What does Khrushchev see as the consequences of the cult of personality? Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU on overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences. “We cannot say that these are the actions of a tyrant”

Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich

About the cult of personality and its consequences

Comrades! In the Report of the Central Committee of the Party to the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates of the congress, as well as earlier, at the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, a lot was said about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.

After the death of Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a course to explain the inadmissibility of exalting one individual, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman possessing supernatural qualities, like a god. This man seems to know everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything, he is infallible in his actions.

This concept of man, and, more specifically, of Stalin, has been cultivated in our country for many years.

This report does not attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of Stalin's life and work. A sufficient number of books, brochures, and studies were written about Stalin’s merits during his lifetime. Stalin's role in the preparation and conduct of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the struggle to build socialism in our country is well known. Everyone knows this well.

Now we are talking about an issue of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party - we are talking about how the personality cult of Stalin gradually took shape, which at a certain stage turned into the source of a number of major and very serious distortions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality.

Due to the fact that not everyone still understands what the cult of personality led to in practice, what enormous damage was caused by the violation of the principle of collective leadership in the party and the concentration of immense, unlimited power in the hands of one person. The Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to report materials on this issue to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Allow me, first of all, to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism condemned any manifestation of the cult of personality. In a letter to the German politician Wilhelm Blos, Marx stated:

“...Out of hostility to any cult of personality, during the existence of the International, I never allowed the numerous appeals in which my merits were recognized and which bothered me from different countries to be made public - I never even answered them, except from time to time to reprimand for them.

The first entry of Engels and myself into the secret society of communists took place under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious admiration of authority would be thrown out of the rules (Lassalle subsequently did just the opposite).”

(Works by K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVI, 1st ed., pp. 487–488).

Somewhat later Engels wrote:

“Both Marx and I, we were always against any public demonstrations in relation to individuals, except only in those cases when it had some significant purpose, and most of all we were against such demonstrations that during our lifetime would concern us personally"

(Op. K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVIII, p. 385).

The greatest modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known.

Lenin always emphasized the role of the people as the creator of history, the leading and organizing role of the party as a living, amateur organism, and the role of the Central Committee.

Marxism does not deny the role of working class leaders in leading the revolutionary liberation movement.

Attaching great importance to the role of leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly castigated any manifestations of the cult of personality, waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Socialist Revolutionary views of the “hero” and the “crowd”, alien to Marxism, against attempts to oppose the “hero” to the masses, the people.

Lenin taught that the strength of the party lies in its inextricable connection with the masses, in the fact that the people follow the party - workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. “Only he will win and retain power,” said Lenin, “who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of living folk creativity” (Works, vol. 26, p. 259).

Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik, communist party as the leader and teacher of the people, he called for bringing all the most important issues to the judgment of class-conscious workers, to the judgment of his party, he declared “we believe in it, in it we see the mind, honor and conscience of our era.” (Works, vol. 25, p. 239).

Comrades! In the Report of the Central Committee of the Party to the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates of the congress, as well as earlier at the Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, a lot was said about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.

After the death of Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a course to explain the inadmissibility of exalting one individual, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman possessing supernatural qualities, like a god. This man seems to know everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything; he is infallible in his actions.

Such a concept about a person, and, speaking specifically, about Stalin,

We have been cultivating it for many years.

This report does not attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of Stalin's life and work. A sufficient number of books, brochures, and studies were written about Stalin’s merits during his lifetime. Stalin's role in the preparation and conduct of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the struggle to build socialism in our country is well known. Everyone knows this well. Now we are talking about an issue of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party - we are talking about how the personality cult of Stalin gradually took shape, which at a certain stage turned into the source of a number of major and very serious distortions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality.

The greatest modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known. Lenin always emphasized the role of the people as the creator of history, the leading and organizing role of the party, as a living, amateur organism, and the role of the Central Committee.

Attaching great importance to the role of leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin mercilessly castigated all manifestations of the cult of personality, waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Socialist Revolutionary views of the “hero” and the “crowd”, alien to Marxism, against attempts to oppose the “hero” to the masses, the people.

During Lenin's lifetime, the Party's Central Committee was the true expression of the collective leadership of the party and the country. Being a militant Marxist revolutionary, always irreconcilable on fundamental issues, Lenin never forced his views on his fellow workers. He convinced and patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin always strictly ensured that the norms of party life were implemented, the Party Charter was observed, and party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee were convened in a timely manner.

In addition to all the great things that V.I. Lenin did for the victory of the working class and the working peasantry, for the victory of our party and the implementation of the ideas of scientific communism, his insight was also manifested in the fact that he promptly noticed in Stalin precisely those negative qualities that later led to serious consequences. Concerned about the future fate of the party and the Soviet state, V.I. Lenin gave a completely correct description of Stalin, pointing out that it was necessary to consider the issue of removing Stalin from the post of General Secretary due to the fact that Stalin was too rude, insufficiently attentive to his comrades, and capricious. and abuses power.

As subsequent events showed, Lenin’s anxiety was not in vain: Stalin, at first after Lenin’s death, still took into account his instructions, and then began to neglect the serious warnings of Vladimir Ilyich.

If you analyze the practice of leading the party and the country by Stalin, think about everything that was allowed by Stalin, you are convinced of the validity of Lenin’s fears. Those negative traits of Stalin, which appeared only in embryonic form under Lenin, have developed in recent years into grave abuses of power on the part of Stalin, which have caused incalculable damage to our party.

We must seriously examine and correctly analyze this issue in order to exclude any possibility of a repetition of even any semblance of what took place during the life of Stalin, who showed complete intolerance towards collectivity in leadership and work, and allowed gross violence against everything that was not only contradicted him, but which seemed to him, with his capriciousness and despotism, contrary to his attitudes. He acted not by persuasion, explanation, and painstaking work with people, but by imposing his attitudes, by demanding unconditional submission to his opinion. Anyone who resisted this or tried to prove his point of view, his rightness, was doomed to exclusion from the leadership team with subsequent moral and physical destruction.

This was especially evident in the period after the 17th Party Congress, when many honest, outstanding party leaders and ordinary party workers, dedicated to the cause of communism, became victims of Stalin’s despotism.

It should be said that the party carried out a great struggle against the Trotskyists, right-wingers, bourgeois nationalists, and ideologically defeated all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological struggle was carried out successfully, during which the party became even stronger and more tempered. And here Stalin played his positive role.

And it was during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the practice of mass repressions along the state line developed, first against opponents of Leninism - Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, who had long been politically defeated by the party, and then against many honest communists, against those party cadres who bore on their shoulders the civil war, the first, most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization, who actively fought against the Trotskyists and the right, for the Leninist party line.

Stalin introduced the concept of "enemy of the people." This term immediately freed you from the need for any proof of the ideological wrongness of the person or people with whom you were arguing: it gave the opportunity to anyone who disagreed with Stalin in some way, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who was simply slandered, subjected to the most brutal repressions, in violation of all norms of revolutionary legality. This concept of “enemy of the people” has essentially already been removed and excluded the possibility of any ideological struggle or expression of one’s opinion on certain issues, even of practical significance. The main and, in fact, the only evidence of guilt was, contrary to all the norms of modern legal science, the “confession” of the accused himself, and this “confession,” as the audit later showed, was obtained through physical measures of influence on the accused.

This led to blatant violations of revolutionary legality, to the fact that many completely innocent people who had supported the party line in the past suffered.

It should be said that in relation to people who at one time opposed the party line, there were often not serious enough reasons to physically destroy them. To justify the physical destruction of such people, the formula “enemy of the people” was introduced.

After all, many people who were subsequently destroyed, declaring them enemies of the party and the people, during V.I. Lenin’s life worked together with Lenin. Some of them made mistakes even under Lenin, but despite this, Lenin used them at work, corrected them, tried to ensure that they remained within the framework of the party, and led them with him.

A completely different approach was characteristic of Stalin. Lenin's traits were completely alien to Stalin - to carry out patient work with people, to persistently and painstakingly educate them, to be able to lead people not through coercion, but by influencing them as a whole collective from an ideological position. He rejected the Leninist method of persuasion and education, moved from the position of ideological struggle to the path of administrative suppression, to the path of mass repression, to the path of terror. He acted more and more widely and persistently through punitive agencies, often violating all existing moral norms and Soviet laws.

The arbitrariness of one person encouraged and allowed the arbitrariness of others. Mass arrests and exiles of thousands and thousands of people, executions without trial or normal investigation gave rise to uncertainty in people, caused fear and even anger.

This, of course, did not contribute to the unity of the ranks of the party, all layers of the working people, but, on the contrary, led to the destruction and cutting off from the party of honest workers who were disliked by Stalin.

Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans

building socialism. It was an ideological struggle. If I were in this fight

If the Leninist approach is demonstrated, the skillful combination of party integrity with a sensitive and attentive attitude towards people, the desire not to alienate, not to lose people, but to attract them to our side, then we probably would not have had such a gross violation of revolutionary legality, the use of terror methods against many thousands of people. Exceptional measures would be applied only to those persons who committed actual crimes against the Soviet system.

Lenin used harsh measures in the most necessary cases, when there were exploiting classes furiously resisting the revolution, when the struggle according to the principle of “who will win” inevitably took the most acute forms, right up to civil war. Stalin applied the most extreme measures, mass repressions already when the revolution was victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already eliminated and socialist relations were established in all spheres of the national economy, when our party became politically stronger and tempered both quantitatively and ideologically . It is clear that Stalin showed intolerance, rudeness, and abuse of power in a number of cases. Instead of proving his political correctness and mobilizing the masses, he often followed the line of repression and physical destruction of not only real enemies, but also people who did not commit crimes against the party and Soviet power. There is no wisdom in this, other than the manifestation of brute force, which worried V.I. Lenin so much.

When considering the issue of the cult of personality, we need first of all

find out what damage this caused to the interests of our party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin always emphasized the role and importance of the party in leading the socialist state of workers and peasants, seeing this as the main condition for the successful construction of socialism in our country. Pointing to the enormous responsibility of the Bolshevik Party as the ruling party of the Soviet state, Lenin called for the strictest observance of all norms of party life, for the implementation of the principles of collective leadership of the party and the country.

The collectivism of the leadership follows from the very nature of our party, built on the principles of democratic centralism. “This means,” said Lenin, “that all party affairs are conducted, directly or through representatives, by all party members, on equal rights and without any exception; and all officials, all leading boards, all party institutions -

elected, accountable, replaceable."

It is known that Lenin himself set an example of the strictest adherence to these principles. There was no such important issue on which Lenin would make a decision alone, without consulting and without receiving the approval of the majority of members of the Central Committee or members of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

In the most difficult periods for our party and country, Lenin considered it necessary to regularly hold congresses, conferences of the party, plenums of its Central Committee, at which all the most important issues were discussed and decisions comprehensively developed by the collective of leaders were adopted.

During Lenin's lifetime, party congresses were held regularly; at every sharp turn in the development of the party and the country, Lenin considered, first of all, it was necessary for the party to broadly discuss the fundamental issues of domestic and foreign policy, party and state building. It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed his last articles, letters and notes specifically to the party congress, as the highest body of the party.

Were these sacred Leninist principles observed for our party after the death of Vladimir Ilyich?

If in the first years after Lenin's death party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee were held more or less regularly, then later, when Stalin began to increasingly abuse power, these principles began to be grossly violated. This was especially evident over the last fifteen years of his life. Is it possible to consider it normal that more than thirteen years passed between the 18th and 19th Party Congresses, during which our party and country experienced so many events? These events urgently required the party to make decisions on issues of national defense during the Patriotic War and on issues of peaceful construction in the post-war years. Even after the end of the war, the congress did not meet for more than seven years.

Almost no plenums of the Central Committee were convened. Suffice it to say that during all the years of the Great Patriotic War, not a single Plenum of the Central Committee was actually held.

This practice reflected Stalin’s disregard for the norms of party life and his violation of the Leninist principle of collectivity of party leadership.

Stalin's arbitrariness towards the party and its Central Committee

especially manifested itself after the 17th Party Congress, held in 1934.

The commission familiarized itself with a large number of materials in the archives of the NKVD, with other documents and established numerous facts of falsified cases against communists, false accusations, blatant violations of socialist legality, as a result of which innocent people died. It turns out that many party, Soviet, and economic workers who were declared “enemies” in 1937-1938 were never actually enemies, spies, saboteurs, etc., that they, in essence, always remained honest communists, but were slandered, and sometimes, unable to withstand the brutal torture, they slandered themselves (under the dictation of falsifying investigators) all sorts of grave and incredible accusations.

It was established that out of 139 members and candidates for members of the Central Committee of the Party, elected at the 17th Party Congress, 98 people, that is, 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mainly in 1937-1938).

This fate befell not only the members of the Central Committee, but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party Congress. Of the 1,966 delegates to the congress with a decisive and advisory vote, significantly more than half - 1,108 people - were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes. This fact alone shows how absurd, wild, and contrary to common sense were the charges of counter-revolutionary crimes brought, as it now turns out, to the majority participants of the XVII Party Congress.

It must be recalled that the 17th Party Congress went down in history as the congress of victors. Active participants in the construction of our socialist state were elected delegates to the congress; many of them fought selflessly for the cause of the party in the pre-revolutionary years in the underground and on the fronts of the civil war, they bravely fought with enemies, more than once looked death in the eyes and did not flinch. How can one believe that such people, in the period after the political defeat of the Zinovievites, Trotskyists and rightists, after the great victories of socialist construction, turned out to be “double-dealers” and went over to the camp of the enemies of socialism?

This happened as a result of abuse of power by Stalin, who began to use mass terror against party cadres.

Why did mass repressions against activists intensify after the 17th Party Congress? Because by this time Stalin had risen so high above the party and over the people that he no longer had any regard for either the Central Committee or the party. If before the XVII Congress he still recognized the opinion of the collective, then after the complete political defeat of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, Bukharinites, when as a result of this struggle and the victories of socialism the unity of the party and the unity of the people was achieved, Stalin increasingly ceased to reckon with the members of the Central Committee of the party and even with members of the Politburo.

Stalin believed that he could now do all the things himself, and he needed the rest as extras; he kept everyone else in such a position that they only had to listen and praise him.

Mass repressions were carried out at that time under the banner of the fight against

Trotskyists. Did the Trotskyists really pose such a danger to our party and the Soviet state at that time? It should be recalled that in 1927, on the eve of the XV Party Congress, only 4 thousand people voted for the Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition, while 724 thousand voted for the party line. In the 10 years that passed from the XV Party Congress to the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee, Trotskyism was completely defeated, many former Trotskyists abandoned their previous views and worked in various areas of socialist construction. It is clear that there were no grounds for mass terror in the country in the conditions of the victory of socialism.

In Stalin’s report at the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee of 1937, “On the shortcomings of party work and measures to eliminate Trotskyists and other double-dealers,” an attempt was made to theoretically substantiate the policy of mass repression under the pretext that as we move forward towards socialism, the class struggle should allegedly become more and more and become more aggravated. At the same time, Stalin argued that this is what history teaches, and this is what Lenin teaches.

In fact, Lenin pointed out that the use of revolutionary violence is caused by the need to suppress the resistance of the exploiting classes, and these instructions from Lenin related to the period when the exploiting classes existed and were strong. As soon as the political situation in the country improved, as soon as Rostov was captured by the Red Army in January 1920 and a major victory was won over Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzerzhinsky to abolish mass terror and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important political event of the Soviet government as follows in his report at the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 2, 1920:

“Terror was imposed on us by the terrorism of the Entente, when the world-powerful powers fell upon us in their hordes, stopping at nothing. We could not have held out for two days if these attempts by officers and White Guards had not been responded to in a merciless manner, and this meant terror, but this was imposed on us by the terrorist methods of the Entente. And as soon as we won a decisive victory, even before the end of the war, immediately after the capture of Rostov, we abandoned the use of the death penalty and thereby showed that we treat our own program as we do. We promised. We say that the use of violence is caused by the task of suppressing the exploiters, suppressing the landowners and capitalists; when this is permitted, we refuse any exceptional measures. We have proven this in practice.”

Stalin retreated from these direct and clear program instructions from Lenin. After all the exploiting classes in our country had already been eliminated and there were no serious grounds for the massive use of exceptional measures, for mass terror, Stalin oriented the party, oriented the NKVD organs towards mass terror. This terror turned out to be actually directed not against the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, but against honest cadres of the party and the Soviet state, who were presented with false, slanderous, meaningless accusations of “double-dealing,” “espionage,” sabotage,” preparing some fictitious “attempts” and etc.

