples in service (supply) and, accordingly, irreversible obsolescence structural elements that make their production in an unchanged form economically or technologically ineffective.

For some complex samples of military equipment, such forced “modernization” costs 70-80% of the original price of the sample. But it has to be done due to the incompleteness of the development of new models and the need to maintain the required equipment of organizational units.

Already from the very description of this problem it follows that with the completion of the development of new models, the transition to their mass production and the re-equipment of the Russian Armed Forces, it will disappear by itself.

Modernization can be an important direction in shaping the appearance of a new generation model if, as a result of a series of modernizations and based on operating experience of modernized models, the following set of tasks is solved:

A scientific and technical basis for new generation technology is being formed;

An appropriate production base is being created;

Based on the interaction between the developer (manufacturer) of the modernized equipment and its operator, the structural and technical appearance of the new generation model is determined.

It should be said that the solution to such a set of problems is only possible if the VHST sample has not reached the “ceiling” in its development and a transition to a fundamentally new appearance or the use of new physical principles in its creation is not required.

This modernization option is the most preferable for complex models (complexes) of military equipment, when the appearance of a promising model of a new generation is not obvious and phased modernization with the simultaneous assessment of possible “technical breakthroughs” is the least risky way to shape this appearance.

The developers followed this path when modernizing the T-80 tanks. Modifications were created: T-80B, T-80BV, T-80BVK, T-80U, T-80UK, T-80AT. The latest modification is essentially a new vehicle, which differs from the T-80 tank in protection, turret, hull, chassis, instrumentation, fire control system, guided weapons, transmission with engine, etc. (Some other examples of the formation of a promising appearance of the VSVT model in the modernization process is given below).

An important factor in the modernization of military and military equipment is the nature of its implementation. Models in service with the troops can be modernized, or modernized models of military and military equipment can be produced at enterprises of the military-industrial complex using new design and technological documentation.

Of course, only in the latter case can the advantages of the modernized model be fully manifested, since the service life of all its structural elements (components) will be complete and most balanced.

Modernization of the so-called system technology is not always an effective investment in increasing the efficiency of a physically worn-out model. As a result of operation, the wear of structural elements may be uneven, and the service life of the modernized sample will be determined by the service life of this particular structural element.

But even if the sample was in storage and formally its service life is very high, still after modernization its life cycle will be much shorter than that of a newly produced analogue, since its structural elements (components) have undergone physical aging as a result of the influence of numerous factors (climatic and biological influences, temperature, moisture, corrosion, etc.).

This is confirmed by the well-known events with the MiG-29 aircraft, one of which crashed due to corrosion of the tail. When examining aircraft that were in storage and were formally unworn (with a large residual life), they were found to have the same corrosion.

In this case, the question arises - what to do with the military equipment, which is in large quantities in the troops and has the prospect of being used for a long period in the event of modernization?

Of course, a thorough military-economic assessment of the feasibility of modernizing each type of military equipment is necessary. For some of them, the residual resource may be quite significant.

For example, in the United States, through measures to modernize the B-52 strategic bombers, they expect to extend their service life until 2040 (at least up to 77 years), B-2 aircraft - until 2058, etc.

The US Air Force command believes that the B-2 aircraft, through phased upgrades, will be in service until 2058.

When conducting a military-economic analysis of modernization options, it is extremely important to determine scenarios for the combat use of organizational formations that will be armed with these models, simulate combat operations, and formulate tactical and technical requirements for military and military equipment based on their results.

At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the cost of the entire complex of measures for the modernization of military equipment models, including carrying out development work (R&D), testing and the modernization itself (production of a modernized model, or modification of an existing one).

In turn, the meaning of modernization will take place when a significant number of military hardware samples are subject to modernization, namely, when the cost of R&D and testing will not exceed 10% of the cost of the entire modernization program (such indicators are dictated by economic feasibility).

Based on the same economic feasibility, it is believed that the cost of modernizing one sample should not exceed 30-40% of its initial cost. However, in world practice there are numerous examples of deviations from these rules, which, however, were dictated by specific goals pursued in the process of modernization.