Using Stalin’s idea that the closer to socialism, the more enemies there will be, using the resolution of the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee on Yezhov’s report, provocateurs who infiltrated the state security agencies, as well as unscrupulous careerists, began to cover up mass terror against party cadres in the name of the party and the Soviet state, against ordinary Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the number of those arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes increased in 1937 compared to 1936 by more than ten once!

Mass arrests of party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused enormous damage to our country and the cause of socialist construction.

Mass repressions had a negative impact on the moral and political state of the party, generated uncertainty, contributed to the spread of morbid suspicion, and sowed mutual distrust among communists. All sorts of slanderers and careerists became active.

A certain improvement in the party organizations was brought about by the decisions of the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1938 36 . But widespread repression continued in 1938.

And only because our party has great moral and political strength, it was able to cope with the difficult events of 1937-1938, survive these events, and raise new cadres. But there is no doubt that our progress towards socialism and preparations for the defense of the country would have been carried out more successfully if not for the huge losses in personnel that we suffered as a result of massive, unjustified and unfair repressions in 1937-1938.

We accuse Yezhov of the perversions of 1937, and we accuse him correctly. But we need to answer the following questions: could Yezhov himself, without Stalin’s knowledge, arrest, for example, Kosior? Was there an exchange of views or a decision by the Politburo on this issue? No, it was not, just as it was not the case in other similar cases. Could Yezhov decide such important issues as the fate of prominent party figures? No, it would be naive to consider this the work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that such matters were decided by Stalin; without his instructions, without his sanction, Yezhov could not do anything.

We have now sorted it out and rehabilitated Kosior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others. On what basis were they arrested and convicted?

A study of the materials showed that there were no grounds for this. They were arrested, like many others, without the sanction of the prosecutor. Yes, in those conditions no sanction was required; What other sanction could there be when Stalin allowed everything? He was the chief prosecutor in these matters. Stalin gave not only permission, but also instructions for arrests on his own initiative. This should be said so that there is complete clarity for the delegates of the congress, so that you can give the correct assessment and draw the appropriate conclusions.

Facts show that many abuses were made at the direction of Stalin, without regard to any norms of party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very suspicious man, with morbid suspicion, as we became convinced of while working with him. He could look at a person and say: “something is wrong with your eyes today,” or: “why do you often turn away today, don’t look straight into the eyes.” Morbid suspicion led him to sweeping distrust, including in relation to prominent party figures whom he had known for many years. Everywhere and everywhere he saw “enemies”, “double-dealers”, “spies”.

Having unlimited power, he allowed cruel arbitrariness and suppressed people morally and physically. A situation was created in which a person could not express his will.

Thus, the most flagrant violations of socialist legality, torture and torture, which led, as shown above, to slander and self-incrimination of innocent people, were sanctioned by Stalin on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Stalin's autocracy led to particularly grave consequences during the Great Patriotic War.

If we take many of our novels, films and historical “research”, they portray the question of Stalin’s role in the Patriotic War in a completely implausible way. Usually such a diagram is drawn. Stalin foresaw everything and everyone. The Soviet Army, almost according to the strategic plans drawn up in advance by Stalin, carried out the tactics of the so-called “active defense”, that is, the tactics that, as we know, allowed the Germans to reach Moscow and Stalingrad. Having used such tactics, the Soviet Army, supposedly thanks to the genius of Stalin, went on the offensive and defeated the enemy. The world-historical victory won by the Armed Forces of the Soviet country, our heroic people, is attributed in such novels, films and “studies” entirely to the military genius of Stalin.

We must carefully understand this issue, as it has

huge, not only historical, but above all political,

educational, practical significance.

What are the facts in this matter?

Before the war, a boastful tone prevailed in our press and in all educational work: if the enemy attacks the sacred Soviet land, then we will respond to the enemy’s blow with a triple blow, we will wage the war on the enemy’s territory and win it with little bloodshed. However, these declarative statements were far from being fully supported by practical actions to ensure the actual inaccessibility of our borders.

During the war and after it, Stalin put forward the thesis that tragedy,

which our people experienced in the initial period of the war is supposedly

the result of the “suddenness” of the German attack on the Soviet Union. But this is

Comrades, this is completely untrue.

If our industry had been timely and truly mobilized to provide the army with weapons and the necessary equipment, then we would have suffered immeasurably fewer casualties in this difficult war. However, such mobilization was not carried out in a timely manner. And from the very first days of the war it became clear that our army was poorly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and aircraft to repel the enemy.

Very grave consequences, especially for the initial period of the war, were also had by the fact that during 1937-1941, as a result of Stalin’s suspicion, numerous cadres of army commanders and political workers were exterminated on slanderous charges. The policy of widespread repression against army personnel also had the grave consequences that it undermined the basis of military discipline, since for several years commanders of all levels and even soldiers in party and Komsomol cells were trained to “expose” their senior commanders as disguised enemies.

All the more shameful and unworthy was the fact when, after our great victory over the enemy, which was given to us at a very heavy price, Stalin began to destroy many of those commanders who made their considerable contribution to the victory over the enemy, since Stalin excluded any possibility that merit victories won at the fronts were attributed to anyone other than himself.

In this regard, Stalin himself very intensively popularized himself as

the great commander, in every way introduced into the consciousness of people the version that all the victories won by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War are the result of courage, valor, the genius of Stalin and no one else.

In fact, take our historical and military films or some works of literature that are sickening to read. After all, they are all intended to promote this particular version to glorify Stalin as a brilliant commander.

Where is the military leadership? Where is the Politburo? Where is the Government? What do they do and what do they do? This is not in the picture. Stalin alone acts for everyone, without considering or consulting anyone. In such a perverted form, all this is shown to the people. For what? In order to glorify Stalin and all this - contrary to the facts, contrary to historical truth.

The question arises: where are our military men, who bore the brunt of the war on their shoulders? They are not in the film; after Stalin there was no place left for them.

Not Stalin, but the party as a whole, the Soviet government, our heroic army, its talented commanders and valiant warriors, the entire Soviet people - that is who ensured victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Members of the Party Central Committee, ministers, our business executives, Soviet cultural figures, leaders of local party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians - everyone was at their post and selflessly gave their strength and knowledge to ensure victory over the enemy.

Comrades! Let's look at some other facts. The Soviet Union is rightfully considered a model of a multinational state, because we have in fact ensured equality and friendship of all peoples inhabiting our great Motherland.

All the more egregious are the actions initiated by Stalin and which represent a gross violation of the basic Leninist principles of the national policy of the Soviet state. We are talking about the mass eviction of entire peoples from their homelands, including all communists and Komsomol members without any exceptions. Moreover, this kind of eviction was in no way dictated by military considerations.

Thus, already at the end of 1943, when a lasting turning point in the course of the war in favor of the Soviet Union was determined on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, a decision was made and implemented to evict all Karachais from the occupied territory. During the same period, at the end of December 1943, exactly the same fate befell the entire population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March 1944, all Chechens and Ingush were evicted from their homes, and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were evicted from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Republic to remote places, and the republic itself was renamed the Kabardian Autonomous Republic. The Ukrainians escaped this fate because there were too many of them and there was nowhere to send them. Otherwise he would have evicted them too.

In the minds of not only a Marxist-Leninist, but also any sane person, this situation cannot be understood - how can one blame entire peoples, including women, children, old people, communists and Komsomol members, for the hostile actions of individuals or groups, and subject them to mass repressions, hardships and suffering.

It must be said that in the post-war period the situation was even greater

has become more complicated. Stalin became more capricious, irritable, rude, and his suspicion especially developed. The mania for persecution increased to incredible proportions. Many workers became enemies in his eyes. After the war, Stalin isolated himself even more from the collective, acting exclusively alone, without regard for anyone or anything.

Stalin's incredible suspicion was cleverly exploited by the vile provocateur, the vile enemy of Beria, who exterminated thousands of communists, honest Soviet people. The nomination of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov frightened Beria. As has now been established, it was Beria who “tossed” to Stalin the materials he and his henchmen had concocted in the form of statements, anonymous letters, in the form of various rumors and conversations.

The question arises: why were we now able to understand this matter, and did not do this earlier, during Stalin’s life, in order to prevent the death of innocent people?

This is what Stalin's megalomania led to. He completely lost his sense of reality, showed suspicion and arrogance towards not only individuals within the country, but also towards entire parties and countries.

Comrades!

The cult of personality acquired such monstrous proportions mainly because Stalin himself in every possible way encouraged and supported the exaltation of his person. This is evidenced by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic manifestations of Stalin’s self-praise and lack of elementary modesty is the publication of his “Brief Biography”, published in 1948.

This book is an expression of the most unbridled flattery, an example of the deification of man, turning him into an infallible sage, the most “great leader” and “unsurpassed commander of all times and peoples.” There were no other words to further praise the role of Stalin.

The layout of the book included the following phrase: “Stalin is Lenin today.” This

the phrase seemed to him clearly insufficient, and Stalin himself

remakes it as follows: “Stalin is a worthy successor to Lenin’s work, or, as they say in our party, Stalin is Lenin today.” This is how strongly it was said, not by the people, but by Stalin himself.

A legitimate question arises: if Stalin is the author of this book, then why did he need to glorify Stalin’s personality so much, and, in essence, make the entire post-October period in the history of our glorious Communist Party only a background to the actions of the “Stalinist genius.”

Did this book adequately reflect the efforts of the party for the socialist transformation of the country, the construction of a socialist society, the industrialization and collectivization of the country and other measures carried out by the party, firmly following the path outlined by Lenin? It mainly talks about Stalin, his speeches, his reports. Everything, without any exception, is connected with his name.

And when Stalin himself declares that it was he who wrote “A Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks),” this cannot but cause at least surprise and bewilderment. Can a Marxist-Leninist write about himself like that, raising the cult of his personality to the skies?

But without Stalin’s knowledge, his name was assigned to many of the largest enterprises and cities; without his knowledge, Stalin’s monuments were erected throughout the country - these “monuments during his lifetime”? After all, it is a fact that on July 2, 1951, Stalin himself signed a decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which provided for the construction of a monumental sculpture of Stalin on the Volga-Don Canal, and on September 4 of the same year he issued an order to release 33 tons of copper for the construction of this monument.

At the same time, Stalin showed disrespect for the memory of Lenin. It is no coincidence that the Palace of Soviets, as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, the decision to build which was made over 30 years ago, was not built, and the issue of its construction was constantly postponed and consigned to oblivion. We need to correct this situation and build a monument to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

During Stalin’s life, thanks to well-known methods, which I have already talked about, citing facts, such as the “Brief Biography of Stalin”, all events were covered in such a way that Lenin seemed to play a secondary role even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films and works of fiction, the image of Lenin is portrayed incorrectly and unacceptably belittled.

All this must be resolutely reconsidered so that the role of V.I. Lenin, the great deeds of our Communist Party and the Soviet people - the creative people, the creative people - are correctly reflected in history, literature, and works of art.

Comrades! The cult of personality contributed to the spread of vicious methods in party building and economic work, gave rise to gross violations of internal party and Soviet democracy, naked administration, various kinds of perversions, covering up shortcomings, and varnishing reality. We have a lot of sycophants, hallelujahs, and defrauders.

It is also impossible not to see that as a result of numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic workers, many of our cadres began to work uncertainly, with caution, to be afraid of the new, to be wary of their own shadow, and began to show less initiative in their work.

Stalin's isolation from life and his ignorance of the actual state of affairs on the ground can be clearly demonstrated by the example of the management of agriculture.

When we now sharply speak out against the cult of personality, which became widespread during Stalin’s lifetime, and talk about many negative phenomena generated by this cult, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, some people may ask: how is this possible, since Stalin stood at the head of the party and country for 30 years, major victories were achieved under him, how can one deny this? I believe that only people blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of personality can pose the question in this way, who do not understand the essence of the revolution and the Soviet state, who do not truly, in a Leninist way, understand the role of the party and the people in the development of Soviet society.

The socialist revolution was carried out by the working class in alliance with the poor peasantry, with the support of the middle peasantry, carried out by the people led by the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great merit lies in the fact that he created a militant party of the working class, armed it with a Marxist understanding of the laws of social development, the doctrine of the victory of the proletariat in the fight against capitalism, he tempered the party in the fire of revolutionary battles of the masses. During this struggle, the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became their proven leader, and led the working people to power and to the creation of the world's first socialist state.

Some comrades may ask the question: where were the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee looking, why did they not speak out against the cult of personality in a timely manner and are doing this only recently?

First of all, we must keep in mind that members of the Politburo looked at these issues differently in different periods. At first, many of them actively supported Stalin, because Stalin is one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, strength and will had a great influence on the cadres and on the work of the party.

It is known that after the death of V.I. Lenin, Stalin, especially in the early years, actively fought for Leninism, against the perverters and enemies of Lenin’s teaching. Based on Lenin's teachings, the party, led by its Central Committee, launched a great deal of work on the socialist industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture, and the implementation of the cultural revolution. At that time, Stalin gained popularity, sympathy and support. The party had to fight against those who tried to lead the country astray from the only correct, Leninist path - against the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and right-wing, bourgeois nationalists. This fight was necessary. But then Stalin, increasingly abusing power, began to crack down on prominent figures of the party and state and use terrorist methods against honest Soviet people. As already mentioned, this is exactly what Stalin did with prominent figures of our party and state - Kosior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.

Comrades! In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, the Central Committee resolutely opposes the cult of personality. We believe that Stalin has been overly exalted. It is undeniable that in the past Stalin had great services to the party, the working class and the international labor movement.

The question is complicated by the fact that everything that was mentioned above was accomplished under Stalin, under his leadership, with his consent, and he was

I am convinced that this is necessary to protect the interests of workers from intrigues

enemies and attacks from the imperialist camp. He considered all this from the standpoint of protecting the interests of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of socialism and communism. You can't say that these are actions

tyrant. He believed that this should be done in the interests of the party, the working people, in the interests of protecting the gains of the revolution. This is the true tragedy!

Comrades! Lenin emphasized more than once that modesty is an essential quality of a true Bolshevik. And Lenin himself was a living personification of the greatest modesty. It cannot be said that in this matter we are following Lenin’s example in everything. Suffice it to say that to numerous cities, factories and factories, collective and state farms, Soviet and cultural institutions, we have distributed, as private property, so to speak, the names of certain state and party leaders who are still alive and prosperous. In the matter of assigning our names to various cities, regions, enterprises, and collective farms, many of us are accomplices. This needs to be fixed.

We must take the issue of the cult of personality seriously. We cannot take this question outside the party, much less into the press. That is why we are reporting it at a closed meeting of the congress. We must know when to stop, not feed our enemies, not expose our ulcers to them. I think that the delegates to the congress will correctly understand and appreciate all these events.

Comrades! We need to resolutely, once and for all, debunk the cult of personality, and draw appropriate conclusions both in the field of ideological-theoretical and in the field of practical work.

To do this you need:

First, in a Bolshevik manner, condemn and eradicate the cult of personality as alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and incompatible with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and wage a merciless struggle against any and all attempts to revive it in one form or another.

To restore and consistently implement in all our ideological work the most important provisions of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism about the people as the creator of history, the creator of all the material and spiritual wealth of mankind, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary struggle for the transformation of society, for the victory of communism.

In this regard, we have to do a lot of work to critically examine and correct, from the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism, the widely circulated erroneous views associated with the cult of personality in the field of historical, philosophical, economic and other sciences, as well as in the field of literature and art. In particular, it is necessary to carry out work in the near future to create a full-fledged Marxist textbook on the history of our party, compiled with scientific objectivity, textbooks on the history of Soviet society, books on the history of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to consistently and persistently continue the work carried out in recent years by the Central Committee of the Party to strictly observe in all party organizations, from top to bottom, the Leninist principles of party leadership and, above all, the highest principle - the collectivity of leadership, to observe the norms of party life enshrined in the Charter of our party , on the deployment of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to fully restore the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight against the arbitrariness of persons who abuse power. It is necessary to completely correct the violations of revolutionary socialist legality that have accumulated over a long period as a result of the negative consequences of the cult of personality.

Comrades!

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union demonstrated with renewed vigor the indestructible unity of our party, its cohesion around its Central Committee, its determination to fulfill the great tasks of communist construction. And the fact that we are now raising fundamental questions in all its breadth about overcoming the cult of personality, which is alien to Marxism-Leninism, and about eliminating the grave consequences caused by it, speaks of the great moral and political strength of our party.


Portrait of N.S. Khrushchev. Hood. YES. Nalbandian. 1961

- What was Khrushchev guided by when he initiated the condemnation of Stalin’s personality cult at the 20th Congress of the CPSU?

Already in the first years of his tenure as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Khrushchev understood that he would become the real leader of the country only if his policies met the vital interests of the ruling layer of the USSR - the Soviet bureaucracy. And the main thing in this regard, what united reformers and conservatives, that is, all layers of officials without exception, was their desire to make bloody purges among the leading cadres impossible in the future.

Indeed, under Stalin, the power and privileges of Soviet officials were balanced by the constant fear of repression. Khrushchev’s report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU “On the cult of personality and its consequences” and the corresponding resolution of the Central Committee solved this problem in the most reliable way - by political condemnation of Stalin’s purges, primarily by condemnation of his policy “in the field of violation of Soviet legality.”

True, they began to correct the situation even before the 20th Congress: if in February 1954 the number of prisoners convicted in the USSR for counter-revolutionary crimes was 468 thousand people, then in January 1956 - already 114 thousand, and in April 1959 - 11 thousand. According to available archival data, a total of 258 thousand people were rehabilitated in 1954-1962, including many party and military leaders - victims of Stalin's purges.

On the other hand, one should not lose sight of the objective regularity of the de-Stalinization process, which was based on the desire of the bulk of the Soviet population to live freely, without the shackles that the Stalinist political regime imposed on society. As one philosopher aptly noted, Stalin “bent society to suit himself,” but this kind of policy could not continue indefinitely.


FIGHTS AROUND THE REPORT


First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev speaks at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union - VASILY EGOROV / TASS PHOTO CHRONICLE

- How was the report prepared?

Mountains of literature are devoted to Khrushchev’s “secret” report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU and its assessment, but the preparation of the report, reflecting the mechanism of action of political power in the USSR, became the subject of special study relatively recently. Let me remind you that in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s report was first published only in 1989, and in 2002 it was published with all known editions and versions of the text. A study of these editions leads to the conclusion that the various versions of the report reflected the vicissitudes of the complex political struggle that unfolded in the Soviet leadership during de-Stalinization.

So, on December 31, 1955, the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee created a special commission headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee, Academician Pyotr Pospelov. The commission was formed “to examine the question of how mass repressions against the majority of the entire membership and candidates of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, elected by the 17th Party Congress, became possible.”

Thus, collectivization, persecution of believers, repression of Soviet prisoners of war and many other repressive acts were outside the scope of her analysis - attention was concentrated exclusively on the fate of the party leadership. The work of the Pospelov commission lasted just over a month: before the start of the congress, on February 8, 1956, a final note containing a report on the repressions of the recent past was presented to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. The next day it was heard at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The Pospelov commission noted that “we must show courage, tell the truth to the congress,” but at the same time “think through how to say it, to whom to tell it”...

- How did the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee react to the document?

All members of the Presidium spoke in favor of publishing the report. But opinions were divided regarding its form. Vyacheslav Molotov believed that “it must be said,” but at the same time, emphasize that Stalin led the country for 30 years and industrialization was carried out under him, that he was “the successor of Lenin’s work.” That is, Molotov insisted on a high assessment of the activities of the late leader.

Lazar Kaganovich did not deny that “along with the ideological struggle, there was an extermination of personnel” and it was necessary to “hear the report”, but at the same time do everything so as not to “unleash the elements.” Kliment Voroshilov agreed with their position. A slightly different point of view was expressed by Georgy Malenkov, who argued that “no fight against enemies can explain why the cadres were killed.”

Khrushchev summed up the discussion: among the members of the Presidium there are “no differences” on the question of “what should be said to the congress.” At the same time, taking into account the opinions of Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and their influence in the party, Khrushchev cautiously noted that the report should “take into account shades.” At the same time, at the meeting of the Presidium the question of who would make the report was not resolved. However, it became clear to Khrushchev that if he showed indecisiveness on the main issue, his political career could end.

On February 13, 1956, the Presidium of the Central Committee made a decision: to make a report on the cult of personality at the congress, and to appoint the first secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Khrushchev, as the speaker. The Plenum of the Central Committee, held on the same day, unanimously approved this decision.

That is, the members of the Central Committee (and this is several hundred people) were aware of what the first secretary would say even before the congress?

That's the thing, no. The report itself on the cult of personality, unlike the report of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev also spoke at the congress, was not presented to either the Presidium or the Plenum of the Central Committee. According to historians, this was a gross violation of party traditions, since a report was approved, “the text of which did not exist at all at that time” and which still “had to be written.”

The draft report “On the cult of personality and its consequences,” which was prepared by the same Pospelov on February 18, 1956, did not satisfy Khrushchev. By this time the congress had already been working for the fifth day. On February 19, Khrushchev dictated his additions to the project to the stenographer. The combination of Khrushchev’s dictations and Pospelov’s project formed the basis of the future “secret” report.

It was read on February 25, the last day of the congress, at a closed morning session. There was no discussion of the report at the congress. The delegates “unanimously” approved the provisions of the report, and the congress concluded its work. Then the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to familiarize all communists, Komsomol members, non-party workers, office workers and collective farmers with the report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences.” In the party organizations of the country, an already edited, corrected version of Khrushchev’s report was read.

STALIN IS BLAME FOR EVERYTHING

- How would you characterize the essence of this report? What was the most important thing about him for Khrushchev?

The most important goal of the Khrushchev report is to place all the blame for everything bad in the past on Stalin and thereby rehabilitate the Soviet system, socialist ideas and the Communist Party. Khrushchev tried to lead listeners to the idea that some people from among the current political leadership of the country share their share of responsibility for the crimes of the past, but he did not name specific names. A large part of the report was occupied by the theoretical section - condemnation of the cult of personality from the standpoint of Marxism and the so-called “political testament of Lenin” of 1922, which noted the shortcomings of Stalin.

Not everyone in the party leadership agreed that the cult of personality needed to be exposed. Why didn’t they show themselves at all at the 20th Congress?

THE XX PARTY CONGRESS, IN ITS ESSENCE, IS THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF “CPSU AGAINST STALIN.” Khrushchev correctly grasped the interest that united all layers of officials without exception: to make bloody purges of leading cadres impossible in the future.

Molotov, Khrushchev’s most principled political opponent among Soviet leaders, noted that those in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee who opposed Khrushchev’s reforms “had no unity, no program,” but only a desire to “remove” Khrushchev. The absence of an alternative political reform program in the conservative camp forced Khrushchev's opponents to inaction and empty criticism.

Molotov claimed that he did not openly speak out against Khrushchev’s report at the 20th Congress because he was afraid of a split in the party, but he immediately added: if his group had opposed it, they would have been “simply kicked out.” This valuable recognition irrefutably demonstrates that by 1956 Khrushchev already enjoyed widespread support among the party. His policy of de-Stalinization also enjoyed popular support, in which people saw the opportunity for free development, not constrained by Stalinist dogmas. It was these circumstances that allowed Khrushchev, as he aptly put it, “to correctly seize the moment and insist that such a report be made.”

Why weren’t all the members of the Leninist party leadership repressed by Stalin, Nikolai Bukharin, for example, rehabilitated during the Khrushchev years?

Because Khrushchev, despite all his criticism of Stalin, considered the latter a “real communist.” As for Bukharin, the resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated April 23, 1929 condemned the “right-wing opportunist factional activities of Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky” and their views as “incompatible with the general line of the party” in the field of domestic and foreign policy. This was just the beginning. In December 1936, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Bukharin was accused of counter-revolutionary activities.


Moscow. XX Congress of the CPSU. N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulganin and A.I. Mikoyan (from left to right) among the delegates - TASS PHOTO CHRONICLE

Let’s not forget that Bukharin’s famous slogan “Get rich!” associated with the revival and development of capitalist elements in the countryside. Khrushchev, after the virgin lands epic did not solve the grain problem in the country, and the outflow of rural residents to cities at the turn of the 1950s-1960s only increased, tried with all his might to prevent the development of personal subsidiary plots of village residents, tried to force the peasants to continue to work meekly on collective farms.

Therefore, for Khrushchev the choice was not this: to condemn Stalin and rehabilitate Bukharin as an ideological opponent of super-industrialization and Stalin’s theory of strengthening the class struggle. Ideologically, Khrushchev completely and completely shared the “general line” of the party in the countryside: public farming (collective and state farms) is the basis of the Soviet economic system.

In addition, from the mid-1930s, Khrushchev was a member of the Central Committee of the party, headed the Moscow City Committee, and in these positions he actively fought against the Trotskyists and “right-wingers.” The rehabilitation of Bukharin (and therefore the Bukharin alternative to Stalinism), and even more so of Leon Trotsky, in the conditions of constant internal party struggle, meant for him a serious political risk with unpredictable consequences.

What was Khrushchev guided by when deciding which of the repressed members of the Communist Party should be rehabilitated and which should not?

Like any politician forced to make a specific decision, Khrushchev was guided by expediency. And what was expedient for him was what contributed to strengthening his personal power and weakening his competitors. Only through the prism of the struggle for power in the USSR did the then leaders consider the possibility of certain reforms.

Hence Khrushchev’s attention to the personality of the murdered Sergei Kirov, in whom the communists in the 1930s saw an alternative to Stalin, to Tukhachevsky, the repressions against whom Khrushchev directly linked with the purges of the leadership of the Red Army, which, in his opinion, was one of the reasons for our failures at the initial stage of the Great Patriotic War. It is known how skillfully Khrushchev played this card in his report, placing all the blame for the military disaster of 1941 on Stalin personally...

"THE FIRST STEP INTO THE Abyss"

- What is the significance and what are the consequences of exposing Stalin’s personality cult?

According to the general recognition of historians, the exposure of Stalin's personality cult at the 20th Congress of the CPSU occupies a key place among Khrushchev's reforms. It was after this that a discussion arose among the progressive part of the communists about the essence of socialism - the system that was created in the USSR. The 20th Congress deprived both the leader himself and the communist ideas of the sacred aura.


Artist V. Govorkov created one of the most famous posters of the era

However, there is still no consensus on the meaning of these changes. Some historians believe that the political system under Khrushchev was unable to get rid of “the worst perversion of socialism” - violence and repression. There is a point of view according to which Khrushchev’s report did not so much criticize Stalin’s personality cult as discredit the past of our country and, in its consequences, was “the first step into the abyss.”

Apparently, those researchers who believe that Khrushchev’s report could not help but expose the entire system as a whole to attack are right, even if the process of its collapse still took time and had to go through many stages.

“They are undermining the system!” - this is exactly how one old Bolshevik described his impressions of the “secret” report. The very first reaction of the Soviet population to this speech by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress showed that many people viewed Stalin’s crimes as crimes of the entire Soviet system, not reducible to the will of one person or group of individuals who used the regime in their own interests.

As modern historians note, perhaps for the first time since the Civil War, people thought about the cost of building a “bright future.” The confusion in assessments of our past, present and future affected not only the party environment, but also all layers of Soviet society. “We all began to think critically,” one of the participants in the discussion of Khrushchev’s report noted in this regard. But many people still considered Stalin “the great successor of Lenin’s work”; they said that under Stalin’s leadership socialism was built and fascism was defeated. There was a split in society, and this critical wave threatened to overwhelm the country and nullify the ideological work of the party.

Psychologically, mentally, what was the beginning of criticism for the entire people was its completion for the party. The resolution defined the scope of this criticism and its limits. In this document, the Stalinist cult was declared to be a consequence of the struggle of “obsolete classes” with the policies of the Soviet regime. It was explained by the internal party struggle against the “enemies of Leninism” who sought the “restoration of capitalism in the USSR”, the complexity of the international situation and the expectation of a “constant threat of attack from the outside”, as well as the gradual replacement of party control over state security bodies with “personal control of Stalin”, in which the norms of justice were replaced by “his individual decisions.”

Along with these provisions, the resolution emphasized that Stalin’s atrocities were committed “in the interests of ensuring the victory of communism,” which constituted Stalin’s “tragedy.” The resolution defined it as a gross mistake “to draw conclusions from the fact of the presence of a personality cult in the past about some changes in the social system or to look for the source of this cult in the nature of the Soviet social system.” This was the official version of events given by the Soviet leadership in response to the intensifying process of democratization of the country.

- How was Khrushchev’s report received abroad?

According to many historians, the contents of Khrushchev's report and the effect it produced contributed to a significant deterioration in the reputation of communist parties around the world. The leaders of 29 foreign communist parties who attended the congress were familiarized with the “closed report.” However, there were also many who learned about the main news from foreign press reports. Thus, the Swedish Communist Party accused the USSR of hiding information from foreign communists, the CPSU Central Committee “generously shares it with bourgeois journalists.”

Various groups have formed in many communist parties, depending on their attitude to Khrushchev’s report. Some argued that the speaker “distorted the historical truth” and even if some of what was said was true, then “they should have remained silent about it”; others considered the report “premature”, and some were completely disillusioned with communist ideas and left the Communist Party.

Already on June 5, 1956, the American The New York Times published the full text of Khrushchev’s report, which, in essence, did not differ from what was heard at the congress. A number of historians, not without reason, believe that the text of the report came to the West with the help of Polish communists. This began a new stage of anti-communist and anti-Soviet hysteria.

It is very significant that in 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev, answering questions from a French newspaper L'Humanite, stated that "Stalinism is a concept invented by opponents of communism and is widely used to denigrate the Soviet Union and socialism in general." True, then, as we know, he changed his position, and as a result, sharp criticism of the Stalinist period unfolded in the USSR...

"RUN AHEAD OF THE STEAM LOGO"

What is the role of Nikita Khrushchev himself in the mass repressions: was he their initiator or just an obedient executor of Stalin’s instructions?

I think it's fair to say both. Khrushchev’s personal guilt was fundamentally no different from the “contribution” to the mass repressions of other members of Stalin’s inner circle: Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Beria and others.

In order to make a career at that time, especially if it was a party or state career, it was not enough to “recognize the program and charter of the party.” It was necessary to constantly show initiative in the matter of “steadily implementing the party’s decisions.” And to do this, in Stalin’s words, not in the manner of “general chatter, but in a strictly businesslike manner.”

It can be said that any Stalinist nominee should have “run ahead of the locomotive”, ahead of competitors in the struggle for a place in the sun, and by personal example show examples of business activity and dog-like devotion to the leader. In addition, one should take into account Khrushchev’s character - lively, impulsive, proactive.

I will give just one example of my own research in this direction. When he was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, Nikita Sergeevich in February 1948 sent Lavrentiy Beria a package of documents. They contained a proposal to adopt a law in the republic tightening labor discipline on collective farms. One of the measures provided for the deportation of “truant workers” to remote areas of the country for a special settlement. This was a cruel anti-peasant measure that Stalin approved. In the summer of the same year it was extended throughout the country.

- To what extent do the documents stored in the archives allow us to reveal Khrushchev’s role in the repressions of the 1930-1950s?

So much so that one can rightfully say: Khrushchev is guilty. The peak of repression, as is known, occurred in 1937-1938. Since 1938, Nikita Sergeevich was not only the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, but also a candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In this capacity, he put his visa on many execution lists...

There is an opinion that during the years of Khrushchev’s reign, a thorough purge of information discrediting him was carried out in the archives. Is this true?

Cleaning archives was commonplace in Soviet times, increasing the chances of contenders in the struggle for supreme power in the country. Archival secrets have terrible destructive power, they help control the past and allow you to shape the future. The publication or, on the contrary, concealment of compromising information about the top officials of the state (and, in the most extreme case, the destruction of secret documents) was an important means in the struggle for leadership.

Let me remind you that on March 5, 1953, when Stalin was living out his last hours, at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a statement was made that “the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee instructed comrades Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev to take measures to ensure that so that Comrade Stalin’s documents and papers, both current and archival, are put in proper order.”

According to the general opinion of historians, at that time these three listed in the statement were the most active figures among possible Stalinist successors. They depended on each other, but did not trust anyone. Therefore, along with the first and main task - the distribution of the most important posts in the state (which was successfully completed for them at the mentioned meeting) - they immediately solved another problem, no less important for them: they took control of the Stalin archive.

This joint control, from their point of view, made it possible to avoid possible “surprises” associated with the presence of compromising information among secret documents, and to a certain extent should have guaranteed their political future.