For example, upgrading the Abrams M1 tank worth $2.5 million (in 1990 prices) into the M1A1 variant cost $3.5 million. The performance enhancement was achieved by installing a 120-mm XM256 gun, refining the instrumentation system and reworking the ballistic calculator for the ballistics of a 120-mm gun, improvement of the control system with a laser range finder and thermal imager, the use of new armor steels with depleted uranium, the introduction of a new collective protection system with the creation of excess pressure, increasing the reliability of the transmission and chassis and some other measures related to changes in final drives and partial internal rearrangement of the tank with a reduction in ammunition, etc.

THERE IS NO NECESSITY TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT MODERNIZING ALL EXISTING WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT (WHICH, OF COURSE, THERE IS NOT ENOUGH FUNDS), BUT THE PRIORITY SHOULD BE IDENTIFIED (BASED ON THE DEGREE OF THEIR INCONFORMITY WITH THE VALUES OF THEIR PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS REQUIREMENTS M OR FROM THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEMS THEY SOLVED)

In fact, during the modernization process, the appearance of the new tank was formed (compare with the measures described above for the modernization of the T-80 tank). It should be noted that the cost of the Abrams M1A2 tank is $4.2 million. If we return to the modernization of the B-52 strategic bombers, then as a result of repeated modernization their initial cost also increased many times, but at the same time two problems were solved:

the efficiency of the modernized sample increased to the required values ​​(a sample was created that meets modern requirements);

a search was carried out (while minimizing technical and technological risks) for directions for shaping the appearance of a promising strategic bomber based on the experience of combat use of modernized models.

In addition to ensuring the required values ​​of the “efficiency-cost” criterion, an important condition for modernization is compliance with the systematic decision to modernize a particular model of military equipment.

For example, there is no point in upgrading a model if such a decision will lead to an increase (or preservation of an unacceptably large) range of military equipment, its spare parts, will cause the need to maintain outdated production and repair capacities, will complicate combat control, operation, maintenance, repair and storage, will increase the number military specialties and thereby complicate the training of crews (crews), etc.

For example, it is not advisable to modernize models of military equipment mounted on the chassis of an ATT tractor or T-54 tank, since this will reveal many of the disadvantages listed above; samples that have KrAZ type vehicles produced in Ukraine as the base chassis due to the complexity of maintenance and repair (in this case, it makes sense to modernize the VVST model by replacing the chassis with a domestic one), etc.

Thus, modernization is an important scientific and industrial problem that requires an integrated approach to its solution. This is a very multifaceted process and should be considered using a methodological framework adapted for each specific case. The only general rule should be to ensure acceptable values ​​of the efficiency-cost criterion.

Measures to modernize weapons, military and special equipment must be carried out systematically - taking into account the influence of individual models on the development of both the weapons system as a whole and its most important subsystems, as well as taking into account the results of a detailed military-economic analysis of the entire set of measures for the technical equipment of the Armed Forces RF for a long period.

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Pulatova G.E.

intern-researcher-applicant at the University of World Economy and Diplomacy

MAIN STAGES IN TAIWAN ECONOMY MODERNIZATION: PROBLEMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

After the global financial and economic crisis of 2008, the world entered an active phase of a new stage of searching for promising ways to reform and modernize the economies of countries. Modernization is considered a condition for the successful development of the country, and this is confirmed by both history and modern practice.

In many languages, the terms "modern" and "contemporary" are often used interchangeably, although there are certain differences between them. Thus, the “New Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language” explains the concept of “modern” as referring to one era; happening now, today, present; meeting the requirements of its time, caused by its requirements, the concept of “modern” as newfangled, modern, newest. In the modern concept, “modernization” is used to denote the complex development of society or its individual sphere, the transformation of traditional values, structures and relationships into “modernized” ones.

In the economic field, modernization, according to experts S. Eisenstadt and A. Desai, is accompanied by: 1) replacement of human or animal power with inanimate energy sources, such as steam, electricity or nuclear energy, which are used in production, distribution, transport and communication ; 2) separation of economic activity from the traditionalist environment; 3) the expanding replacement of tools with machines and complex technologies; 4) growth in quantitative and qualitative terms of the secondary (industry and trade) and tertiary (service) sectors of the economy;

miki while simultaneously reducing the primary (production); 5) growing specialization of economic roles and clusters of economic activity - production, consumption and distribution; 6) ensuring self-sustaining growth in the economy; at a minimum, ensuring growth sufficient to simultaneously expand production and consumption on a regular basis; 7) growing industrialization1.