Each of this trio was primarily concerned with their own safety, but in the literature there is no mention of which of their trusted persons they entrusted with the work of dismantling the Stalin archive. Most likely, each of the trio limited himself to a quick glance and took from Stalin’s papers, including the archive, those documents that could compromise him personally. They clearly did not have enough time to identify all possible documents containing incriminating evidence. And it is unlikely that in such a short period of time (the struggle for power in 1953 among Stalin’s epigones developed rapidly) it would have been possible to competently disassemble the Stalinist archive and find the necessary papers without the involvement of archival specialists.

On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences

Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Workers of all countries, unite!

The Central Committee of the CPSU notes with satisfaction that the decisions of the historic 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met with the full approval and warm support of our entire party, the entire Soviet people, fraternal communist and workers' parties, the working people of the great commonwealth of socialist countries, millions of people in capitalist and colonial countries. This is understandable, since the 20th Party Congress, which marks a new stage in the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, gave a profound analysis of the current international and domestic situation, armed the Communist Party and the entire Soviet people with a majestic plan for the further struggle to build communism, and opened new prospects for the united actions of all parties of the working class for preventing the threat of a new war, for the interests of the working people.

Implementing the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, are achieving new outstanding successes in all areas of the political, economic and cultural life of the country.

The Soviet people have rallied even more closely around the Communist Party and are showing high creative activity in the struggle to fulfill the tasks set by the 20th Congress.

The period that elapsed after the congress showed at the same time the great vitality of its decisions for the international communist and workers' movement, for the struggle of all progressive forces to strengthen peace throughout the world. The important fundamental theoretical provisions put forward by the congress on the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, on the possibility of preventing wars in the modern era, on the diversity of forms of countries' transition to socialism have a beneficial effect on the international situation, contribute to defusing tensions, strengthening the unity of action of all forces fighting for peace and democracy, further strengthening the position of the world socialist system.

If among the Soviet people, among the working people of people's democracies and the whole world, the historical decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU caused great enthusiasm, a new surge of creative initiative and revolutionary energy, then among the enemies of the working class they gave rise to anxiety and embitterment. Reactionary circles in the United States and some other capitalist powers are clearly concerned about the great program of struggle for the consolidation of peace outlined by the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Their concern increases as this program is actively and consistently implemented.

Why do the enemies of communism and socialism focus their fire on the shortcomings that were mentioned by the Central Committee of our party at the 20th Congress of the CPSU? They do this in order to divert the attention of the working class and its parties from the main issues that were put forward at the 20th Party Congress and which clear the way for new successes in the cause of peace, socialism, and the unity of the working class.

The decisions of the 20th Party Congress and the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet government caused confusion in the imperialist circles of the United States and other countries.

The bold and consistent foreign policy of the USSR to ensure peace and cooperation between states, regardless of their social system, finds support among the broad masses of all countries of the world, expands the front of peace-loving states and causes a deep crisis in the politics of the Cold War, the policy of putting together military blocs and race weapons. It is no coincidence that the greatest noise about the fight against the cult of personality in the USSR was made by imperialist circles in the USA. They benefited from the presence of negative phenomena associated with the cult of personality in order to use these facts to fight against socialism. Now that our party is boldly overcoming the consequences of the cult of personality, the imperialists see in this a factor accelerating the movement of our country forward towards communism and weakening the position of capitalism.

In an effort to weaken the great attractive power of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, their influence on the broad masses of the people, the ideologists of capitalism resort to all kinds of tricks and tricks in order to divert the attention of the working people from the advanced and inspiring ideas put forward to humanity by the socialist world.

Recently, a wide slanderous anti-Soviet campaign has been launched in the bourgeois press, the reason for which reactionary circles are trying to use some facts related to the cult of personality of J.V. Stalin, condemned by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The organizers of this campaign are making every effort to “muddy the waters,” to hide the fact that we are talking about a passed stage in the life of the Soviet country; they want to silence and distort the fact that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government, in the years since the death of Stalin, with exceptional persistence and determination have eliminated the consequences of the cult of personality, successfully carried out new tasks in the interests of consolidating peace, building communism, in the interests of the broad people wt.

By launching a slanderous campaign, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie are again and unsuccessfully trying to cast a shadow on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, to undermine the trust of workers in the world's first country of socialism - the USSR, and to cause confusion in the ranks of the international communist and labor movement.

The experience of history teaches that the enemies of international proletarian unity in the past have more than once tried to use what they considered advantageous moments to undermine the international unity of communist and workers' parties, to split the international labor movement, and to weaken the forces of the socialist camp. But every time, the communist and workers' parties recognized the maneuvers of the enemies of socialism, rallied their ranks even more closely, demonstrating their inviolable political unity, their unshakable loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism.

The fraternal communist and workers' parties recognized this maneuver of the enemies of socialism in time and are giving it a worthy rebuff. At the same time, it would be wrong to turn a blind eye to the fact that some of our friends abroad have not fully understood the issue of the cult of personality and its consequences and sometimes allow incorrect interpretations of some provisions related to the cult of personality.

In criticizing the cult of personality, the party proceeds from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For more than three years now, our party has been consistently fighting against the personality cult of J.V. Stalin and persistently overcoming its harmful consequences. Naturally, this issue occupied an important place in the work of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and in its decisions. The Congress noted that the Central Committee quite correctly and timely spoke out against the cult of personality, the spread of which belittled the role of the party and the masses, belittled the role of the collective leadership in the party and often led to serious omissions in work, to gross violations of socialist legality. The Congress instructed the Central Committee to consistently implement measures to ensure the complete overcoming of the cult of personality alien to Marxism-Leninism, the elimination of its consequences in all areas of party, state and ideological work, strict implementation of the norms of party life and the principles of collectivity of party leadership developed by the great Lenin.

In the fight against the cult of personality, the party is guided by the well-known tenets of Marxism-Leninism about the role of the masses, the party and individuals in history, and the inadmissibility of the cult of personality of a political leader, no matter how great his merits. The founder of scientific communism, K. Marx, emphasizing his hostility “to any cult of personality,” stated that his and F. Engels’ entry into the communist society “occurred under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious admiration of authorities would be thrown out of the rules” ( K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, volume 26, 1st edition, pp. 487–488).

When creating our Communist Party, V.I. Lenin irreconcilably fought against the anti-Marxist concept of the “hero” and the “crowd”, and resolutely condemned the opposition of the lone hero to the masses. “The mind of tens of millions of creators,” said V.I. Lenin, “creates something immeasurably higher than the greatest and most brilliant foresight” (Works, volume 26, p. 431).

When raising the issue of combating the cult of personality of J.V. Stalin, the CPSU Central Committee proceeded from the fact that the cult of personality contradicts the nature of the socialist system and turned into a brake on the development of Soviet democracy and the advancement of Soviet society towards communism.

The 20th Party Congress, on the initiative of the Central Committee, considered it necessary to boldly and openly speak about the dire consequences of the cult of personality, about the serious mistakes that were made in the last period of Stalin’s life, and to call on the entire party through joint efforts to put an end to everything that the cult of personality entailed. At the same time, the Central Committee was aware that frank admission of mistakes made would be associated with known disadvantages and costs that enemies could take advantage of. Bold and merciless self-criticism on the issue of the cult of personality was a new, striking evidence of the strength and strength of our party and the Soviet socialist system. It is safe to say that none of the ruling parties in capitalist countries would ever risk taking such a step. On the contrary, they would try to remain silent and hide such unpleasant facts from the people. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, brought up on the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, told the whole truth, no matter how bitter it was. The party took this step solely on its own initiative, guided by principles. She proceeded from the fact that even if the action against the cult of Stalin caused some temporary difficulties, then in the long term, from the point of view of the fundamental interests and ultimate goals of the working class, it would give a huge positive result. This creates strong guarantees that never again will phenomena like a cult of personality arise in our party and country, that henceforth the leadership of the party and the country will be carried out collectively, on the basis of the implementation of Marxist-Leninist policy, in conditions of expanded internal party democracy, with active the creative participation of millions of working people, with the full development of Soviet democracy.

By resolutely speaking out against the cult of personality and its consequences, and openly criticizing the mistakes generated by it, the party once again demonstrated its loyalty to the immortal principles of Marxism-Leninism, its devotion to the interests of the people, its concern for creating the best conditions for the development of party and Soviet democracy in the interests of the successful construction of communism in our country.

The CPSU Central Committee states that the discussion in party organizations and at general meetings of workers on the issue of the cult of personality and its consequences took place with great activity from party members and non-party members, and that the line of the CPSU Central Committee found full approval and support among the party and the people.

The facts of violations of socialist legality and other mistakes related to the cult of personality of J.V. Stalin, published by the party, naturally evoke feelings of bitterness and deep regret. But Soviet people understand that condemnation of the cult of personality was necessary in the interests of building communism, of which they are active participants. The Soviet people see that in recent years the party has been persistently implementing practical measures aimed at eliminating the consequences of the cult of personality in all areas of party, state, economic and cultural construction. As a result of this work, the party, whose internal forces are now unfettered by anything, has become even closer to the people and is now in a state of unprecedented creative activity.

How could it happen that under the conditions of the Soviet socialist system, the personality cult of Stalin arose and spread, with all its negative consequences?

When considering this issue, one must keep in mind both the objective, specific historical conditions in which the construction of socialism took place in the USSR, and some subjective factors associated with Stalin’s personal qualities.

The October Socialist Revolution has gone down in history as a classic example of a revolutionary transformation of capitalist society accomplished under the leadership of the working class. Using the example of the heroic struggle of the Bolshevik Party, the world's first socialist state - the USSR, and the Communist Parties of other countries, all progressive and democratic forces learn from the experience of solving fundamental social issues raised by modern social development. Over the course of almost 40 years of building a socialist society, the working people of our country have accumulated vast experience, which is being studied and creatively, in relation to their specific conditions, mastered by the working people of other socialist countries.

This was the first experience in history of building a socialist society, which was formed in the process of searching, testing in practice many truths that had previously been known to socialists only in general terms, in theory. For more than a quarter of a century, the Soviet Union was the only country that paved the way for humanity to socialism. It was like a besieged fortress surrounded by capitalism. Enemies of the Soviet country in the West and in the East after the failed intervention of 14 states in 1918–1920. continued to prepare new “crusades” against the USSR. Enemies sent spies and saboteurs in large numbers to the USSR, trying by all means to undermine the world's first socialist state. The threat of new imperialist aggression against the USSR especially intensified after fascism came to power in Germany in 1933, which declared its goal to be the destruction of communism, the destruction of the Soviet Union - the world's first workers' state. Everyone remembers the formation of the so-called “Anti-Comintern Pact”, the “Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis”, actively supported by the forces of the entire international reaction. In the context of the looming threat of a new war, the refusal of the Western powers from the measures repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union to curb fascism and organize collective security, the Soviet country was forced to strain all its forces to strengthen its defense and combat the machinations of the hostile capitalist encirclement. The party had to educate the entire people in the spirit of constant vigilance and mobilization readiness in the face of external enemies.

The machinations of international reaction were all the more dangerous because a fierce class struggle had been going on inside the country for a long time, and the question of “who would win?” was being resolved. After Lenin's death, hostile movements became more active in the party - Trotskyists, right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists who took the position of rejecting Lenin's theory about the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country, which in fact would lead to the restoration of capitalism in the USSR. The Party launched a merciless struggle against these enemies of Leninism.

Fulfilling Lenin's behests, the Communist Party set a course for the socialist industrialization of the country, the collectivization of agriculture and the implementation of the cultural revolution. On the path to solving these greatest tasks of building a socialist society in one single country, the Soviet people and the Communist Party had to overcome incredible difficulties and obstacles. Our country had to, in the shortest historical period, without any economic assistance from outside, eliminate its centuries-old backwardness and rebuild the entire national economy on new, socialist principles.

This difficult international and domestic situation required iron discipline, a tireless increase in vigilance, and the strictest centralization of leadership, which could not but have a negative impact on the development of some democratic forms. In the course of a fierce struggle with the entire world of imperialism, our country had to accept some restrictions on democracy, justified by the logic of our people’s struggle for socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement. But these restrictions were already considered by the party and the people as temporary, to be eliminated as the Soviet state strengthened and the forces of democracy and socialism developed throughout the world. The people consciously made these temporary sacrifices, seeing more and more successes of the Soviet social system every day.

All these difficulties on the path to building socialism were overcome by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, which consistently pursued Lenin’s general line.

The victory of socialism in our country, which was in a hostile environment and the constant threat of attack from outside, was a world-historical feat accomplished by the Soviet people. During the first five-year plans, the economically backward country, as a result of the intense, heroic efforts of the people and the party, made a giant leap in its economic and cultural development. Based on the successes of socialist construction, the living standards of the working people were raised and unemployment was eliminated forever. A profound cultural revolution took place in the country. In a short period of time, the Soviet people raised numerous cadres of technical intelligentsia, who rose to the level of world technical progress and promoted Soviet science and technology to one of the leading places in the world. The inspiration and organizer of these victories was the great Communist Party. Working people all over the world, using the example of the USSR, have clearly seen that workers and peasants, having taken power into their own hands, can successfully build and develop their own socialist state, which expresses and protects the interests of the broad masses of the people, without capitalists and landowners. All this played a huge inspiring role in the growth of influence of communist and workers' parties in all countries of the world.

While serving for a long period as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, I.V. Stalin, together with other leading figures, actively fought for the implementation of Lenin’s behests. He was devoted to Marxism-Leninism, as a theorist and major organizer, he led the party’s struggle against the Trotskyists, right-wing opportunists, bourgeois nationalists, and against the machinations of the capitalist encirclement. In this political and ideological struggle, Stalin gained great authority and popularity. However, all our great victories began to be incorrectly associated with his name. The successes achieved by the Communist Party and the Soviet country and the praise addressed to Stalin turned his head. In this environment, Stalin’s personality cult gradually began to take shape.

The development of the cult of personality was greatly facilitated by certain individual qualities of J.V. Stalin, the negative nature of which was pointed out by V.I. Lenin. At the end of 1922, Lenin addressed a letter to the next party congress, which said: “Comrade. Stalin, having become Secretary General, concentrated immense power in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be able to use this power carefully enough.” In an addition to this letter, written at the beginning of January 1923, V.I. Lenin again returns to the question of some of Stalin’s personal qualities intolerable for a leader. “Stalin is too rude,” Lenin wrote, “and this shortcoming, quite tolerable in the environment and in communications between us communists, becomes intolerable in the position of General Secretary. Therefore, I suggest that the comrades consider a way to move Stalin from this place and appoint another person to this place, who in all other respects differs from Comrade. Stalin has only one advantage, namely, more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more attentive to his comrades, less capriciousness, etc.”

At the XIII Party Congress, which took place shortly after the death of V.I. Lenin, his letters were brought to the attention of the delegations. As a result of the discussion of these documents, it was considered advisable to leave Stalin as Secretary General so that he would take into account the criticism from V.I. Lenin and draw all the necessary conclusions from it.

Remaining at the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin took into account his critical remarks for the first period after the death of Vladimir Ilyich. However, later Stalin, having enormously overestimated his merits, believed in his own infallibility. Some restrictions of internal party and Soviet democracy, inevitable in the conditions of a fierce struggle with the class enemy and his agents, and later in the conditions of the war against the Nazi invaders, Stalin began to raise into the norm of internal party and state life, grossly trampling on Leninist principles of leadership. Plenums of the Central Committee and party congresses were held irregularly, and then were not convened at all for many years. Stalin actually found himself beyond criticism.

Great harm to the cause of socialist construction and the development of democracy within the party and state was caused by Stalin’s erroneous formula that as the Soviet Union moves towards socialism, the class struggle will become more and more intensified.

This formula, true only for certain stages of the transition period, when the question of “who won?” was being decided, when there was a persistent class struggle to build the foundations of socialism, was brought to the fore in 1937, at a time when socialism had already won in our country, when the exploiting classes and their economic base were eliminated. In practice, this erroneous theoretical formula served as the justification for gross violations of socialist legality and mass repression.

It was in those conditions that, in particular, a special situation was created for the state security agencies, which were given enormous trust, since they had undoubted merits before the people and the country in protecting the gains of the revolution. For a long time, the state security organs justified this trust, and their special position did not cause any danger. Things changed when control over them by the party and government was gradually replaced by Stalin’s personal control, and the usual administration of justice was often replaced by his individual decisions. The situation became even more complicated when the criminal gang of the agent of international imperialism Beria was at the head of the state security agencies. There were serious violations of Soviet legality and mass repressions. As a result of the machinations of enemies, many honest communists and non-party Soviet people were slandered and innocently suffered.

The 20th Party Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee after the death of Stalin clearly demonstrate that within the Central Committee of the Party there was an established Leninist core of leaders who correctly understood the urgent needs in the field of both domestic and foreign policy. It cannot be said that there was no opposition to those negative phenomena that were associated with the cult of personality and slowed down the forward movement of socialism. Moreover, there were certain periods, for example, during the war years, when Stalin’s individual actions were sharply limited, when the negative consequences of lawlessness, arbitrariness, etc. were significantly weakened.

It is known that it was during the war that members of the Central Committee, as well as outstanding Soviet military leaders, took into their own hands certain areas of activity in the rear and at the front, made decisions independently and through their organizational, political, economic and military work, together with local party and Soviet organizations, ensured victory of the Soviet people in the war. After the victory, the negative consequences of the cult of personality again began to be felt with great force.

Immediately after Stalin's death, the Leninist core of the Central Committee took the path of a decisive struggle against the cult of personality and its dire consequences.

The question may arise: why didn’t these people openly oppose Stalin and remove him from leadership? Under the current conditions this could not be done. Of course, the facts indicate that Stalin was guilty of many lawlessnesses that were committed especially in the last period of his life. However, we must not forget at the same time that the Soviet people knew Stalin as a man who always spoke out in defense of the USSR from the machinations of enemies and fought for the cause of socialism. He sometimes used unworthy methods in this struggle and violated Leninist principles and norms of party life. This was Stalin's tragedy. But all this at the same time made it difficult to fight against the lawlessness that was being committed at that time, because the successes of building socialism and strengthening the USSR in an atmosphere of a cult of personality were attributed to Stalin.

Any protest against him under these conditions would not be understood by the people, and the point here is not at all due to a lack of personal courage. It is clear that anyone who would have spoken out against Stalin in this situation would not have received support from the people. Moreover, such a speech would be regarded in those conditions as an attack against the cause of building socialism, as an extremely dangerous undermining of the unity of the party and the entire state in a capitalist environment. In addition, the successes that the working people of the Soviet Union achieved under the leadership of their Communist Party instilled legitimate pride in the heart of every Soviet person and created an atmosphere where individual mistakes and shortcomings seemed less significant against the backdrop of enormous successes, and the negative consequences of these mistakes were quickly compensated colossally the growing vitality of the party and Soviet society.

It should also be borne in mind that many facts and incorrect actions of Stalin, especially in the field of violation of Soviet legality, became known only recently, after Stalin’s death, mainly in connection with the exposure of the Beria gang and the establishment of party control over state security agencies.

These are the main conditions and reasons that led to the emergence and spread of the personality cult of J.V. Stalin. Of course, everything that has been said explains, but does not at all justify the personality cult of J.V. Stalin and its consequences, so sharply and rightly condemned by our party.

Undoubtedly, the cult of personality caused serious damage to the cause of the Communist Party and Soviet society. But it would be a gross mistake to draw conclusions from the fact of the presence of a personality cult in the past about some changes in the social system in the USSR or to look for the source of this cult in the nature of the Soviet social system. Both are absolutely wrong, since they do not correspond to reality and contradict the facts.

Despite all the evil that Stalin’s personality cult caused to the party and the people, he could not and did not change the nature of our social system. No cult of personality could change the nature of the socialist state, which is based on public ownership of the means of production, the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and the friendship of peoples, although this cult caused serious damage to the development of socialist democracy and the rise of the creative initiative of millions.

To think that an individual personality, even one as big as Stalin, could change our socio-political system means falling into deep contradiction with the facts, with Marxism, with truth, and falling into idealism. This would mean attributing to an individual such exorbitant, supernatural powers as the ability to change the structure of society, and even such a social system in which the decisive force is the many millions of working people.

As is known, the nature of the socio-political system is determined by what the method of production is, who in society owns the means of production, and in the hands of which class political power is located. The whole world knows that in our country, as a result of the October Revolution and the victory of socialism, the socialist mode of production was established, and that for almost forty years power has been in the hands of the working class and peasantry. Thanks to this, the Soviet social system is strengthening year after year and its productive forces are growing. Even our ill-wishers cannot help but admit this fact.

The consequences of the cult of personality, as is known, were some serious mistakes in the leadership of various sectors of the activity of the party and the Soviet state, both in the internal life of the Soviet country and in its foreign policy. One can, in particular, point out the serious mistakes made by Stalin in the management of agriculture, in organizing the country's preparation to repel the fascist invaders, and the gross tyranny that led to the conflict in relations with Yugoslavia in the post-war period. These mistakes caused damage to the development of certain aspects of the life of the Soviet state, slowed down, especially in the last years of J.V. Stalin’s life, the development of Soviet society, but, of course, did not lead it away from the correct path of development towards communism.

Our enemies claim that the personality cult of Stalin was generated not by certain historical conditions, which are already a thing of the past, but by the Soviet system itself, its, from their point of view, undemocratic nature, etc. Such slanderous statements are refuted by the entire history of the development of the Soviet state. The Soviets, as a new democratic form of state power, arose as a result of the revolutionary creativity of the broad masses of the people who rose up to fight for freedom. They were and remain organs of genuine democracy. It was the Soviet system that created the opportunity to reveal the enormous creative energy of the people. He set in motion the inexhaustible forces inherent in the masses of the people, involving millions of people in the conscious management of the state, in active creative participation in the construction of socialism. In a short historical period of time, the Soviet state emerged victorious from the most difficult trials and was tested in the fire of the Second World War.

When the last exploiting classes were eliminated in our country, when socialism became the dominant system in the entire national economy, and the international position of our country changed radically, the framework of Soviet democracy expanded immeasurably and continues to expand. Unlike any bourgeois democracy, Soviet democracy not only proclaims, but also materially ensures to all members of society, without exception, the right to work, education and rest, to participate in public affairs, freedom of speech, press, freedom of conscience, as well as a real opportunity for the free development of personal abilities and all other democratic rights and freedoms. The essence of democracy is not in formal characteristics, but in whether political power actually serves and reflects the will and fundamental interests of the majority of the people, the interests of the working people. The entire internal and foreign policy of the Soviet state suggests that our system is a truly democratic, truly popular system. The highest goal and daily concern of the Soviet state is to fully improve the living standards of the population and ensure a peaceful existence for its people.

Evidence of the further development of Soviet democracy is the measures taken by the party and government to expand the rights and competence of the union republics, strict adherence to the rule of law, restructuring the planning system in order to unleash local initiative, intensify the activities of local Soviets, and develop criticism and self-criticism.

Despite the cult of personality and in spite of it, the powerful initiative of the people led by the Communist Party, born of our system, accomplished its great historical work, overcoming all obstacles on the path to building socialism. And in this the democracy of the Soviet socialist system finds its highest expression. The outstanding victories of socialism in our country did not come by chance. They were achieved thanks to the enormous organizational and educational work of the party and its local organizations, thanks to the fact that the party always educated its cadres and all communists in the spirit of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, in the spirit of devotion to the cause of communism. Soviet society is strong in the consciousness of the masses. Its historical destinies were and are determined by the creative work of our heroic working class, the glorious collective farm peasantry, and the people's intelligentsia.

By eliminating the consequences of the cult of personality, restoring Bolshevik norms of party life, and developing socialist democracy, our party has achieved further strengthening of ties with the broad masses, uniting them even more closely under the great Leninist banner.

The fact that the party itself boldly and openly raised the issue of eliminating the cult of personality and the unacceptable mistakes that were made by Stalin is convincing proof that the party firmly stands guard over Leninism, the cause of socialism and communism, observance of socialist legality and the interests of the peoples, ensuring the rights of Soviet citizens. This is the best proof of the strength and vitality of the Soviet socialist system. At the same time, this speaks of a determination to completely overcome the consequences of the cult of personality and to prevent the repetition of mistakes of a similar nature in the future.

Our party's condemnation of the personality cult of J.V. Stalin and its consequences evoked approval and wide responses in all fraternal communist and workers' parties. Noting the enormous importance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU for the entire international communist and labor movement, communists of foreign countries consider the struggle against the cult of personality and its consequences as a struggle for the purity of the principles of Marxism-Leninism, for a creative approach to solving modern problems of the international labor movement, for the establishment and further development principles of proletarian internationalism.

Statements by a number of fraternal communist parties express approval and support for the measures taken by our party against the cult of personality and its consequences. The organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the newspaper “Ren Min Zhi Bao”, outlining the conclusions from the discussion of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, wrote in the editorial article “On the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat”: “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, following the precepts of Lenin, seriously refers to some serious mistakes made by Stalin in the leadership of socialist construction and the consequences caused by them. In view of the seriousness of these consequences, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union faced the need, simultaneously with the recognition of the great merits of Stalin, to reveal with all severity the essence of the mistakes made by Stalin, and to call on the entire party to beware of a repetition of this, to decisively eradicate the unhealthy consequences generated by these mistakes. We, the Communists of China, deeply believe that after the sharp criticism that unfolded at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, all those active factors that were greatly restrained in the past due to some political mistakes will definitely come into motion everywhere, that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people “will be even more united and united than before in the struggle for building a great communist society unprecedented in the history of mankind, for lasting peace throughout the world.”

“The merit of the leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” says the statement of the Politburo of the French Communist Party, “is that they undertook the correction of mistakes and shortcomings associated with the cult of personality, which testifies to the strength and unity of Lenin’s great party, the trust it enjoys in the Soviet people, as well as about its authority in the international labor movement." The General Secretary of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the USA, Comrade Eugene Dennis, noting the enormous importance of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, states in a famous article: “The 20th Congress strengthened universal peace and social progress. It marked a new stage in the development of socialism and in the struggle for peaceful coexistence, which began in the time of Lenin, was continued in subsequent years and has become more and more effective and successful.”

At the same time, it should be noted that when discussing the issue of the cult of personality, a correct interpretation of the reasons that gave rise to the cult of personality and the consequences of this cult for our social system is not always given. So, for example, in a detailed and interesting interview with Comrade Togliatti for the magazine Nuovi Argomenti, along with many very important and correct conclusions, there are also incorrect statements. In particular, one cannot agree with Comrade Togliatti’s question about whether Soviet society has “arrived at some forms of degeneration”? There is no basis for raising such a question. It is all the more incomprehensible because in another place in his interview, Comrade Tolyatti says quite correctly: “It is necessary to conclude that the essence of the socialist system was not lost, since none of the previous gains and, above all, the support of the system by the masses of workers, peasants, intelligentsia forming Soviet society. This very support proves that, against all odds, this society has retained its fundamental democratic character.”

Indeed, without the support of the broad masses of the Soviet government and the policies of the Communist Party, our country would not have been able to create a powerful socialist industry in an unprecedentedly short time, carry out the collectivization of agriculture, it would not have been able to win the Second World War, on the outcome of which the fate of all mankind depended . As a result of the complete defeat of Hitlerism, Italian fascism and Japanese militarism, the forces of the communist movement received widespread development, the Communist Parties of Italy, France and other capitalist countries grew and became massive, a system of people's democracy was established in a number of countries in Europe and Asia, the world system of socialism arose and strengthened, The national liberation movement achieved unprecedented success, leading to the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism.

Unanimously approving the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, condemning the cult of personality, communists and all Soviet people see in them evidence of the increased strength of our party, its Leninist integrity, its unity and cohesion. “The party of the revolutionary proletariat,” V.I. Lenin pointed out, “is strong enough to openly criticize itself, to bluntly call mistakes and weaknesses mistakes and weaknesses” (Works, vol. 21, p. 150). Guided by this Leninist principle, our Party will continue to boldly expose, openly criticize and decisively eliminate errors and blunders in its work.

The CPSU Central Committee believes that the work carried out so far by the party to overcome the cult of personality and its consequences has already yielded positive results.

Based on the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, the Central Committee of the CPSU calls on all party organizations:

consistently observe in all our work the most important provisions of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism about the people as the creator of history, the creator of all the material and spiritual wealth of mankind, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary struggle for the transformation of society, for the victory of communism;

persistently continue the work carried out in recent years by the Central Committee of the Party to strictly observe in all party organizations, from top to bottom, the Leninist principles of party leadership, first of all the highest principle - the collectivity of leadership, to observe the norms of party life enshrined in the Charter of our Party, to develop criticism and self-criticism ;

fully restore the principles of Soviet socialist democracy expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, completely correct the violations of revolutionary socialist legality;

to mobilize our cadres, all communists and the broadest masses of working people to fight for the practical implementation of the tasks of the sixth five-year plan, developing in every possible way for this the creative initiative and energy of the masses - the true creators of history.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU indicated that the most important feature of our era is the transformation of socialism into a world system. The most difficult period in the development and establishment of socialism is behind us. Our socialist country has ceased to be a lonely island in the ocean of capitalist states. Today, more than a third of all humanity is building a new life under the banner of socialism. The ideas of socialism are taking over the minds of many, many millions of people in capitalist countries. The influence of the ideas of socialism on the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who oppose all types of colonialism, is enormous.

The decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU are perceived by all supporters of peace and socialism, all democratic and progressive circles as an inspiring program of struggle for the consolidation of peace throughout the world, for the interests of the working class, for the triumph of the cause of socialism.

In modern conditions, broad, inspiring prospects are opening up for the communist parties and the entire international labor movement - to achieve, together with all peace-loving forces, the prevention of a new world war, to curb monopolies and ensure lasting peace and security of peoples, to stop the arms race and remove the heavy burden of taxes generated by it from the working people, to defend democratic rights and freedoms that ensure working people fight for a better life and a brighter future. This is what millions of ordinary people in all countries of the world are vitally interested in. The successful solution of these problems is greatly facilitated by the peace-loving policy, more and more successes of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and all other countries following the path of socialism.

In the new historical conditions, such international organizations of the working class as the Comintern and Cominform ceased their activities. But it does not at all follow from this that international solidarity and the need for contacts between revolutionary fraternal parties that stand on the positions of Marxism-Leninism have lost their significance. At the present time, when the forces of socialism and the influence of the ideas of socialism throughout the world have grown immeasurably, when the unique paths to socialism in different countries are being revealed, the Marxist parties of the working class must naturally preserve and strengthen their ideological unity and international fraternal solidarity in the struggle against the threat a new war, in the struggle against the anti-people forces of monopoly capital, seeking to suppress all revolutionary and progressive movements. The communist parties are united by the great goal of liberating the working class from the oppression of capital; they are united by loyalty to the scientific ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the spirit of proletarian internationalism, and selfless devotion to the interests of the masses.

In their activities in modern conditions, all communist parties proceed from the national characteristics and conditions of each country, expressing with the greatest completeness the national interests of their peoples. At the same time, realizing that the struggle for the interests of the working class, for peace and the national independence of their countries is at the same time the cause of the entire international proletariat, they unite and strengthen ties and cooperation among themselves. Ideological unity and fraternal solidarity of the Marxist parties of the working class of various countries are all the more necessary because the capitalist monopolies are creating their own international aggressive associations and blocs, like NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, directed against peace-loving peoples, against the national liberation movement, against the working class and vital interests of workers.

While the Soviet Union has done and is doing a lot to defuse international tension - and this is now recognized by everyone - at the same time, American monopoly capital continues to allocate large sums to intensify subversive activities in the socialist countries. At the height of the Cold War, as is known, the American Congress officially (in addition to those funds that were released unofficially) allocated 100 million dollars for the purpose of subversive activities in the people's democracies and in the Soviet Union. Now that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries are doing everything possible to ease international tension, supporters of the Cold War are trying to intensify the actions of the Cold War, which has been condemned by the peoples of the whole world. This is evidenced by the decision of the US Senate to allocate an additional $25 million for subversive activities, which are cynically called “promoting freedom” behind the Iron Curtain.

We must soberly assess this fact and draw appropriate conclusions from it. It is clear, for example, that anti-people protests in Poznan were paid for from this source. However, the provocateurs and saboteurs, paid from overseas funds, only had the courage for a few hours. The workers of Poznan fought back against enemy attacks and provocations. The plans of the dark knights of “cloak and dagger” failed, their vile provocation against the people’s power in Poland failed. Thus, subversive actions in people's democracies will continue to fail, although such actions are generously paid for from the sums allocated by the American monopolies. You could say it's money wasted.

All this indicates that we must not be careless about the new machinations of imperialist agents seeking to penetrate socialist countries in order to harm and undermine the achievements of the working people.