The experience of Taiwan is noteworthy, as it successfully modernized its economy while being an agricultural country poor in mineral resources and fuel. Consideration of the main directions of its creation of modern production and transformation of society from traditional to modern should help determine a strategy for further development acceptable for our republic.

Taiwan is part of the first wave of newly industrialized countries. Its development began at the turn of the fifties and sixties of the last century, and by the mid-1960s it was the leader in the world

1 Ermakhanova S. A. Theory of modernization: history and modernity // Current problems of socio-economic development: the view of young scientists: Collection. scientific tr. / Ed. V.E. Seliverstova, V.M. Markova, E.S. Gvozdeva. Novosibirsk: IEOPP SB RAS, 2005. Sec. 2. pp. 233-247

according to the rate of economic growth. By the end of the 1980s, Taiwan reached the level of moderately developed countries, thanks to political reforms, this country turned into a political democracy.

As world and Taiwanese practice shows, the process of economic modernization of the country depends on several international and internal factors, which can be divided into 3 periods:

The first period is 1952-1980, when initially the state actively stimulated agriculture, which suffered the least during the Second World War. Land reforms were carried out, infrastructure was restored and the government achieved an average annual economic growth of 9.21%, which at the time was the highest in the world. Since 1962, agriculture lost its key position as a driving force of the economy - the industrial sector began to develop rapidly. With the exception of two energy crises, in 1973-1974. and 1979-1980, Taiwan's industrial sector maintained an average annual growth rate of approximately 14%.

Beginning in 1950, the government adopted a series of economic development plans that promoted economic growth and industrialization. The first four-year economic development plan (195356) outlined reconstruction, which allowed for increased production of rice, fertilizer, and hydroelectric power. This led to an increase in GNP to 37%. The Second Four-Year Plan (1957-60) encouraged import substitution industries, with GNP increasing by 31% and national income per capita by 13%. The Third Four-Year Plan (1961-64) stimulated the development of labor-intensive export industries, basic services, energy development, industries that contributed to agricultural growth, scientific research, and the development of the island's limited natural resources. The results were a 42% increase

reduction in GNP and a 31% increase in per capita income. These early stages of development were financed by only US$2.2 billion in foreign investment.

Following the reduction in foreign aid in 1965, a fourth four-year plan (1965-68) was adopted and was followed by a fifth four-year plan (1969-72). The increase in GNP during these periods was 46% and 55%, respectively. By 1971, exports of manufactured goods increased, and the government began to redirect its priorities away from labor-intensive industries toward the development of capital-intensive sectors such as shipbuilding, chemicals, and petrochemicals. The Sixth Four-Year Plan (1973-76), which was negatively affected by the international crisis, was completed with only a 19% increase in GNP. It was replaced by a six-year plan (1976-81), which focused on expanding key industries and completing 10 major infrastructure projects, including the construction of a steel mill in Kaohsiung and a new Tajikistan port.

Second period - 1981-1999. - economic conditions throughout the world and within Taiwan itself have undergone great changes. The economic growth rate fell to 7.15%, and the country's economic focus slowly shifted from the industrial sector to the service sector.

The four-year plan (1986-89) achieved an average annual increase in GNP of 6.5%. Among the main priorities of this period, his goals were price stability, growth in the service sector (7.5%), trade liberalization, support for regional development, and growth in high technology industries such as computer manufacturing, robotics, and bioengineering. In response to weakening export growth and slowing private investment in the stock market in 1990, the government developed a six-year plan (1991-97) aimed at economic recovery. This plan is intended

was intended for investments, mainly in transport, telecommunications, electricity generation, and pollution control. Private investment in the research and high technology sectors was stimulated. In the 1990s, the privatization of government enterprises continued, and the Taiwan market was opened to foreigners to attract investment in the technology sector.

Although the average level of economic growth decreased between the two stages of economic development, the average level of economic growth from 1952 to 2001 was 8.13%.

Since 1997, high technology began to provide almost half of all Taiwanese exports, according to this indicator the island took 18th place in the world. The technology parks of Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan have become the main bases of activity not only for large enterprises, but also for numerous small and medium-sized enterprises that form the basis of the island economy.