From the book Stalin before the court of the pygmies author Emelyanov Yuri Vasilievich

Chapter 3 Malenkov against Stalin's cult of personality Beria's arrest drew a line under his attempts to discredit Stalin. However, in his final speech at the July Plenum of the Central Committee G.M. Malenkov criticized those provisions of A.A.’s speeches. Andreeva and I.T. Tevosyan on

author

No. 44 RESOLUTION OF THE CPSU Central Committee “On GREETINGS TO COMRADE ZHUKOV G.K. FROM THE CPSU Central Committee AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR AND HIS AWARDING WITH THE ORDER OF LENIN AND THE FOURTH MEDAL “GOLD STAR” December 1, 1956 In connection with the sixtieth anniversary of the birth of the USSR Minister of Defense comrade. Zhukova G.K. And

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 2 DECISION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON THE FORMATION OF A COMMISSION TO DEVELOP A DRAFT DECISION OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON IMPROVING PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN THE SOVIET ARMY October 17, 1957 Strictly SecretP117/II. Report of the head of GlavPUR, Comrade Zheltova, on the condition

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 4 DECISION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON THE DRAFT DECISION OF THE CPSU Central Committee “ON IMPROVING PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY” October 19, 1957 Strictly secretP118/1. On improving party-political work in the Soviet Army and Navy (comrades Suslov, Mikoyan,

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 11 RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON THE DATE OF CONVENING AND AGENDA OF THE PLENAUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee October 25, 1957 Top secretP120/16. On convening the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee21 Convene the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on October 28 of this year. at 10 o'clock in the morning. Raise the issue of improvement for discussion at the Plenum

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 12 DECISION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON THE APPROVAL OF A SPEAKER AT THE PLENAUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee October 25, 1957 Strictly secretP120/XXV. On the results of the discussion at meetings of party activists in military districts of the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on improving party political work in the Soviet Union

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 19 PLENAUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU - OCTOBER 1957 Transcript FIRST MEETING Morning, October 28Chairman comrade. KHRUSHCHEV.Comrades, out of 126 members of the Central Committee, more than one member of the Central Committee has arrived and is here; out of 117 candidates arrived

From the book by Georgy Zhukov. Transcript of the October (1957) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and other documents author History Author unknown --

No. 27 CLOSED LETTER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF ENTERPRISES, COLLECTIVE FARMS, INSTITUTIONS, PARTY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND NAVY, TO MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET SOYU FOR October 31, 1957 Dear

From the book Why we must fight against the cult of personality and its consequences author Author unknown

Why we need to fight against the cult of personality and its consequences Material for a conversation with Komsomol students of seven-year and secondary schools, educational institutions of labor reserves Not for publication In the life of our country, in the life of working people around the world, in February 1956, something happened

author Artizov A N

No. 9 DECISION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee ON THE APPROVAL OF ACTIVITIES OF THE USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs TO CORRECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW April 10, 1953 No. 5. Item IX - On the activities carried out by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (comrades Malenkov, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Bulganin ,

From the book Rehabilitation: how it was March 1953 - February 1956 author Artizov A N

No. 19 RESOLUTION OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CPSU Central Committee “ON THE REMOVING OF RESTRICTIONS IN THE LEGAL STATUS FROM MEMBERS AND CANDIDATES FOR MEMBERS OF THE CPSU AND THEIR FAMILIES LOCATED IN A SPECIAL SETTLEMENT” May 9, 1955 No. 119. p. 35 - On the removal of restrictions in the legal status of members and candidates members of the CPSU and their families,

From the book Party of the Executed author Rogovin Vadim Zakharovich

XXII Liquidation of the Central Committee Historians who look for the roots of the great terror in the institutions in force during the Leninist period of the party’s life most often refer to the resolution “On Party Unity” adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP (b). There is no doubt that this resolution, drafted

Nikolay Fedotov

Anti-scientific methodology of liberalism

Part 1. Report “on the cult of personality and its consequences”: a lie on a global scale

The current liberalism has shredded. Representatives of liberal ideology, for all their declared progressiveness, for all their talk about the “backwardness of Russia” and the “advanced democratic West,” in fact, are not much different from sectarians. The capitalist class, overgrown with fat and mired in depravity, is no longer capable of producing ideologists who would be worth even the little finger of Rousseau, Voltaire, or Montesquieu. But the bourgeoisie has created a huge manipulative apparatus that makes it possible to introduce myths into the mass consciousness, influencing only people’s emotions. In addition, an entire ersatz science has even been created that is dedicated to substantiating these myths for those who consider themselves adherents of the “scientific approach.” The general philosophical and methodological illiteracy of the modern bourgeois intelligentsia precisely contributes to the fact that pseudoscientific works, replete with skillfully disguised falsifications, are easily accepted by those who consider themselves intellectuals at face value.

If the above-mentioned founders of liberalism had a certain positive program, then the main feature of the ideology of modern liberals is anti-communism. Moreover, this anti-communism has absolutely no scientific justification in the form of at least attempts to refute Marxism from a scientific position. Liberals completely reject scientific methodology, which requires, in order to refute a particular theory, to refute the system of objective laws on which it is based, and to create a new theory, with a new system of such laws. No, on the scientific and theoretical front, liberals avoid fighting communism. Gentlemen liberals reduce any conversation about communism to criticism of their own versions of the history of the USSR. In fact, the only “argument” that they have left against the communists is supposedly the “bloody Soviet past” with “millions of innocently repressed”, “peasants doomed to starvation”, again “millions of Soviet soldiers whom the bloody Soviet military leaders persecuted into a war for slaughter in senseless attacks,” and, naturally, with a shortage of sausage so dear to the liberal heart. According to liberals, thus, “history itself has proven the impossibility and destructiveness of communism.”

Paradoxically, modern liberal anti-communist mythology has its roots in Soviet times. Its cornerstones were laid back in the mid-50s. Relatively speaking, Khrushchev, with his report at the 20th Congress, awakened Solzhenitsyn and Co., who launched anti-communist agitation in an even more deceitful, ignorant and arrogant form. Well, after the bourgeoisie came to power, the methodology of the anti-Sovietists was adopted by numerous “scientific” servants of the bourgeoisie, who filled the shelves with anti-Soviet literature. Moreover, some of this literature, indeed, is quite skillfully, in compliance with all design requirements, disguised as scientific works.

In this work, I will not set as my goal the identification of objective truth regarding certain phenomena in Soviet history. This, ultimately, is the job of historians, who in due time will get to the bottom of the truth from a truly scientific position of materialist dialectics. My task is to demonstrate the unscientific nature of the methodology used by the tribunes of anti-communism and certified lackeys of the bourgeoisie to criticize the Soviet period.

As you know, the favorite topic of all anti-communists is the Stalinist period. It is presented in the form of a kind of “concentrated horror” for which communists must repent and which, according to liberal logic, is “proof” of the “bestial essence” of communism and communists. It would not be an exaggeration to say that anti-Stalinist mythology is the cornerstone of all modern anticommunism. Indeed, in theoretical terms, liberals cannot oppose anything to Marxists. And the cornerstones of the anti-Stalinist mythology were laid by none other than the “communist” Khrushchev. It’s funny, while repeating to this day theses from his infamous report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences,” liberals somehow forget that they were formulated by one of the “Stalinist executioners” (according to the liberal classification).

In fact, the falsity of this report is an established fact. For example, American researcher Grover Furr in his book "Anti-Stalin meanness" convincingly refuted all the anti-Stalinist “arguments” expressed by Khrushchev. Moreover, he did this not even from the standpoint of Marxism, but simply on the basis of facts.

It is noteworthy that in modern liberal anti-communist discourse the question of the truth/falsity of the Khrushchev report is not raised at all. Its “world-historical significance” as a “blow against communism” comes to the fore. The liberal gentlemen are not the least bit embarrassed that this “blow” was dealt with the help of an outright lie. Here, for example, is what the famous anti-communist Svanidze says at one of the liberal conferences.

“This is a report that shocked the imagination. The first country of socialism. A country that personifies an almost ready-made paradise on earth. And then the head of state and party says this from the rostrum. He talks about a man equal to God. Who was prayed for just now".

They say it doesn’t matter that he lied. The main thing is that it “shocked the imagination.” And indeed, in conditions when mass ignorance had not yet been overcome, despite all the successes of mass education, this lie was accepted by many at face value. And the fact that the leader of the world’s first socialist state, who stood at the head of the world class struggle of the proletariat, suddenly appeared before the whole world as a liar, certainly caused enormous harm to the cause of communism.

Although those who are particularly “stubborn” still carry this report around like it’s a sack and they even re-release.

So, let's turn to the text of the report. I will not analyze it in as much detail as Grover Furr did. I will dwell only on some key places.

A thoughtful reading of this opus leads to the idea that it is intended for some primitive people who are ready to accept absolutely unproven theses on faith. One gets the impression that it was written by political strategists whose goal was not to prove Stalin’s guilt, but to convince the audience that Stalin was “bad.” For this purpose, the widest range of manipulative techniques was used: opposition (Lenin to Stalin), logical manipulation (taking as an axiom what needs to be proven), appeal to emotions (when, for example, the number of repressed party members is called without regard to the analysis of their guilt), etc. p. Finally, all this is seasoned with the author’s blatant scientific and theoretical illiteracy and outright opportunism.

The formula of the Khrushchev report consists of four “constants”: “cult of personality” and “repression,” which are contrasted with “collective leadership” and “socialist legality.” Let's start with the first one:

“After the death of Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a policy of explaining the inadmissibility of exalting one individual, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman possessing supernatural qualities, like a god. This man seems to know everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything; he is infallible in his actions.

This concept of man, and, more specifically, of Stalin, has been cultivated among us for many years.”

A Marxist, in principle, cannot pose the question in such an abstract and metaphysical way when considering any phenomenon. If someone is endowed with some kind of supernatural qualities, then the key question for a communist is whether this serves the cause of communism or not. That is, the “cult” of someone or something cannot be bad “at all.” Is it bad, for example, the cult of science or the cult of knowledge? But the cult of health can serve reactionary goals in some conditions (as in Nazi Germany) and progressive goals in others (USSR). A Marxist should have structured his study of this issue in the following way. First, you need to understand the essence of the phenomenon. That is, to what extent the positive characteristics attributed to Stalin and his activities did not correspond to objective reality, that is, Stalin’s real contribution to the cause of communism. Secondly, if it turns out that they did not comply, then determine what harm the “cult” caused to the cause of communism. Thirdly, if such harm is proven, then identify the objective and subjective reasons for the formation of such a “cult.” This would be the correct, scientific approach.

What is Khrushchev doing? He poses the question abstractly. They say, “the cult of personality is bad,” apparently, only for reasons of abstract “justice.” Khrushchev does not analyze the role of Stalin in the cause of communist construction, does not try to prove the inadequacy of the “cult” and does not even find out its reasons. Why he does this is understandable. After all, both the speaker himself and his comrades in the Politburo were themselves conductors of this “cult” and repeatedly praised Stalin in their speeches.

Khrushchev acts like a manipulator. Having just accused Stalin of “likening God,” he likens Lenin to God and quotes him, thoughtlessly, as if it were “holy scripture.” His entire “logic” is based on the selection of quotes in such a way as to present Stalin’s actions as contrary to Lenin’s precepts.

For example, supposedly Lenin spoke about relying on the masses, and Stalin decided everything himself.

“Lenin taught that the strength of the party lies in its inextricable connection with the masses, in the fact that the people follow the party - workers, peasants, intelligentsia. “Only he will win and retain power,” said Lenin, “who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of living folk creativity.” (V.I. Lenin, vol. 26, p. 259)»

Khrushchev just forgets that this “inextricable connection with the masses” and calls to “plunge into the spring of folk creativity” are by no means identical to tailism and do not at all prove that Lenin placed the PRINCIPLE of decision-making above the CORRECTNESS of these decisions. The connection with the masses consists, first of all, in the objective role of the scientific vanguard played by the Bolshevik Party, in the recognition of this role by the masses, and not in the fact that the masses themselves made decisions. The vanguard role of the party and its monopoly on making the most important decisions was never questioned by Lenin.

Stalin's "cult of personality" is contrasted with Lenin's "collective leadership":

“During Lenin’s lifetime, the Central Committee of the Party was the true expression of the collective leadership of the Party and the country. Being a militant Marxist revolutionary, always irreconcilable on fundamental issues, Lenin never forced his views on his fellow workers. He convinced and patiently explained his opinion to others. Lenin always strictly ensured that the norms of party life were implemented, that the Party Charter was observed, that party congresses and plenums of the Central Committee were convened in a timely manner.”

What kind of “beast” is “collective leadership”? And why was it necessary to reinvent this terminological wheel when Khrushchev was probably familiar with the term “democratic centralism”? Apparently, because Stalin’s violation of the principles of democratic centralism would have to be proven, but this would be difficult to do, since these principles were stated very clearly and were well known to the party masses. And under the violation of the incomprehensible principle of “collective leadership” anything can be summed up.

The term “collective leadership”, in fact, is an “ideologeme”, that is, a concept with an arbitrary, easily changeable meaning, “separated” from the phenomenon. By “collective leadership” we mean “leadership in the Leninist way.” But what does “in Lenin’s way” mean? According to Khrushchev, this is “not to forcefully impose your views, to convince, to explain.” However, by convincing and explaining, Lenin more than once imposed his views on the majority. For example, on the issue of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty. And Stalin, as Khrushchev says below, played a big role in the ideological defeat of the Trotskyists and Bukharinites. That is, he still managed to explain to the party masses the hostility of these platforms without resorting to administrative measures. Both Lenin and Stalin found themselves in conditions where “convictions and explanations” did not help, and they had to push through their decisions one way or another. As Proryv has repeatedly written about this, the principle of democratic centralism with this approach was, in fact, a formality, since it was not difficult to obtain collective approval of a decision whose correctness had been impeccably proven. In such and only in such conditions, the destructive potential of democratic leadership is neutralized by the high level of scientific development of the party leadership. However, as soon as, with the help of one or another formal democratic manipulation, mediocrities make their way into the leadership of the party and decisions begin to be made by voting, the scientific quality of these decisions very quickly declines.

Khrushchev’s thesis that Stalin neglected “collective leadership” is just a demagogic statement, since “collective leadership” is the essence of God knows what. What Stalin neglected is not clear.

So, the first “argument”. Stalin, according to Lenin’s “political testament”, “rude”, “concentrated enormous power in his hands” and in general “consideration should have been given to removing him from this position and replacing him with someone else.”. True, Lenin never proposed a candidate for the post of General Secretary, and the Central Committee, having considered it, did not find a more suitable candidate for this position.

The falsity of this argument is exposed by Grover Furr in the study mentioned above. In fact, the “Letter to the Congress” mentioned by Khrushchev is not any kind of “political testament”. It was never considered such in the Bolshevik Party; Trotsky first called this letter a “political testament” in 1934 in an article "Lenin's Testament".

In addition, it turns out that Stalin (oh, horror!) allowed himself to be rude to Lenin’s wife Krupskaya, after which Lenin wrote a letter to Stalin demanding an apology. From this the following conclusion is drawn:

“If Stalin could behave this way during Lenin’s life, could treat Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya this way, whom the party knows well and highly values ​​as a loyal friend of Lenin and an active fighter for the cause of our party from the moment of its inception, then one can imagine how Stalin treated with other employees."

But what, exactly, does rudeness have to do with assessing Stalin’s activities? Moreover, the reason for the specific “rude attack” against Krupskaya is never told to us. Here we are dealing with a typical attempt to manipulate the audience. Such “argumentation” was subsequently picked up by “debunkers” of communism from the bourgeois pulpit, who began to delve into the personal lives of Marx, Lenin, Stalin, playing on the emotions of the average person who was not inclined to think critically. Unable to do anything to oppose Marxism as a science, these would-be scientists, by order of their class masters, began to create “negative images” of the largest Marxists. By the way, in the mentioned book by Ferra, evidence is provided that, despite the possible reality of this episode of rudeness, good relations between Krupskaya and members of Lenin’s family with Stalin remained for many years.

"Argument" second. Stalin dealt too harshly with the “Trotskyists-Bukharinites-Zinovievites.” Khrushchev does not question Stalin’s merits in defeating these anti-party movements. True, he does this bashfully, declaring that “the party destroyed”, “the party exposed”, etc. The reproach boils down to the fact that ideological defeat was quite enough, and “repressing” them did not make the slightest sense.

“The struggle was carried out on an ideological basis. But a few years later, when socialism was already basically built in our country, when the exploiting classes were basically eliminated, when the social structure of Soviet society radically changed, the social base for hostile parties, political movements and groups was sharply reduced, when ideological opponents of the party were politically defeated long ago, repressions began against them.”