The third period - starting in 2000 - Taiwan's economy resumed its path of steady growth.

Taiwan's six-year national development plan (2002-08) was called "Challenges 2008", which was estimated at US$75 billion, and had seven goals: 1) expand the number of products and technologies of the highest global standards; 2) double the number of foreign tourists; 3) increase spending on scientific research to 3% of GDP; 4) reduce unemployment to 4%; 5) increase the average growth rate to more than 5%; 6) increase the number of broadband Internet users to 6 million; 7) create approximately 700,000 jobs1.

At the same time, the program for creating a “Green Silicon Island” was adopted, which was considered as a set of government measures aimed at finding optimal methods for managing the economy based on

1 http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/economy/edown/3-5.htm

on the economy on knowledge - which replaced information technology.

The program included five priority areas:

"Green Taiwan" - support for all types of activities aimed at restoring, preserving and maintaining the environment;

"Dynamic Taiwan" - the formation of basic and scientific and technical infrastructures necessary to accelerate economic growth;

"Effective Taiwan" - implementation of a program to create an integrated transport network on the island;

"Quality Taiwan" - creating conditions for the development of personal qualities of citizens;

"Attractive Taiwan" - making the island a pleasant place to live.

From 2002 to 2007, Taiwan's economic growth ranged from 3.5% to 6.2% annually. In 2008 GDP grew by 0.7%, however, in 2009 GDP growth rate decreased to -1.91% due to the global economic crisis. Thanks to the implementation of government measures and an increase in exports to the level of previous years, in 2010. the GDP growth rate was 10.5%. In 2010, Taiwan was ranked as the 20th largest economy in the world with a GDP of US$427.0 billion2

The industrial sector is a key driver of Taiwan's economic development. Over the past years, the government has stimulated the private sector, which has allowed it to increase industrial competitiveness and achieve sustainable economic growth. The industrial sector's contribution to GDP peaked in 1986 at 44.8% and has declined steadily since then. In 2010, the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP decreased to 31.1%, while the service sector increased to 67.5%. With the advent of the knowledge-based economy, the contribution of the service sector to GDP continues to rise; whereas, the contribution of the agricultural sector

2 http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/economy/edown/3-5.htm

Table 1

Macroeconomic indicators of Taiwan in 2010

GDP (billions of US dollars) 427.0

GDP, per capita (US dollars) 35,800

Economic growth rate (%) 10.5

Unemployment rate (%) 5.2

Export (billion US dollars) 274.6

Imports (billion US dollars) 251.4

Trade balance (billion US dollars) 23.2

Gold and foreign exchange reserves (billion US dollars) 387.2

Exchange rate (TWD:USD) 31.642

Source: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Economic Affairs of Taiwan1

torah in GDP has been falling for decades and fell to 1.4% in 2010.2

In 2009, manufacturing output, with a total value of US$320,202 million, accounted for 91.48% of the total output of the industrial sector in Taiwan. Within the manufacturing industry, information and communication technology products accounted for 34.2%, chemical industry 30.5%, metalworking and mechanical engineering 24.2%, consumer goods industries 11.1%3.

The modernization and economic development of the country was carried out thanks to a combination of three forces: small and medium-sized businesses, large corporations and state support, which allowed the following:

About 8 million of the country's population work in 70 thousand small and medium-sized enterprises, which have created a very flexible economic structure;

Over the past decades, 100 largest corporations have been formed in the country, actively participating in certain industries, in foreign trade and in operations on the stock market;

The state regulates the most important processes in the economy, stimulates

1 http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/2010/view/en/index.html

2 http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/2010/view/en/index.html

3 http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/2010/view/en/

export, creating special economic zones and scientific and production zones, of which there are more than 100 in the country, and their activities contribute to the further growth of scientific and technological progress.

Along with its successes, Taiwan faces many economic challenges like other developed economies. Dependence on exports makes the country's economy vulnerable to ups and downs in the global economy. If in 2009 Taiwan's GDP fell to 1.9% due to a 20% decrease in exports, then in 2010. GDP rose 10.5% as exports returned to previous years' levels. Taiwan's diplomatic isolation, low birth rate, and rapidly aging population are Taiwan's main long-term economic problems. Free trade agreements have proliferated in East Asia over the past few years, but until now Taiwan has been excluded from greater economic integration in large part because of its diplomatic status. Taiwan's fertility rate (1.0 children per woman) is among the lowest in the world, raising the prospect of future labor shortages, falling domestic demand, and declining tax revenues. The country's population is aging rapidly, with the number of people over the age of 65 accounting for 10.7% of the island's total population in 20104.

4 http://www.moeaidb.gov.tw/2010/view/en/index.html

IKTISOD VA MOLIYA / ECONOMICS AND FINANCE No. 3, 2012

Diagram 1:

Dynamics of Taiwan's GDP composition by economic sectors

Dynamics of GDP structure

80 70 60 50 ^ 40 30 20 10 0

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

□ agriculture ■ industry □ services

Political modernization of society is a necessary conscious process of systematization, classification and formalization of ideas of civil order with the aim of designing an optimal strategy for social development on this basis. The key concepts of modernization are “coherence of branches of government”, “sustainable process of social development”, “supporting social guidelines”. Today you cannot build power “at random”. Life requires a new approach that combines particular theories and concepts. The philosophy of our concept is based on the ideas of East and West. In the East, the main task of the authorities is to ensure public order. In Western societies, the dilemma of “democracy or authoritarianism” is discussed. In general, the main problem of political philosophy has become the question of measuring power functions in all spheres of public life. We propose to carry out power measurements by combining the individual properties of democratic and authoritarian strategies. This is our idea of ​​synthesizing an optimal dynamic strategy for social development.

Let's look at the basics of the European strategy, which grew out of the morality of Protestant communities: “be intolerant of the mistakes of others, be diligent, be thrifty.” Fundamentally, this morality can unite a community under the leadership of a strong leader, but does not stand up to the test of “the same thing” in different situations. A unified approach to valuing “the same” was proposed by Luca Pacioli in the form of accounting. This was the first stage in history of modernization of society, built on control on distrust, which gave inertial stability to bureaucracy, democracy, individualism, which reached its apogee in the 19th century and fell into decline by the 21st century.

The first successful system of relations “based on mistrust” is implemented in the US Constitution in the form of opposition to the branches of government. For 150 years, the Constitution has been a major U.S. export and a driver of foreign investment. As a result, the meaning of democratic modernization was reduced to the total application of the principle of mutual distrust and manifested itself in social guidelines: error control, education of diligence, preservation of property. V.I. Lenin called this relationship a “war of all against all.” Max Weber in the book. “Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism” refers to these relations as Western capitalism, based on the recognition of business entities, the widespread use of accounting and reporting, the development of methods of analysis, rational management, and the Protestant ethic.

The second historical stage of modernization was implemented in the USSR in the form of centralized planning, the core of which is control over the implementation of GOST standards. This stage was formalized by a system of social guidelines: monitoring the implementation of GOSTs, instilling executive discipline, and fulfilling planned targets. The principle of this system is the increase in public property (Article 131 of the USSR Constitution of 1937), and the guideline for imitation is the structure of industries in developed countries.

The third historical stage of the unifying modernization of society is carried out today through control by trust on relations of consent; it has the goal of increasing property based on the development of creative initiatives of the population, based on the constitutional right to work according to ability (Article 41, Constitution of the USSR 1977; Article 34, Constitution RF 1993) and contains social guidelines: control of the subject’s initiative, education of responsibility, competent activity.

The first of the mentioned historical stages of modernization of society represents a social corridor in which order arises as a result of the continuous search for balance between opposing branches of power. Here the formal order can be expressed by a system of homogeneous algebraic equations, where the intensity of error control is such as is necessary to ensure diligence and the preservation of property; accordingly, similar equations can be expressed for diligence and property maintenance. The usefulness of such a regime is monitored and directed by public organizations and the media. The ideology of the first stage of modernization was successfully mastered in the United States, which attracted investors from all over the world. Unlimited access to cheap credit allowed the United States to develop for 150 years.

Soviet modernization proceeded under the slogan of “catching up” with the structure of industries in developed countries. Success here arose due to the scissors between static tariff rationing and dynamic technical rationing. The ideology did not have deep moral and moral traditions, so Soviet modernization was doomed. World War II delayed the regime's demise until the end of the 20th century. Today, the Soviet regime has sunk into oblivion, although the idea of ​​imitation of innovations is useful and needs to be implemented locally.