And here Khrushchev once again demonstrates his misunderstanding of Marxist dialectics. He looks at the situation like a typical metaphysician. They say that since the number of kulaks and bourgeois elements has become smaller, the “social base” for hostile movements has become smaller. He believes that an exiled kulak or a banned NEP speculator instantly became conscientious Soviet citizens and began to work diligently for the cause of communism. And in the shortest possible time, literally in one decade. Here Khrushchev demonstrates a misunderstanding of the law of intensification of class struggle as we move towards communism. Even if the social base for bourgeois movements has shrunk quantitatively, this does not mean that these movements have weakened. No, they simply took other forms, their representatives got jobs in Soviet bodies and moved on to sabotage work. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the class balance of forces on a global scale, that is, the international situation in which the groups of Bukharinites and Trotskyists-Zinovievites were physically destroyed. If within the country a serious blow was dealt to the remnants of the exploiting classes, then in the international arena, on the contrary, fascism intensified. It was absolutely clear that a world war would begin in the near future. So, qualitatively, in such conditions, even ideologically defeated enemies, whose social base has decreased, become no less, but more dangerous.

However, Khrushchev avoids the question of the essence and danger of these trends at that specific historical moment. This technique will also be used many times in the future by anti-Soviet dissidents. The emphasis is not on proving the wrongness of the chosen preventive measure for adherents of anti-party lines, but on abstract moralizing in the spirit of “you cannot kill people for their views.” It would seem, what could be simpler? Certain figures were convicted, their trials were open, and all case materials were published in the press. If Khrushchev raises the question that the preventive measure was chosen incorrectly, then it is necessary to “only” prove that the investigation was guided by falsified data, therefore such a severe punishment was unnecessary. But the whistleblower of the “cult of personality” does nothing of the sort. He continues to influence the audience's emotions with unsubstantiated claims.

“Stalin introduced the concept of “enemy of the people.” This term immediately freed you from the need for any proof of the ideological wrongness of the person or people with whom you were arguing: it gave the opportunity to anyone who disagreed with Stalin in some way, who was only suspected of hostile intentions, anyone who was simply slandered, subjected to the most brutal repressions, in violation of all norms of revolutionary legality.”

So he lies and doesn’t blush. Well, yes, there was such a concept as “enemy of the people,” but it was not a legal term. No one was convicted with the wording “enemy of the people”; this concept is not used anywhere in the Criminal Code. Declaring someone an “enemy of the people” was not a source of legal consequences, but, on the contrary, the presence of evidence of hostile activity was the reason for declaring a particular figure an “enemy of the people.” In addition, here Khrushchev clearly contradicts himself, since above he himself claims that the “Trotskyist-Bukharinites” were exposed precisely ideologically. That is, it was ideological exposure that preceded the declaration of “enemies of the people,” and not vice versa.

Well, then Khrushchev’s favorite technique is used again - contrasting Stalin with Lenin, “supported” by quotes. They say that Lenin preferred to convince those who were mistaken, while Stalin simply destroyed them. The following Leninist statement is cited as “proof”:

“As a special task of the Control Commission, to recommend an attentive and individualized attitude, often even a kind of direct treatment in relation to representatives of the so-called opposition who have suffered a psychological crisis due to failures in their Soviet or party career. We must try to calm them down, explain the matter to them in a comradely manner, find them (without any method of showing) a job suitable for their psychological characteristics, give advice and instructions at this point from the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, etc.”

In general, while reading Khrushchev’s report, there is a strong feeling of a kind of deja vu. Well yes, of course! After all, the reasoning of our contemporary opportunists is like two peas in a pod, in terms of the level of argumentation they are similar to Khrushchev’s idle talk.

It is unclear what the author meant by this quote. It is obvious to any dialectical materialist that the question of the attitude towards dissidents in the party must be resolved concretely and historically, and not abstractly, as Khrushchev does, elevating Lenin’s recommendation of 1920 to the rank of dogma, valid for all times and for all cases.

The fact is that in 1920, specific historical conditions required a different approach to non-Bolshevik elements, and personnel shortages dictated the need to use even these people in the interests of building communism until the actual Bolshevik cadres or these cadres themselves were trained will not switch to Bolshevik positions. But even later, they did not disdain ideologically defeated oppositionists.

The opposition was ideologically defeated by the end of the 1920s. Which, in fact, Khrushchev also speaks approvingly of. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, etc. were shot by court verdict. were in 1936-1938. But from the moment of the ideological defeat to the execution, they tried to use these people in responsible positions. Thus, Bukharin, until his arrest, held the position of editor-in-chief of Izvestia, Zinoviev worked on the editorial board of the Bolshevik magazine, Kamenev was also quite officially engaged in editorial work. That is, Stalin acted with personnel completely in accordance with Lenin’s recommendations.

They were shot only when it became clear that these cadres, despite the ideological defeat, continued to carry out anti-party work, that is, to cause harm. Moreover, in extremely difficult conditions, when internal enemies turned to sabotage and terror, inspired by the strengthening of the reaction in Europe. There was not the slightest point in convincing them again.

Grover Furr writes regarding this “argument”:

“During his entire life, Stalin did not have at least one case when someone was “expelled from the leadership team” only because of disagreement with his opinion. It is noteworthy that Khrushchev’s report does not contain a single such specific example.

It is worth recalling: Stalin was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; he had only one vote in the Central Committee and the Politburo. The Central Committee could release him at any time, and Stalin himself tried to resign as General Secretary four times. But each time his resignation requests were rejected. The last attempt of this kind was made at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. She was also rejected, like all the others.”

“But Lenin used such measures against real class enemies, and not against those who make mistakes, who are mistaken, who can be led by ideological influence on them and even retained in the leadership.”

Nevertheless, that the Bukharinites, Trotskyists, and Zinovievites were just such “good” enemies is not proven in any way, but is presented as an axiom. Khrushchev not only knew about the trials of these groups, but he himself fought against them, demanding the shooting of enemies at rallies. Then, in 1936-1938, for some reason it did not seem to him that they could be “re-educated.” By the way, in his report at the 20th Congress, he did not admit that he was mistaken then, and did not even prove that he was misled by the allegedly falsified case materials.

In fact, whatever one may say, if Stalin is a “criminal,” then Khrushchev and his gang are accomplices in “crimes.” After all, they were in the leadership together with Stalin and approved all the “criminal decisions.” The reference to the fact that they were “afraid” puts an end to Messrs. Khrushchev and Co. as communists. Here Furr gives a remarkable fact:

“Some in the communist movement astutely noted how unworthy such an excuse looks: “When Soviet leader Anastas Mikoyan, at the head of the CPSU delegation to China, attended the Eighth Congress of the CPC in 1956, Peng [Dehuai] asked him privately why only Now the Soviet party has condemned Stalin. Mikoyan allegedly replied: “We did not dare to express our opinion at that time. To do so meant death." To this Peng [Dehuai] objected: “What kind of communist is he who is afraid of death?”

That's it. The fact is that under Stalin these gentlemen were afraid. But they were afraid not just to speak out, but to lie and talk irresponsible nonsense. History has convincingly proven the role these resourceful mediocrities played in relation to the cause of communism. The results of their policies are well known.

Well, then again comes the “hymn to collective leadership.” They say, “Lenin never made decisions alone,” “always consulted with the Central Committee,” “regularly convened congresses,” and in general “sacredly observed the principle of democratic centralism.” I will not go deeper into criticism of this principle. Fortunately, Proryv published a whole series of articles devoted to this issue. I will only emphasize that here Khrushchev again pays attention not to the essence of the decisions made, but to the form of their adoption. In fact, there is no difference here. If Lenin formulated a decision, and the majority approved it, then in practice it was Lenin’s decision that was still implemented, due to its CORRECTNESS, that is, the opponents’ lack of ability to refute the correctness of this decision from a scientific point of view. On the good side, Khrushchev needed to show which decisions were made by the majority and at the same time differed from Lenin’s, proving that the truth in Lenin’s Central Committee was determined by voting. But this did not happen in practice. In practice, both under Lenin and Stalin, the principle of scientific centralism dominated the party, despite the proclaimed principle of democratic centralism. It is absolutely unimportant that Lenin, due to specific historical circumstances, was forced to make formal concessions and receive majority approval for each of his decisions, while Stalin no longer had such a need due to other conditions, when the authority of the party was further strengthened and the fight against opportunism led to his serious defeat. Therefore, congresses were convened less frequently. Instead of proving the wrongness of Stalin's decisions, Khrushchev only focuses on the form of their adoption.

“The commission reviewed a large number of materials in the archives of the NKVD, with other documents and established numerous facts of falsified cases against communists, false accusations, flagrant violations of socialist legality, as a result of which innocent people died. It turns out that many party, Soviet, and economic workers who were declared “enemies” in 1937-1938 were never actually enemies, spies, saboteurs, etc., that they, in essence, always remained honest communists, but were slandered, and sometimes, unable to withstand the brutal torture, they slandered themselves (under the dictation of falsifying investigators) all sorts of grave and incredible accusations. The commission submitted to the Presidium of the Central Committee a large amount of documentary material about the mass repressions against the delegates of the XVII Party Congress and members of the Central Committee elected by this congress. This material was reviewed by the Presidium of the Central Committee."

What catches your eye here? Yes, lack of specifics. “Numerous facts” - how much? 10 out of 100 is one thing, 10 out of 10,000 is qualitatively different. “Many innocent people died” - again, how many? And from what does their “innocence” follow? As is known, guilt, like innocence, is determined by the court. If someone has been found guilty by a court verdict, then to prove innocence it is necessary to prove the falsification of the case materials, find the specific culprits and punish them.

However, Khrushchev “proves” his innocence in a very unique way. For example, he states that “out of 139 members and candidates for members of the Central Committee of the Party, elected at the XVII Party Congress, 98 people, that is, 70 percent, were arrested and shot (mainly in 1937-1938)”. At the same time, instead of proving the innocence of those executed, he indulges in lengthy reflections, saying that 80% of the congress delegates joined the party before 1920, that is, during the years of the underground and the Civil War. And in general, “It was unthinkable that a congress of such composition would elect a Central Committee in which the majority would turn out to be enemies of the party”.

Well, why was this “unthinkable”? In the end, it turned out to be very “conceivable” that an active whistleblower of “enemies of the people”, that is, a direct participant in those very “repressions”, Khrushchev came out with slanderous fabrications against Stalin and, moreover, began to pursue an openly opportunistic policy that had nothing in common with communist construction. And after all, practically no one from the Khrushchev Central Committee was able to oppose anything to this policy. That is, the principle of democratic centralism in the mid-50s was quite able to work against communism, but in the mid-30s, in a much more complex domestic and foreign political situation, according to Khrushchev’s logic, it could not.

Whatever one may say, it is necessary to prove the innocence of the “repressed”. However, Khrushchev does this in a very unique way; he begins to give examples of “innocent victims.” Thus, he cites as an example a former candidate for membership of the Central Committee of Eikhe. Khrushchev states from the very beginning that the Eikhe case was falsified and was generally conducted in violation of Soviet legality. They say that he was forced under torture to sign pre-drawn interrogation protocols, and in general he is completely innocent. As proof of all this, there is... a letter from Eikhe himself to Stalin, in which he naturally insists on his innocence. And there is an interesting fragment there. Eikhe claims that he gave evidence about his counter-revolutionary activities after he was subjected to torture by investigators Ushakov and Nikolaev. And they, in turn, as stated in the footnotes to the report, were shot in January 1940, that is, even before Eikhe himself was shot. This means that their sabotage activities were exposed by the NKVD, and if only the materials obtained by these investigators had proven Eikhe’s guilt, he should have been acquitted. However, he was still shot. So not everything is as simple as it turns out for Khrushchev. This is not to mention the fact that proving the innocence of the accused with his own testimony is savagery. Even if torture took place, this does not mean that absolutely all the testimony was false. And what are the grounds for believing reports of torture from an interested party, that is, from the accused? After all, he has the direct intent to lie, trying to prove his innocence. As Furr correctly noted:

“In one of the fragments of the transcript of the trial in 1940, Yezhov states that he was subjected to savage torture in order to obtain false testimony from him. And, nevertheless, Yezhov’s guilt in falsifying confessions, beatings and torture, fabricating cases and the physical destruction of many innocent people is beyond doubt.”

Nevertheless, based on this fact, for some reason Khrushchev does not draw a conclusion about Yezhov’s innocence, but regarding Eikhe and others, he easily does.

Such pseudo-evidence is enough for Khrushchev to declare: “It has now been indisputably established that Eikhe’s case was falsified, and he has been posthumously rehabilitated.”.

If this was established “indisputably”, then it could somehow be more convincingly demonstrated. Let’s say we raise the cases of the same investigators Ushakov and Nikolaev, convincingly expose the absurdity of Eikhe’s own testimony, allegedly given under torture. Again, if the case was falsified, then by whom exactly and in what specific way? If the investigators are Ushakov and Nikolaev, then the execution of Eikhe looks absurd. If by someone else, then we need, as they say, “names, appearances, surnames.” But there is nothing.

Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU.
Meanness and stupidity sanctified by democratic procedure.

Moreover, there is one nuance that is worth dwelling on in more detail. Khrushchev declares that Eiche has been “posthumously rehabilitated.” But the point is that in Soviet criminal procedural legislation there was no such term as “rehabilitation”. The verdict could be overturned, which implied the person’s innocence, but the overturning of the verdict is the prerogative of the court. Moreover, falsification of materials in a criminal case, if the person was found innocent, is also a serious criminal offense, in accordance with Soviet criminal legislation.

So, one might ask, why, instead of the procedure for overturning a sentence prescribed in Soviet legislation, was it necessary to reinvent the wheel with “rehabilitation”? Yes, because the procedure was greatly simplified. What is most interesting is that Khrushchev is outraged by the summary trial procedure, but the simplification of the procedure for overturning the verdict does not bother him at all. Although in the first case, innocent people could suffer, and in the other, outright enemies could be released.

Khrushchev's “rehabilitation” was carried out out of court. This task was entrusted to certain “rehabilitation commissions” “composed of: the prosecutor of the republic, territory, region (chairman), members of the commission: the Minister of Internal Affairs of the republic, the head of the Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the territory, region, the head of the Department of the State Security Committee for the republic, territory, region, the Minister of Justice of the republic, the head of the Department of the Ministry of Justice , edges, regions" ("Rehabilitation: How it happened" )

Moreover, serious problems arise regarding the motivation for each of the “rehabilitation” decisions. In the same collection of documents cited above, one can see the following formulations of such decisions:

“The USSR Prosecutor’s Office has established that the case about the existence of the counter-revolutionary organization “National Center” in the USSR Academy of Sciences was fabricated in 1938 on the instructions of the now exposed enemies of the people Beria and Kobulov.” (Ibid. P.35)

That's all. No details or evidence are provided. No documents or references to them, although such work should have been carried out, all necessary investigative actions should have been carried out to expose the falsifiers. And it would be very nice to give these documents wide publicity. This was entirely in Khrushchev's interests. But nothing of the kind happened.

In general, it is very strange that the collection of documents regarding “rehabilitation” does not contain documents regarding the verification of case materials. As a rule, a sufficient condition for “rehabilitation” was the testimony of the accused that they were subjected to torture. And if there were testimonies of other witnesses in the case and they also stated about torture, then their testimonies were also declared invalid.

Of course, it is stupid to argue with the fact that in Stalin’s times, violations were committed during the investigation of cases. However, under Stalin, work was carried out to expose enemies, including in the internal affairs bodies. Their leaders such as Yagoda and Yezhov were convicted and shot, along with many lower-ranking employees.

It is not within the scope of this article to determine the guilt or innocence of those individuals whom Khrushchev mentions in his report. However, the fact is that both in this report and in the collections of documents published to date, the “evidence” of the absence of guilt is extremely superficial. This is not to mention the controversial nature of the term “rehabilitation” itself, which was absent in Soviet criminal procedural legislation. Apparently, “rehabilitation” is the recognition as innocent of those who claimed violations of “Soviet legality” (that is, testifying under torture), while categorically denying their guilt and swearing allegiance to Soviet power. Criticizing Stalin for the fact that under him confession was supposedly the “queen of evidence,” Khrushchev himself, when considering the issue of innocence, relies on the same confessions. All those “norms of Soviet legality” that Khrushchev accused Stalin of violating were also violated by himself during the so-called “rehabilitation”.

In fact, overturning a sentence is quite a difficult task. Case materials sometimes occupy more than one volume. Review of cases and proof of falsification, if approached in good faith, also requires appropriate documentation. Here the difference between the Stalinist and Khrushchevian approaches is striking. The most high-profile trials of 1936-1938, as well as the “Leningrad Case,” were conducted openly, and case materials were published in central newspapers. At the same time, not a single trial of the “Stalinist executioners”, like Beria and Abakumov, was open. The case materials of key “rehabilitated” figures, such as Postyshev, Kosior, Rudzutak, Kosarev and the same Eikhe, were not published, nor was evidence of the falsification of their cases published.

If Khrushchev’s goal was to restore justice, then, on the contrary, the evidence of innocence should have been impeccable and available for study to every Soviet citizen. But it seems that the motive was different, namely, the “rehabilitation” of a number of openly opportunistic theses. For example, the thesis that the value of a party member is determined by his merits. They say that the status of an “old Bolshevik” provides eternal guarantees against a slide into opportunism. The law formulated by Stalin on the growth of class struggle as we move towards communism is subject to an absolutely unsubstantiated revision. The principle of democratic centralism is raised to an absolute level, which involves determining the truth by voting and equalizing the rights of all opinions, regardless of their compliance with objective truth. Certain “Leninist norms of party life” are openly sanctified metaphysically. Although, if Khrushchev had mastered materialist dialectics, he would have understood that there could be no norms of party life given once and for all, that these norms are determined exclusively by specific historical conditions. We must understand that the goal of communists is not compliance with the “Leninist norms” formulated by Khrushchev, but real communism. The norms of party life must serve the cause of communism. If they hinder communist construction, then they must certainly and creatively be investigated, tested and promptly replaced. History has convincingly demonstrated how adherence to the “norms of party life” attributed to Lenin by Khrushchev, that is, the same “principles of democratic centralism,” without regard to the quality of the party itself, not only did not hinder, but even contributed to the restoration of capitalism.

Every now and then the author of the report slides into empty and abstract moralizing. For example, on the issue of torture. Khrushchev categorically stated that torture is a “violation of Soviet legality” and cannot, in principle, be permissible. The typical position of a metaphysician-moralist, not a Marxist. Any Marxist understands that one cannot simply take and once and for all fundamentally exclude one or another method of exposing enemies and criminals. Since the methods are again determined by specific historical conditions.

It is noteworthy that it was during the “heyday of liberal freedoms”, in the 90s, that torture became most widespread in Russia. The racketeer's iron and soldering iron are still considered unofficial symbols of that decade. However, law enforcement officers did not disdain them either. Of course, gentlemen liberals, they can argue that all this was illegal and they are, of course, against torture. However, it would not be out of place to ask liberals to prove in philosophical detail how the situation when torture is used by both legal and illegal structures (the difference between which was only formal) with almost impunity is qualitatively different from the one when the use of torture is still regulated by law. On the one hand, these gentlemen shout that “you cannot torture,” on the other hand, their actions have more than once led to the use of torture on the widest scale. Be it Pinochet's Chile, the Russian Federation in the 90s or modern Ukraine.

Yes, of course, allowing such methods opens up certain opportunities for arbitrariness by internal affairs officers. But here again the Marxist must turn to such a category as “measure”. What was more dangerous for the cause of communism in the 1930s? The possibility of condemning the innocent or avoiding punishment by outright enemies? Khrushchev had to prove that the use of torture in those conditions was inappropriate and did more harm than good. Khrushchev’s entire argument boils down to the fact that there was more harm, since “many honest party members suffered.” But there is no “evidence” of their “honesty”. It all boils down to the fact that they were “slandered” and “forced under torture to slander themselves,” and were assigned crimes that they did not commit. However, the political physiognomy of these party members is completely ignored. The allegations that the destruction of these party members caused damage to the party are therefore completely unfounded. For some reason, for example, Rokossovsky did not slander anyone, but firmly proved to the investigation that he was right.

After all, it’s enough to look at those figures whom Khrushchev cites as examples as “innocent victims.”

Kosior, apparently, is a rather mediocre manager, not to say mediocrity. He frankly failed collectivization in Ukraine, and, in general, did not note any special achievements in industry. There is nothing to say about Kosior’s scientific Marxist work. She simply doesn't exist.

Postyshev. This generally has one “merit”. “Rehabilitated” the New Year tree. Again, no scientific work, no outstanding achievements. But he mixed with right-wing Trotskyists.

Rudzutak - everything is the same. There are no special merits either on the labor or scientific front.

Eiche. This guy was appointed People's Commissar of Agriculture in 1937, and was already arrested in 1938. It’s hard to believe that he did a good job at his post.

What’s most interesting is that they are all active promoters of that very “policy of repression.” However, like Khrushchev himself, who personally signed the so-called “execution lists” (in fact, these were lists indicating the maximum possible preventive measures), since at the time of the peak of “repression” he held the position of first secretary of the Moscow and regional city party committees.

But let's return to the text of the report. The next “argument” against Stalin boils down to the fact that he is supposedly to blame for the losses that the USSR suffered during the Great Patriotic War. Especially in the initial period. These accusations are still repeated in different ways by anti-communists of all stripes, so let’s look at them in more detail.

So, the first charge. “Everyone warned Stalin about the attack, they even named the dates, but he “rested on his laurels” and did nothing.”

“During the war and after it, Stalin put forward the thesis that the tragedy that our people experienced in the initial period of the war was allegedly the result of the “suddenness” of the German attack on the Soviet Union. But this, comrades, is completely untrue. As soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he immediately set himself the task of defeating communism. The fascists spoke about this directly, without hiding their plans.”

This article has already given several examples of Mr. Khrushchev’s scientific illiteracy. Moreover, this illiteracy is of an unceremonious, impudent nature. Here too, apparently, he takes his audience for complete idiots, so openly substituting concepts. He first argues that Stalin's surprise attack thesis is incorrect. However, he “proves” it by the fact that “the fascists never hid their hostility to communism.” Yes, they didn't hide it. And Stalin understood this perfectly. And hardly anyone in the Soviet leadership doubted that there would definitely be a war against fascism. But we were talking about surprise. So, neither Stalin nor anyone else in the Soviet leadership could know the EXACT time of the start of this war and the form in which it would begin. Knowing about hostile intentions is one thing, but knowing how and when these hostile intentions will be realized is quite another.

It was easy, of course, to think this way 15 years after the start of the war, when there was already knowledge about where, who, when and with what forces the enemy attacked. But immediately before the start of the war, such knowledge could not have existed. There was a complex international situation and many possible scenarios for the development of events and intelligence reports, which often contradicted each other.

However, Khrushchev continues to insist that Stalin did everything wrong, when, in fact, supposedly there were every opportunity to “prepare for war.”

“If our industry had been timely and truly mobilized to provide the army with weapons and the necessary equipment, then we would have suffered immeasurably fewer casualties in this difficult war. However, such mobilization was not carried out in a timely manner. And from the very first days of the war it became clear that our army was poorly armed, that we did not have enough artillery, tanks and aircraft to repel the enemy.

Before the war, Soviet science and technology produced magnificent examples of tanks and artillery. But mass production of all this was not established, and we began rearmament of the army essentially on the very eve of the war. As a result, at the time of the enemy’s attack on Soviet soil, we did not have the required quantities of either the old equipment that we were removing from service, or the new equipment that we were going to introduce. The situation with anti-aircraft artillery was very bad; the production of armor-piercing shells for fighting tanks had not been established. Many fortified areas turned out to be helpless at the time of the attack, since the old weapons had been removed from them, and new ones had not yet been introduced.”

Well, this is quite a kindergarten. What is “on time and for real”? Khrushchev could not have been unaware of what specific measures to expand industrial production were taken in 1939-40. This includes increasing the length of the working day and working week, and the adoption of strict laws against absenteeism, and the construction of backup enterprises beyond the Urals. Yes, we didn’t have time to do a lot. But in what interesting way would Khrushchev be able to jump over his head in industrial mobilization? He does not name any specific mistakes of Stalin in preparing the production base for war. “They didn’t have enough tanks and artillery”... Okay. But how could it be possible to produce more under those conditions without losing quality? He doesn't offer anything specific. Were there real opportunities to provide the army with “magnificent examples of tanks and artillery” in full and earlier than “on the very eve of the war”? It seems that Khrushchev either has no idea how difficult it was to reduce these deadlines and rearm the army, or he knows, but is deliberately lying. The fact that already when he was the head of the Soviet state the nickname of a voluntarist stuck to him speaks, rather, of the first. In economic matters he was an outright layman. If Khrushchev had been in power in those years, instead of Stalin, they would have had “expanded production” of low-quality tanks. How he solved the issues of “expanded production” can be seen, for example, by the way he “solved the housing problem”, when in a relatively short time they produced a lot of square meters of low-quality housing with a short service life.

By the way, how did Khrushchev himself “prepare for war” and how did he behave in his responsible post as first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine? In his report he complains:

“By the time of the war, we did not even have a sufficient number of rifles to arm the people conscripted into the active army. I remember how in those days I called comrade from Kyiv. Malenkov and told him:

The people joined the army and demanded weapons. Send us weapons.

To this Malenkov answered me:

We cannot send weapons. We’ll transfer all the rifles to Leningrad, and you arm yourself.”

In fact, here Khrushchev discredits himself as a top-level leader. After all, it is his direct responsibility to be aware of whether there are enough or not enough rifles. He states that Stalin poorly prepared the country for war. Okay, let's assume. But Khrushchev, in his post, had every opportunity to prepare better, at least within the framework of the Ukrainian SSR. Why doesn’t he quote his letters from the pre-war period, in which he reported on unpreparedness, shortage of rifles, etc.? Yes, because there were no such letters. Grover Furr quotes Vasilevsky, who presents this point quite differently:

“...The Supreme Commander-in-Chief said that he would take all measures to provide assistance to the Southwestern Front, but at the same time asked them to rely more on themselves in this matter.

It would be unreasonable to think, he said, that everything will be served to you ready-made from the outside. Learn to supply and replenish yourself. Create spare parts for the armies, adapt some factories for the production of rifles and machine guns, move around as you should, and you will see that you can create a lot for the front in Ukraine itself. This is what Leningrad is doing at the present time, using its machine-building bases, and it is succeeding in many ways and is already having great success. Ukraine could do the same. Leningrad has already managed to establish the production of eres. This is a very effective mortar-type weapon that literally crushes the enemy. Why don't you do this too?

Kirponos and Khrushchev reported:

Comrade Stalin, all your instructions will be carried out by us. Unfortunately, we are not familiar with the structure of eres. We ask for your order to send us one sample of eres with drawings, and we will organize production at our place.

The answer followed:

Your people have the drawings, and the samples have been available for a long time. But your inattention to this serious matter is to blame. Okay, I will send you a battery of eres, drawings and production instructors... All the best, I wish you success.”

Issues of preparatory measures in the pre-war period and the organization of defense in the initial period of the war were within the competence of Khrushchev, that is, he had the necessary powers to resolve these issues.

In general, the favorite polemical technique of modern anti-communists is to criticize the measures of the Soviet government, armed with “after-knowledge”. But, in fact, there was no knowledge that German troops would attack on June 22 even on June 21. There was an understanding that war was inevitable, and there were numerous and contradictory intelligence reports about the date of the attack. As, however, there was the same intelligence data in favor of the fact that the concentration of troops on the border of the USSR was a bluff before landing in Great Britain. The study of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. However, scientific works on this issue publicly available.

Khrushchev in his report only meanly, like a cheater, manipulates the facts. From a long list of intelligence reports, he selects those that contained information about the attack on June 22, and brandishes them, accusing Stalin in the spirit of “they told him, but he didn’t believe him.”

But Khrushchev does not stop there. He goes out of his way to “prove” that Stalin had no merit in the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief. The “arguments” he uses for this are again openly false. Here's an example:

“It would be wrong not to say that after the first severe setbacks and defeats at the front, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of his conversations these days, he stated:

What Lenin created, we have lost all of it irrevocably.

After this, for a long time he did not actually direct military operations and did not get down to business at all, and returned to leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that such and such measures must be immediately taken in order to improve the situation at the front "

He lies, as they say, “like Trotsky.” And he lies deliberately. As the head of state, he had the opportunity to access the archive to familiarize himself with the notebook of the persons received by Stalin and see what the flow of visitors was like these days. Now this notebook is in open access.

And here is another “argument”, once again testifying to Khrushchev’s scientific and theoretical illiteracy:

“Stalin was very far from understanding the real situation that was developing at the fronts. And this is natural, since during the entire Patriotic War he was not on a single sector of the front, in any of the liberated cities, except for the lightning-fast departure to the Mozhaisk highway when the front was in a stable state.”

Obvious nonsense. That is, according to his logic, it turns out that in order to understand the situation at the fronts, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief needs to “visit the front sector,” so to speak, to see and “touch” everything with his own eyes. Khrushchev apparently does not recognize other ways of understanding. Just like a real positivist. Why doesn’t he remember Lenin here? After all, for many years he successfully led the party from exile, and during the Civil War he was also not on any sector of the front. And, on the contrary, Khrushchev’s practice of “traveling from place to place” during his time as General Secretary did not lead to anything good. An administrative system in which nothing is decided without the direct participation of the first person is rotten, as they say, by definition.

As “proof” of Stalin’s “mediocrity” as a military leader, Khrushchev cites the “Kharkov Operation” of 1942 as an example.

“When in 1942 extremely difficult conditions developed for our troops in the Kharkov region, we made the right decision to stop the operation to encircle Kharkov...

What came of it? But it turned out the worst of what we expected. The Germans managed to encircle our military groups, as a result of which we lost hundreds of thousands of our troops. Here’s Stalin’s military “genius”, here’s what he cost us.”

Exactly the same lie as all other “arguments”. Firstly, there is again no evidence of Stalin’s guilt. Khrushchev asks Bagramyan, the same one who was the chief of staff of the Southwestern Front, which conducted an unsuccessful campaign, to confirm his words. It is noteworthy that Stalin laid the blame for the failure of the operation on him, Timoshenko and Khrushchev in a directive note dated June 26 1942. This is quite logical, since it was not Stalin who developed the operation plan. This was done by the leadership of the front, that is, Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagramyan. Consequently, they should bear direct responsibility for the failure. Modern studies of the Kharkov operation also confirm the correctness of Stalin’s conclusions. The operation was not initially a failure or poorly planned. On the contrary, at a certain moment it was very close to success, and it was precisely the wrong actions of the front line that led to defeat. command.

With this, it seems to me, we can finish quoting Khrushchev’s report. Its deceitful essence is quite obvious, proven and, in general, not disputed even by the majority of bourgeois researchers. All Khrushchev's accusations against Stalin are unfounded. The author of the report, when analyzing the Stalinist period, completely ignored the Marxist dialectical method; the “facts” were taken out of the historical context of the most acute phase of the class struggle or were simply distorted.

It is only necessary to once again emphasize the negative role that this report played in the cause of communist construction. Here the anti-communist gentlemen are right. The damage was enormous.

Firstly, the world communist movement was faced with a serious challenge, which consisted in the fact that it became obvious: at the head of the Communist Party, which organized and directed the world communist movement, there was an absolutely illiterate figure in scientific and theoretical terms, capable of lying to the whole world, throwing mud at one of the most authoritative Marxists who successfully led communist construction in the USSR. Moreover, he found himself in power completely in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism. Unfortunately, the world communist movement was unable to discern the deadly power of this principle for communism. He contributed to the gradual victory of the opportunists in other countries of the socialist camp.

Secondly, Khrushchev rendered a huge service to the class enemy. The bourgeois press of all countries happily circulated a speech in which the “communist” Khrushchev tried to discredit Stalin with lies. The bourgeoisie benefited from the fact that this criticism came from the first person of the USSR, and the fact that this first person was lying. Both worked against communism. Inside the USSR, class enemies saw the Khrushchev report as a signal to action. They say that now you can not only criticize Stalin, but do it in the style of Khrushchev, that is, lie, ignore objective conditions, appeal to emotions about thousands of supposedly “innocently killed.” And at the same time, but still carefully, kick communism as such.

Finally, thirdly, neither the CPSU nor the world communist movement, unfortunately, found the strength to decisively defeat Khrushchev’s opportunism. And this testified to the scientific and theoretical weakness of the communist movement. Which, of course, could not but please the bourgeoisie.

If communism, in its most global sense, is science, then opportunism is stupidity. Khrushchev's report marked the tactical victory of stupidity over science, which had the saddest impact on the fate of the first attempt to build communism in the history of mankind.

To be continued…

January-February 2016