The third historical wave of unifying modernization arose from the need to smooth out the costs of previous stages, where morality and morality moved away from reality, where people en masse lost the aesthetic principle and proactive independent decision-making, abandoned social activity, and became “superfluous” in society. According to the Internet, the number of “extra” Russians is close to 100 million. It is important that it was not society that rejected them, but they themselves made a protest choice. We explored this modern negative social phenomenon using the example of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, where as a result of the accident social guidelines disappeared and workers lost the need and ability to make decisions. In such extreme situations, people suffer from obsessive fears and insomnia. Organizationally, we have strengthened social guidelines in the Chernobyl NPP team. Employees have become more adequate, they have a need to make decisions, sleep has normalized, and fears have disappeared. Our conclusion: the essence of man is the aesthetics of advanced orientation in the form of a coordinated unity of social guidelines; with a large mismatch of guidelines, a person loses connection with society and refuses to make decisions. Coordination of guidelines returns a person to adequacy.

It seems that the pedagogical personality-oriented paradigm is caused by the need to eliminate disagreements between the aesthetic principle of man and outdated elements of ethical practice, which was manifested by a systemic crisis of ideology, the destruction of Soviet statehood, the crisis of pedagogical science and requires a person to acquire a human image in the time of history and the space of culture. Along this path, a need arose to create and launch mechanisms aimed at speedy coordination of factors in the educational process.

The proposed training course for organizers of the modernization of the educational process is devoted to the mechanisms of systematization, classification and coordination of factors in the educational process by combining three historical stages of modernization. The content of modernization is the systematization of citizens' social guidelines and bringing them into line with the information level, social character, and the needs of society's development. Education, as a vanguard sector of the economy, is at the forefront of modernization. The driving force here is the new personal paradigm - the leading trend in the pedagogical consciousness of the 21st century. According to the person-oriented paradigm, the following categories need to be clarified: basic policy goals, property, freedom, equality, human social guidelines, criteria for coordinating social guidelines, which is included in the range of tools for modernizing society.

Do good and talk about it

Modernization is a transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, which is accompanied by the following processes:

Stages of Russian modernization

Pre-industrial modernization. Occurs in Russia during the reign of Peter 1 and is marked by the creation and gradual transition to manufacturing production.

Early industrial modernization. Occurs during the reign of Alexander 2 and is marked by the transition from manufactory to factory type of production. The transition was facilitated by the reforms of S. Yu. Witte and P. A. Stolypin.

Late industrial modernization. Occurs under I.V. Stalin, marked by the creation and gradual transition to flow-conveyor production.

Post-industrial modernization. (1960-70s). The era of scientific and technological revolution (transition to knowledge-intensive production)

Features of Russian modernization:

“Catch-up nature of development”, i.e. modernization in Russia is only catching up with highly developed Western countries.

Exaggerated role of the state. At almost all stages of Russian history, the state plays a decisive role, controls all spheres of social life, which results in the dependence of industry and the economy as a whole on the state, which in turn interferes with modernization processes.

The impulsive nature of the development of Russian reforms. Reforms aimed at deeply reforming society were often carried out without prior preparation of a clear development of a plan for these reforms. As a result, they led to economic crises, increased social discontent, stagnation, etc. This, in turn, also slowed down the process of modernization.

Forced "Europeanization". Reforms in Russia were often carried out similar to Western ones. At the same time, the ruling elite did not take into account the characteristics of Russia, such as territory (it is quite difficult to carry out a reform leading to success in such a large state, since everyone has their own interests, the interests of residents of the south of Russia and, for example, Siberia are extremely different), characteristics mentality, the state of the economy and the political situation. The reforms were not focused on Russia and its needs and specifics.

Ideological, political and cultural splits in Russian society. Throughout history, starting from the 18th century, the ruling elite and the opposition (Decembrists, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, liberals and conservatives) are clearly visible. In Russia there is no consensus on the path of its development.

Heterogeneity of interests of society and the state. This was clearly visible especially during the tsarist rule and the USSR. When carrying out reforms, it was necessary to find a certain consensus between the state and society, which ultimately led to dissatisfaction among some and ineffective management of others.

The original nature of the development of Russian modernization (perhaps we are talking about reforms and counter-reforms).